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ABSTRACT
Modern education reform in the U.S. was trending toward privatization and
centralization of public education as part of a search for a policy solution that would
significantly improve student achievement. This study examined MAST (Merit
Accountability System for Teachers) from its inception in 2005 through 2011, the related
policy rhetoric, its impact on student achievement, and its implementation in local school
districts using ideal typology and grounded theory analysis. The five major findings of
the study were: (a) the financial starvation of local school districts fostered a greater
willingness to try new initiatives if there was money attached to them; (b) MAST failed
as a pre-fabricated solution to improve student achievement by altering teacher
compensation, but did prove to be a promising professional development model; (c)
CSDE attempted to manipulate the MAST legislation to promote the Governor’s agenda
regarding teacher compensation; (d) the rhetoric used by CSDE regarding MAST shifted
over time; and (e) local district leadership was important to effective MAST
implementation.
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INTRODUCTION
This study explored how one state implemented the national education policy
movement toward private governance of education through its attempt to transform
teacher compensation. I studied the rhetoric related to Central State’s Merit
Accountability System for Teachers (MAST) Policy and its implementation in local
school districts. This study follows the path of this performance-based pay initiative for
teachers from its initial legislation in 2005 to the program as implemented by public
school districts in Central State through 2011.
When I began this study, I was uncertain about the feasibility of MAST, but the
concept of compensation based on performance resonated with my experience with
compensation methods in the business sector. I worked in the private sector for 10 years
in a marketing and middle management capacity. Performance-based compensation
seemed to be an effective tool for retaining quality employees and encouraging weaker
ones to voluntarily seek employment elsewhere. As a teacher, in addition to many other
hard-working and effective teachers, I saw some teachers working their contractual duty
day, taking no work home. I saw those same teachers knitting and passing notes in
faculty meetings. I did not understand how they could behave that way and keep their
jobs, other than that they must have performed differently until they achieved tenure.
Intellectually, I understood the reason for tenure—the protection of academic
freedom and the protection from dismissal solely because a teacher had climbed too high
on the compensation schedule and could be replaced by a newer, cheaper teacher.
However, I have seen too many district administrators keep poor-performing, tenured
teachers because the process to remove a tenured teacher was time consuming and costly,
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and at the end of the process, the district may have been forced to keep the teacher
anyway. I have also seen too many new, talented teachers forced out of their job because
of seniority rules, while poor-performing, veteran teachers comfortably keep theirs.
When I taught, I thought I did a good job and welcomed the idea of being paid
based on my performance. I never joined the teachers’ union and resented the “fair share”
portion of union dues being taken out of every paycheck. I would have been happy to
negotiate my own compensation and from time to time saw union rules and politics get in
the way of educating students. There was definitely a time in my work as an educator
when I would have fully supported a de-unionized, non-tenured faculty that was
compensated based on their performance as educators. However, as I have learned more
about public education practices in Central State and merit-based compensation plans
both in my work as an educator and through the research conducted for this study, I
increasingly had more doubts about the effectiveness of performance-based
compensation as an effective tool to increase student achievement in the public school
setting.
I believed that the drive to align teacher compensation practices with those of the
business sector was part of a larger push to open the public education market sector to
private enterprise. At the time of this research, public education was a $712 billion
industry and was a largely untapped market. However, that was changing. The marketing
materials I used to receive at school were occasional mailings from textbook companies
and professional organizations. By the time this study occurred, I received multiple emails, phone calls, catalogs, and brochures promoting the latest product or program to
increase student achievement and raise test scores on a daily basis. These materials
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sounded a lot like ads for weight loss products—“with just six weeks of using this
product in your classroom, all of your students will be achieving at or above grade level.”
These new companies capitalized on educators’ fears of students not achieving adequate
yearly progress like the diet pill pushers capitalized on our fears of being overweight.
Weight loss industry products have about a one percent success rate, and from what I had
seen, the student achievement gimmicks worked about as well, but desperate educators,
like desperate dieters, were willing to try just about anything for success.
These new education product and consulting companies and their programs were
not regulated or tested. There was no endorsement of efficacy other than from the
companies themselves. I believed the greater motivator for these companies was profit.
While working at a large medical device company, I learned the profit lesson first-hand.
The company’s rhetoric was all about developing products to improve patients’ quality of
life, and employees heard this on a daily basis. It was also a part of the company’s
mission statement. Through researching potential new markets for the company, I
discovered a disease that could be palliated by one of our existing products, resulting in
improved quality of life. The incidence rate (the number of people who would contract
the disease each year) for this disease was about 13,000 patients per year in the U.S.
When I presented this potential new market to upper management, I was told that because
the incidence rate was so low, there was not enough money in it to pursue getting FDA
approval and marketing the device for this purpose. I was young, naïve, and had to ask
about the mission statement and how the company could turn its back on 13,000 people a
year that could be helped by a product we already had. I was told that the company’s first
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loyalty was to the shareholders and that it only cared about improving a patient’s quality
of life if there was a big enough market to turn a sizeable profit for investors.
Over the years that I worked in a corporate setting, I experienced many things that
would not be palatable in educating students. These things included giving physicians
more company stock to encourage them to provide favorable research results and not to
publish unfavorable results and not pursuing cures for diseases that not enough of the
“right people” had, and making the “right donations” to open market doors. I believed
that these types of practices, if implemented in the education sector, would have a
negative effect on student achievement, especially for those students who need more
support in order to learn.
It was also essential to note that private sector companies were continuously
searching for easy-entry, untapped markets. That was exactly the kind of market they
hoped education would be, and many private sector companies were lobbying hard and
making the right donations to open the education market for their wares. However, based
on my experience in the private industry sector and the research gathered for this study, I
believed that increased student achievement was likely secondary to the profits gained
from being able to access this previously untapped market. It was difficult for me to
otherwise explain why companies would invest so much time and money to open the
market when there were so many decades of failed education policies that promised to
significantly improve student achievement. Additionally, research data that showed that
any educational program or methodology significantly increased student achievement did
not exist. In fact, there was data that showed that the most significant factor in
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determining student achievement was the mother’s socio-economic status and that
schools had very little ability to overcome that influence in any significant way.
Although it seemed like a relatively new phenomenon, performance-based pay for
teachers was in existence since at least the mid 1800s and performance-based plans have
come and gone ever since. In 1862 England established the "Payment by Results" teacher
compensation system (Nelson, 2001). Payment by results was abolished in1897, but as
“Payment by Results” was dying in England, performance-based pay for teachers was
gaining popularity in the United States (Nelson, 2001). By 1918 almost half of the school
districts in the U.S. were using a performance-based pay system for teachers, but within
10 years 30% of those districts had abandoned their performance-based compensation
systems (Harris, 2007). Interest in merit pay in the U.S. increased after the 1957 launch
of the Russian satellite, Sputnik, and again in the 1980s after “A Nation at Risk,” a report
that was highly critical of public education, was published (Harris, 2007).
I studied MAST in order to determine what, if any, relationship existed between
MAST, de-unionization of public workers, and the increased number of private sector
organizations providing educational services. I analyzed communication disseminated
through formal communication channels by federal, state, and local policy makers and
conducted interviews of teachers, administrators, school officials, and school board
members in Central State. Despite the early rhetoric of MAST being a significant tool to
reform teacher compensation and increase student achievement, it seemed to have
accomplished little in terms of teacher compensation reform; however, it did appear to
serve as a promising model for effective professional development for educators.
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At the time of this research, most school districts in Central State were struggling
financially to maintain the kind of educational programs that would result in a high
quality educational experience for students. Because of the financial pressures, teachers’
take home salaries have been relatively flat with any compensation increases going to pay
skyrocketing health care insurance premiums. As a result, I was somewhat surprised that
more districts did not implement MAST. I believed this was due to the early MAST
rhetoric that really pushed the “pay-for-performance” aspect of MAST and the Central
State Department of Education’s insistence that the traditional steps and lanes salary
schedule be completely eliminated. Those were two huge culture changes for unions to
accept.
The most important things I learned from conducting this research were: (a) how
the political process really worked in Central State, (b) how political appointees served to
advance political agendas, (c) how political rhetoric influenced the perception of
programs and (d) how school district leadership impacted the implementation of
programs locally. Each of these things helped to shape my view of public policy
implementation and leadership in Central State.
The first thing I learned was how the political process really worked in Central
State. At first when I was watching legislative sessions, I was appalled that legislators
were debating components of MAST and neither side had the facts correct. As I spent
more time at the State Capitol, I began to understand how that happened and that it
happened frequently. Legislators had mountains of reading to do regarding the many bills
that were brought before them. Additionally, Legislators not only had to read and analyze
the bills themselves but also the background information related to the bills on a variety
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of subjects, most of which were unfamiliar to law makers. Legislators had research
assistants to help, but the amount of information to be processed was overwhelming at
times.
On top of the voluminous reading required, as bills went through the House and
Senate, compromises were made and the bills were changed. This happened to MAST.
As MAST legislation travelled through the legislative bodies, many compromises were
made that softened the bill’s original pay-for-performance stance. If legislators did not
keep up with their reading and did not remember what they read, they were not prepared
to accurately debate legislation on the floors of their respective houses. This taught me to
follow the pieces of legislation that are important to me throughout the legislative process
and to make sure that my representatives were as knowledgeable about them as possible,
but also educated me on the political nature of the process and that this lobbying would
likely have a minimal impact. In general, I was appalled that conditions existed that
enabled laws to be made this way.
The second thing I learned was that political appointees could hold significant
power to shape the implementation of laws passed by the Legislature. The final language
of the MAST bill was vague enough so that parts of the bill could be interpreted much the
same as the bill was initially introduced. One specific example of this that was important
in this research was the definition of “reform” as it applied to the traditional step and lane
compensation used by the majority of teachers’ unions and school districts throughout
Central State. The Central State Commissioner of Education, Lydia Mahoney, was
appointed by the Governor and led the Central State Department of Education (CSDE).
CSDE’s definition of “reform” was that the traditional step and lane compensation had to

Pay-for-Performance Page 17 of 299
be eliminated and replaced with a different compensation model. However, many local
school districts defined “reform” as that the traditional step and lane compensation had to
be changed, but could still exist in some form. Since CSDE approved MAST
applications, in most cases, CSDE’s definition of reform prevailed. Options for appealing
CSDE’s decisions on local school districts’ application were limited, and included suing
CSDE. This was a time consuming and expensive option for financially strapped school
districts, so largely CSDE had the power to prevail over local school districts.
The third thing I learned was that the rhetoric used to promote an initiative could
have a significant impact on its implementation. The hard-charging “pay-forperformance” rhetoric of the Governor and CSDE cast the teachers’ unions as the villains
and the cause of inadequate student achievement in Central State. This was generally
well-received by the public who largely worked in the business sector, but not by
teachers. Since teachers’ unions had the power to vote for or against MAST participation
locally, the rhetoric needed to resonate with them as well. The Governor’s and CSDE’s
inability to court the teachers’ unions led to limited local school district participation in
MAST.
Eventually, CSDE and, to a lesser extent, the Governor changed the focus of their
rhetoric from the pay-for-performance to the professional development aspects of MAST.
However, this realization came too late. The teachers’ unions were already cast as the
villains and were generally reluctant to participate in a program that was designed to
weaken them.
The fourth thing I learned was that local leaders really did have the ability to
positively influence program implementation at the local level, provided that they

Pay-for-Performance Page 18 of 299
understood the political nature and rhetoric of the program they hoped to implement.
Leaders of local school districts who were able to see MAST from the point of view of
the teachers’ union and “translate” the pay-for-performance rhetoric of CSDE and the
Governor into the rewarding teachers and professional development rhetoric that was
accepted by teachers’ unions were more likely to have successful MAST programs in
their school districts.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE HISTORY OF U.S. TEACHER COMPENSATION MODELS

In order to understand the current rhetoric regarding what I call “MAST” in this
research and how it fits within the broader scope of education reform, we must first
understand the history of teacher compensation and relevant education reforms that have
set the stage for this most current debate on teacher compensation and student
achievement.

Compensation Level
In colonial America, compensation and social status for teachers was structured
with college teachers receiving the highest pay and status, secondary teachers receiving
the middle pay and status, and elementary teachers receiving the lowest pay and status
(Butts & Cremin, 1953). Teacher salaries needed to be supplemented so that teachers
could survive, and many teachers gained additional income from farming, shepherding,
tavern keeping, and skilled trades (Butts & Cremin, 1953). As a result, teaching was
viewed as something to do until a teacher could find a better job (Butts & Cremin, 1953).
In the 1800s a connection was made between low teacher salaries and the
competency level of teachers (Butts & Cremin, 1953). Similarly to today’s rhetoric, calls
for increasing teacher salaries to attract more competent individuals to the profession
were made repeatedly, but salaries remained low until the 1920s (Butts & Cremin, 1953).
Teacher salaries peaked around 1930, declined to their lowest level by 1935, and nearly
regained their 1930 level by 1940 (Butts & Cremin, 1953). In 1951-1952 average teacher
salaries reached an all-time high of $3,300 per year (adjusted for inflation) (Butts &
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Cremin, 1953). Teacher salaries increased an average of 84% between 1925 and 1949,
but the earnings of production workers in industry rose 125%, and increases in dollar
salaries for teachers were virtually wiped out by the rise in the cost of living and tax
increases (Butts & Cremin, 1953).
In the early 1980s, the Carnegie Forum recommended that teachers be paid higher
salaries in general to attract more competent teachers and that teacher compensation be
linked to performance and National Board certification and that teachers should have
more responsibilities (Chubb & Moe, 1986, June 24). At the time of this research, there
was still an abundance of rhetoric surrounding the idea of paying teachers more if they
taught in troubled schools or in areas where teacher shortages existed. To implement this
type of compensation model would have necessitated a change in the traditional step and
lane method of teacher compensation that had all teachers earning the same amount of
money based on education level and years of experience regardless of which subject the
teacher taught or which school within a district a teacher worked.
However, at the time of this research, in terms of general compensation levels, the
debate continued about whether or not teachers were paid fairly relative to other
professions. Recent data regarding the equity of teacher compensation was mixed.
According to the Census Bureau (2004) and National Education Association (NEA), in
2002 salaries for lawyers were $77,100, $72,400 for engineers, $52,300 for accountants,
and $41,800 for teachers (Cameron, 2005). In some states the beginning salary for
teachers was only $23,000 (Cameron, 2005). The poverty threshold for a two-person
household in 2002 was $12,047 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). However, data from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics found that the average public school teacher was paid
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36% more than the average white-collar worker in 2005 (Honawar, 2007, April 18).
Teacher union leaders strongly opposed this data because it did not take into account the
extra hours a teacher worked outside of the school day (Honawar, 2007, April 18).
However, based on my experience, the same argument could have been made for salaried
workers. In the companies I worked for, employees’ salaries were based on a 40-hour
work week with no extra compensation for additional time spent working. However,
employees were responsible for performing all duties for which they were responsible.
This often took more than the 40 hours for which the employees were compensated.
Despite the rhetoric that MAST would modernize teacher salaries and increase teacher
performance, this brief history shows that the educational debate regarding teacher
compensation and competency had changed little in 200 years.

Uniform Salary Schedule
One of the methods of teacher compensation was the uniform salary schedule.
The uniform salary schedule was a compensation system that compensated teachers
based on their education level and years of service. It was developed in the early 1920s
and gained widespread appeal in the 1950s as a way of creating equity in compensation
rates between largely female elementary teachers and largely male high school teachers
and was currently used by nearly all school districts in the U.S. (Koppich, 2005). Teacher
performance was not a factor in determining teacher compensation in traditional uniform
salary schedule plans.
There were a number of advantages to using a uniform salary schedule.
Advantages included: (a) freedom for teachers to teach how and what they wanted within
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district guidelines, (b) provided a predictable budget for school districts, (c) promoted
positive relationships among teachers, (d) promoted the perception of objectivity, and (e)
required minimal administrative costs (Harris, 2007). With a uniform salary schedule
teachers could experiment and learn new, ultimately more effective, techniques without
worrying about a temporary dip in student achievement (Harris, 2007). In districts where
there were significant social needs or a transient population, a willingness for teachers to
learn new techniques to reach these students was extremely important (Harris, 2007). A
uniform salary schedule allowed school districts to accurately budget personnel costs.
District administrators could easily look at the previous year’s compensation levels, add
the appropriate dollars for step and lane changes, and make basic assumptions regarding
retirees and new hires to determine a reasonably accurate estimate of projected
compensation costs. Since there was no ranking of teacher performance on a uniform
salary schedule, teachers had no incentive to undermine the performance of others and
were more likely to help each other succeed (Harris, 2007). Teachers also believed that
the uniform salary schedule was objective and minimized favoritism (Viadero, 2007).
Because there were minimal costs associated with implementing a uniform salary
schedule, this compensation method also saved districts money (Harris, 2007).
However, critics of uniform salary schedules have noted potential disadvantages.
These included: (a) discouraging good teachers, (b) negatively impacting teacher
recruitment and retention (especially in poor districts), (c) failing to provide incentives
for teachers to work to their potential, and (d) providing inappropriate rewards (Ritter &
Lucas, 2005). Good teachers could become discouraged because their hard work went
unrewarded financially. Teachers who worked extra hours improving their skill and
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instruction were paid at the same rate as those who put forth a minimal effort, so there
was little to no financial incentive to learn and implement new best-practice strategies
(Hershberg & Lea-Kruger, 2007). Performance was not rewarded in a uniform salary
schedule, and as a result, performance-driven candidates who would be excellent teachers
may have been discouraged from entering into the profession (Vigdor, 2008). Instead, the
uniform salary schedule may have actually dissuaded many potential teachers due to
teachers’ low starting salaries (Vigdor, 2008). Because pay was not linked to
performance in the uniform salary schedule model, there was no financial incentive for
teachers to work hard or implement best-practice strategies (Vigdor, 2008), thus
eliminating a potentially effective method of teacher motivation.
The uniform salary schedule rewarded teachers for longevity in their teaching
career and attainment of advanced education; however, these were not necessarily
characteristics of high-performing teachers (Vigdor, 2008). There was evidence that
experience positively impacted teaching during the first few years, but had little impact
thereafter (Vigdor, 2008). Likewise, advanced degrees have been shown to have little
impact on teacher effectiveness in the classroom (Vigdor, 2008).

History of Merit-based Models
A second teacher compensation method was pay-for-performance or merit-based
models. Although merit-based models were often touted as innovative and modern, payfor-performance teacher compensation models were found as early as 1862 when, in
England, the Payment by Results teacher compensation model was established (Nelson,
2001). Payment by Results compensated teachers based on student attendance and exam
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scores (Nelson, 2001). Payment by Results lasted for 35 years but ended when school
inspectors who initiated the program retired and criticized it, and teachers unionized and
gained power over their working environment (Nelson, 2001).
Similar to criticisms of modern merit-based compensation models, criticisms of
Payment by Results included skepticism that a test could accurately measure everything
that was important about education, inability to account for normal fluctuations in student
population outside of a teacher’s control, incentives for teachers to cheat and/or focus
only on the tested material, inconsistency of the test and testing environment, and
incentives for teachers to move to wealthier schools where there were fewer perceived
social problems that would negatively impact test scores and attendance (Nelson, 2001).
Over time, there was more evidence gathered that indicated that Payment by Results
encouraged negative teacher behaviors that did not promote quality teaching rather than
its intended result of encouraging teachers to perform at higher levels (Nelson, 2001). As
a result, teacher autonomy became the newly recommended standard in England after
Payment by Results ended (Nelson, 2001).
As Payment by Results was failing in England, interest in merit-based models
grew in the U.S. By 1918 almost half of the school districts in the U.S. were using a
merit-based teacher compensation model (Gratz, 2005). These models were generally
short-lived. For example, in 1917, when the St. Paul, MN School District attempted to
introduce merit pay, it created extreme tension between teachers, their unions,
administrators, and civic associations (Harris, 2007). The District was polarized on the
issue of merit pay for teachers, and after 14 teachers and principals were fired for voicing
opposition to the plan, the pro-merit pay superintendent resigned to accept a higher
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paying position in another school district, and the merit pay plan was abandoned (Harris,
2007). Finding that merit pay plans did more harm than good regarding teacher morale
and raising similar concerns to the Payment by Results program, the number of school
districts using a merit pay plan in the U.S. dropped to fewer than 18% by 1928 and
further decreased to 4% by the early 1950s (Gratz, 2005).
Then, in 1957, Sputnik's launch renewed concerns about public education and
raised interest in merit-based compensation programs. In 1957 approximately 10% of
U.S. school districts adopted merit-based compensation plans for teachers (Gratz, 2005).
However, only 4% of school districts had a merit-based teacher compensation plan in
place in 1969 (Gratz, 2005).
In 1978, an Education Research Service survey found that 183 school districts had
implemented merit-based compensation plans for an average of six years, and one third
of the plans survived two years or less (Harris, 2007). The most common reasons districts
cited for discontinuing their merit-based compensation programs included difficulty
conducting evaluations, administrative issues, teacher resistance, lack of funding, and
inadequate measurement tools (Harris, 2007).
After “A Nation at Risk” was published in 1983 interest in merit-based
compensation plans rose again (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). By 1985, 25 states had
mandated merit-based compensation programs for teachers (Harris, 2007). One of these
was Houston's Second Mile Plan. Under this plan teachers were given financial
incentives for low absenteeism, high student test scores, and teaching in geographic and
subject shortage areas (Harris, 2007). Evaluators found conflicting results about the
success of this program, and by the early 1990s Houston's program and many others
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ended (Harris, 2007). When a survey similar to the Education Research Service survey
was administered in 1983 the reasons districts gave for discontinuing their merit-based
compensation plans were similar to those given in the Education Research Service survey
(Harris, 2007). A 1993 follow-up study found that 75% of the plans studied in 1983 were
discontinued (Viadero, 2007). This meant that the longevity of these plans was 10 years
or less. Like the debate about teacher compensation in general, the discussion regarding
merit pay had not changed much in 150 years.

Modern Teacher Compensation Models

Merit-based Models
At the time of this research, there were two main merit-based teacher
compensation models (Odden, 2009). The first was an outcome-based model that linked
teacher compensation to the students’ performance (Harris, 2007). The second was a
performance-based model that linked teacher compensation to the teacher's performance
(Harris, 2007).
Advantages of these merit-based teacher compensation models included providing
incentives for teachers to work hard, improving teacher recruitment and retention, and
gaining political support for education (Odden, 2009). The logic was that hard-working,
performance-driven teachers may be more attracted to the teaching profession if they
believed they would be rewarded for their hard work and strong performance (Odden,
2009). This was similar to the piece rate method of compensation used in manufacturing
where employees were paid based on the amount of goods they produced (Smith, 1982).
At the time of this research, there was strong political support for merit-based
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compensation models. Districts and states that implemented merit-based compensation
models found that legislators were more willing to approve funding increases for public
education if they felt those increases would reward high-performing teachers (Podgursky
& Springer, 2007).
Disadvantages of merit-based compensation models included a lack of long-term
commitment to funding and support, teachers' insensitivity to financial rewards, an
imperfect understanding of what merit-based compensation models were, and a lack of
support for improvement (Harris, 2007).
Since the inception of Payment by Results in 1862, many merit-based
compensation models have come and gone. Historically, the biggest problem with meritbased compensation models was that school districts could not or would not pay the merit
compensation to teachers as promised (Cameron, 2005). Most merit-based compensation
plans failed because of inadequate funding, and every time a merit-based compensation
plan failed, teacher morale decreased and union cynicism increased (Cameron, 2005).
School districts and state departments of education often found themselves unable to
honor commitments when the Legislature cut their budgets (Harris, 2007). For example,
California promised teachers performance bonuses in 1999 as part of its merit-based
compensation model, but the state found itself in a budget shortfall and never paid the
bonuses (Harris, 2007). Similarly, voters and school districts could freeze or rollback
property taxes, leaving district officials unable to honor the financial commitments of
their merit-based compensation plan (Harris, 2007). When districts were forced to cut
their budgets, merit-based compensation plans were often the first programs to be cut
(Olson, 2007, October 3).
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Support for merit-based compensation plans was dependent upon political and
district leaders’ views on teacher compensation. As elected officials and district leaders
came and went, so did support for merit-based compensation (Harris, 2007). At the time
of this research, the average tenure for school superintendents was seven and a half years,
while the election cycle for most elected officials ranged between four and six years
(Harris, 2007). These tenures were significantly shorter than a teaching career, and may
have impacted teachers' willingness to adopt new plans (Harris, 2007).
Merit-based compensation models were based on the assumption that teachers
would work harder and improve their performance for monetary rewards. However,
teachers tended to de-emphasize monetary rewards in favor of developing relationships
with people, thus making them somewhat less sensitive to monetary rewards than people
in other professions (Harris, 2007). Seventy-five percent of new teachers believed they
were seriously underpaid, making it unlikely that they became teachers for the money
(Harris, 2007). Additionally, normative pressure on new teachers may have further deemphasized the importance of monetary rewards in the teaching profession. Zhijuan,
Verstegen, and Kim (2008) found that monetary rewards were of even less importance to
teachers early and late in their careers.
For example, in a study of novice teachers, given the choice between working in a
district with higher pay or one with highly motivated and effective teachers, 75% of the
teachers studied chose the district with highly motivated and effective teachers (Harris,
2007). In a second study, when novice and veteran teachers were asked about a meritbased compensation plan, they responded that they were motivated by gains in student
achievement, positive recognition, and fear of sanctions, but that additional compensation
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was not particularly motivating (Harris, 2007). This may have been because the monetary
rewards in merit-based compensation plans tended to be small and may have been too
small to provide teachers the incentive to change their behavior or improve performance
(Harris, 2007).
However in a study of merit-based compensation plans in Kentucky, when given
the choice to designate rewards for student achievement to either compensate students or
teachers, 98% of teachers voted to designate the rewards for teacher compensation
(Harris, 2007). This data corresponded to a 2008 study by Zhijuan, et al.(2008) that found
teachers' job satisfaction was most strongly related to school climate, with teacher
compensation being the second most important factor.
Most merit-based compensation models were complex and implementation plans
varied from district to district, and teachers may not have understood what they needed to
do to receive the merit-based compensation (Harris, 2007). This confusion could have led
to undesired behaviors and teachers becoming frustrated with the plan and discontinuing
their support for it (Harris, 2007).
Some teachers may have worked harder and improved their teaching skills in a
merit-based compensation plan; however, others may have wanted to improve their
teaching but did not know how to do it (Harris, 2007). Merit-based compensation
assumed that teachers knew how to perform, but were choosing not to due to a lack of
motivation. Additionally, merit-based compensation models created incentives for
teachers to hide their weaknesses rather than share them and work to improve them
(Harris, 2007).
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Evidence relating merit-based teacher compensation to increased student
achievement was inconclusive. Some studies linked merit-based teacher compensation to
increased student achievement, but it was unknown whether school districts that choose
to implement merit-based compensation already had systems in place that promoted
student achievement, developed systems to improve student achievement concurrently
with the implementation of merit-based pay, or if the merit-based compensation was the
cause of increased student achievement (Harris, 2007). However, researchers like
Hanushek and Lindseth (2009) believed that none of the teacher compensation models
that had been tried led to significant gains in student achievement. Many researchers felt
that more data was needed. For example, according to Matthew Springer, Director of the
National Center on Performance Incentives at Vanderbilt University, "We don't know if
pay-for-performance is an effective policy. We don't know how it should be designed.
We know more research is needed. It is critical that a program of this magnitude is
rigorously and independently evaluated" (Honawar, 2007, October 24, p. 6).

Performance-based Models
Performance-based compensation models were a subset of merit-based models
that provided teachers financial incentives to improve their teaching in relation to specific
pedagogical methodology and content-based criteria (Harris, 2007). Advantages of this
model included being able to reward teachers without having to account for complicated
factors such as students’ backgrounds, providing teachers with concrete feedback on how
to improve their performance, and understanding the plans and what teachers had to do to
receive the additional compensation was relatively easy (Harris, 2007). However, most of
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the indicators of quality teaching were difficult to measure (Podgursky & Springer,
2007).
In large part, this difficulty was due to the fact that there was no single set of bestpractice teaching methods. In addition, administrator preference and skill may have
influenced assessments (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). For example, sometimes
administrators used low benchmarks to try to build a team or inflate teacher performance
scores in hopes that teachers would live up to them (Harris, 2007). Additionally,
administrators may have faced pressure to minimize the amount of money spent on
rewards, or to keep average ratings at or below a certain level due to budgetary
constraints (Harris, 2007).
Evaluators needed to be trained in identifying and measuring indicators of quality
teaching, and more frequent teacher observations were necessary (Podgursky & Springer,
2007). Additional time had to be spent observing and documenting compensation
decisions (Rothstein, 2005). These factors made performance-based models more
expensive to administer.
In addition, it was possible for teachers to abuse performance-based compensation
models by focusing their efforts only on those items that were measured and ignoring
items that were equally as important, but not measured (Harris, 2007). This behavior was
observed in studies of NFL quarterbacks and computer programmers receiving
performance-based compensation (Harris, 2007).
Thus, there were several unintended consequences of performance-based
compensation that would potentially arise. These models included incentives for
undesirable teacher behavior (Harris, 2007). Teachers may have attempted to influence
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higher-achieving students to join their classrooms and to encourage lower-achieving
students to transfer to a different teacher or school (Harris, 2007). Teachers who excelled
at working with challenging students may have been discouraged from doing so (Harris,
2007). Additionally, districts had a financial incentive to limit professional development
opportunities because having more effective teachers would place an increased financial
burden on school districts (Harris, 2007).

Outcome-based Models
Whereas merit- and performance-based compensation models were concerned
with teacher behavior, outcome-based compensation models were a type of merit-based
compensation model that focused on student achievement (Harris, 2007). Outcome-based
compensation was based on student achievement results measured by a set of
standardized criteria. This was typically measured by a standardized test that all students
in a particular grade level throughout a district or state took to measure their proficiency
on the tested material. Advantages of outcome-based compensation models were that (a)
they were purportedly objective, (b) teachers were free to use their own desired methods
to achieve results, and (c) teachers were encouraged to strengthen areas of weakness
(Harris, 2007).
Disadvantages of outcome-based compensation models include: (a) teachers being
unwilling to base their compensation on factors that were outside of their control, (b) the
plans were more complex, (c) they were expensive to administer, (d) they promoted a
short-term and one-dimensional vision of student achievement typically measured by
standardized tests, and (e) the ability to cheat on those tests (Harris, 2007). National
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teacher unions were opposed to merit-based teacher compensation, especially outcomebased models (Honawar, 2007, October 24). This opposition could make implementation
difficult.
In addition to the above disadvantages, student test scores were reflective of more
than teacher performance. Items such as parental support, socio-economic status,
language barriers, and disability affected students’ test scores but were outside of a
teacher’s control (Harris, 2007). Teachers were generally unwilling to support plans that
tied their compensation to factors outside of their control (Harris, 2007). Additionally,
this provided an unintended incentive for teachers to avoid working in schools where
students had many social problems or for teachers to encourage students with social
problems or low ability to transfer to other classrooms or schools (Harris, 2007).
Measuring student achievement through standardized testing was also problematic
due to the one-dimensional aspect of the tests. Standardized tests typically focused on
reading and math because districts were required to measure student achievement in these
areas as part of No Child Left Behind legislation. Not every teacher taught math or
reading. Some districts allowed groups of teachers, for example, all music teachers, to
develop a common standardized assessment that would be used district-wide; however,
that still did not address the factors mentioned above that were simply out of a teacher’s
control. Additionally, school social workers and counselors typically were part of the
teachers’ union and were compensated under the district’s and teachers’ union’s master
agreement. They did not teach content that could even be measured one-dimensionally
through a standardized test.
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To combat some of the problems with standardized testing as a measure of
student learning, school districts devised value-added compensation plans that tried to
measure the teachers’ contributions to student learning (Harris, 2007). These were also
referred to as “growth models.” Under this type of model, the student’s previous
standardized test score was recorded, then a standardized rate of growth was calculated
and added to the student’s previous test score to determine the student’s new “target”
score. Meeting the new target score would mean that the student learned an appropriate
amount of material as determined by the standardized test. One drawback of value-added
compensation plans was that they may have reinforced low student expectations because
student growth was based on past performance (Harris, 2007).
Value-added compensation plans were more complex than other outcome-based
pay systems and teachers were often unwilling to endorse plans they did not understand
(Harris, 2007). Both straightforward outcome based compensation models and valueadded compensation models assumed that a teacher’s impact on student learning was
easily measurable. This was often deliberated among educators. Moreover, in subject
areas where students were not tested in a standardized manner, this was exceedingly
difficult (Harris, 2007). Teachers in art, physical education, music, special education, and
other specialty areas such as counselors and social workers had concerns about how they
would be measured (Harris, 2007).
Determining a teacher’s impact on student learning could be difficult and required
a significant amount of observation and documentation of compensation decisions,
making outcome-based compensation models expensive to administer (Harris, 2007). The
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expense required for administering this type of model left school districts with less
money to pay teachers (Harris, 2007).
There were also a few negative unintended consequences of outcome-based
compensation. One unintended consequence of outcome-based compensation models was
that they provided teachers with incentives to take a short-term approach to student
achievement. Traditionally, students were often exposed to concepts numerous times in
increasing complexity several years before the concept was tested in a standardized
manner (Harris, 2007). In outcome-based models, teachers had an incentive to focus only
on material that was being tested in the current school year (Harris, 2007). Thus teachers
may not have introduced and taught students material that would be tested in future years
and that they needed to be successful in following years thus limiting students' long-term
academic achievement (Harris, 2007). Another unintended consequence of outcomebased compensation models was that they provided teachers incentives to cheat on tests
(Harris, 2007).
Outcome-based models were also a boon to private industry, creating a relatively
new and much expanded economic sector. Supplemental education service providers,
such as those that provided additional instruction and support for students who lacked
educational proficiency, benefitted from outcome-based compensation. This type of inperson, on-site support came with the highest cost of private providers of education
services. Online providers also provided additional instruction and support, but at a
reduced cost compared to in-person providers. Online providers tailored their support to
student needs based on student performance on online assessments administered by the
provider. Student lessons were then generated through a database of lessons and selected
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to provide more practice in areas where students scored poorly. In my experience, these
companies appeared to benefit from the fears of school personnel, students, and their
families that their students were in some way deficient and would be “left behind”
without some type of intervention beyond what the regular classroom could provide. In
my experience, there were also companies that appeared to benefit from teachers’ fears of
inadequate student test scores by promising to teach the teacher how to raise his/her
students’ test scores through teacher professional development.

Individual, Group, and Hybrid Merit-based Rewards
In addition to being performance- or outcome-based, merit-based compensation
models could be based on individual, group, or a combination of individual and group
rewards. The following paragraphs describe the similarities and differences of each of
these models.
Individual rewards encouraged high-performing teachers to remain in education
and lower performing teachers to leave the profession (Harris, 2007). However individual
rewards provided no incentives for teachers to help each other or perform non-measured
tasks, such as student supervision, that help a school run smoothly (Harris, 2007).
Additionally, determining which part of a student success an individual teacher was
responsible for was difficult to do simply and fairly (Harris, 2007).
Group rewards could be either outcome- or performance-based; however, they
tended to be outcome-based and generally focused on student achievement (Odden,
2000). Group rewards tended to be easier to measure and less costly to administer
(Harris, 2007). They also provided incentives for teachers to engage in tasks that helped

Pay-for-Performance Page 37 of 299
the school run smoothly (Harris, 2007). However group rewards did not ensure that all
teachers were working together to achieve school district goals. Some may not have
believed that their work was significant enough to impact the results of the school or
district as a whole (Odden, 2000). Friction could arise between teachers who were
working hard and those who received a "free ride" based on the work of others (Harris,
2007). Additionally teachers may have had incentives to avoid working at lowperforming schools (Harris, 2007). Teachers naturally had a preference toward schools
where there were high achieving students, and group incentives may have strengthened
this tendency (Harris, 2007). Group reward models did little to provide incentives to high
achieving teachers because the impact of their work was diluted, but low-quality teachers
had incentives to remain in the profession because high-quality teachers’ work helped
increase their compensation (Harris, 2007). Hybrid rewards combined some individual
rewards with some group rewards.

Piece-rate Rewards
Piece rate reward models compensated teachers for achieving a predetermined,
fixed goal or outcome (Harris, 2007). In this model, there was no incentive to undermine
the work of others to improve one's ranking because there was no limit to the number of
teachers who could receive the reward; however, this made budgeting difficult for school
districts (Harris, 2007). One study found that 17% of school districts eliminated their
piece-rate, merit-based compensation models because they were too expensive to
maintain (Harris, 2007). In this model teachers may have worked together to refuse to
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meet the standard in an attempt to try to lower the standard (Harris, 2007). This behavior
was a common problem in the factory setting (Harris, 2007).

Relative Ranking or Tournament Rewards
Relative ranking or tournament reward models established a percentage of
teachers who would receive rewards and teachers received those rewards based on their
relative ranking among other teachers in the district, thus making it easier for districts to
remain within their budget (Harris, 2007). In this model, teachers had the unintended
incentive to undermine the work of others to improve their ranking (Harris, 2007).
Relative rankings tended to attract people who were competitive and did not like to work
as a team (Harris, 2007).

Relevant Current Merit-based Compensation Models

Teacher Advancement Program
The Milken Family Foundation created and funded the Teacher Advancement
Program (TAP) founded in 1999 (Milken Family Foundation, 2008). This was a hybrid of
performance- and outcome-based models with individual piece-rate rewards. The TAP
program included additional income for teachers based on student achievement and
teacher performance (Honawar, 2006, November 1). TAP combined bonuses based on
classroom observation and student test score increases, provided leadership roles for
teachers, and professional development opportunities (Milken Family Foundation, 2008).
Under this program, effective, experienced teachers were assigned a role as master
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teachers who served as mentors to work with inexperienced teachers to help them work
on improving their teaching (Honawar, 2006, November 1).
TAP also provided financial incentives for teachers who taught math or science
(Honawar, 2006, November 1). Douglas County, Colorado has had a teacher pay-forperformance model since 1984 and was the first district to implement TAP (Dobbs,
2003). TAP was the merit-based compensation model that most closely resembled
MAST. In fact, MAST was developed based on TAP.

Teacher Incentive Fund
A signature program of the George W. Bush administration, the Federal
Department of Education created the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) to help schools that
served at least 30% poor and minority students to hire, develop, and retain effective
teachers and administrators (Keller, 2006, November 6; Viadero, 2007, March 21). The
federal government allocated up to $99 million in awards for 2006, and allocated 16
grants worth $42 million (Olson, 2007). Additional funds were awarded to districts that
could show that their teachers and communities supported their plans (Honawar, 2006,
November 1). Under TIF, school districts could develop their own merit-based pay
model, pending Federal Department of Education approval of their grant application.
More than 60 Grant applications were submitted, but most were rejected because they
"needed improvement" (Honawar, 2006, November 1). Whether or not the grantees
received their allotted funds depended upon the grantees’ performance and the federal
budget (Keller, 2006, November 6).
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The Columbus, Ohio School District received the first TIF award of $5.5 million,
with the state of Ohio to receive $20 million over five years (Honawar, 2006, November
1). The Columbus District planned to use the TIF award to expand its TAP program that
was already implemented in some of the schools in the District (Honawar, 2006,
November 1).
The future of TIF was in doubt in 2007 when Congress reduced funding its
funding from $99 million to $200,000 for FY 2007 (Olson, 2007). However, in 2007, no
TIF grants were awarded (U.S. Department of Education, 2012). TIF funding was reestablished in FY 2008, and in September 2009, a bill to include TIF in a revision of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was introduced in Congress
(Govtrack.us, 2012). The bill was referred to the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce where it died (Govtrack.us, 2012). Since then, TIF funding peaked at $400
million in FY 2010 and had declined to $299 million in FY 2012 (U.S. Department of
Education, 2012).

Merit Accountability System for Teachers (MAST)
The Merit Accountability System for Teachers (MAST) was a hybrid
performance- and outcome-based model like TAP with individual piece-rate rewards for
performance-based measures. However, MAST allowed individual school districts to
determine if the outcome-based rewards would be awarded by individual, group, or
hybrid. At the beginning of this research, three states had statewide merit-based teacher
compensation plans (Honawar, 2007, August 1). In 2005, Central State launched MAST,
the first statewide pay-for-performance model and the basis for this research. Central
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State's MAST plan was based on TAP (Honawar, 2007, January 17). Required
components of MAST included professional development, a teacher evaluation system
that included three annual observations, performance-based pay, an alternative salary
schedule to the traditional steps and lanes, teacher mentor programs to evaluate pedagogy
and best practices, and goals for improving student performance (Honawar, 2007,
January 17). District participation was voluntary but funds were allocated on a firstcome-first-served basis (Honawar, 2007, January 17). Specific implementation plans
were developed at the local school district level and were not able to financially penalize
teachers who failed to meet the new performance standards (Lopez, 2005, August 18).
MAST was a voluntary program that gave school districts financial incentives to
create and submit their own plan (Lopez, 2005; Mathur, 2005). Moving toward a freemarket model of education, MAST awarded teachers raises based on their performance
and student achievement instead of the length of their teaching career (Draper, 2005).
Teachers and local school districts were required to vote on whether or not to participate
in MAST each year that they participated in MAST. If the teachers and local school
district decided to participate in MAST, changes necessary to the master agreements
between districts and teachers’ unions were typically addressed through memoranda of
understanding. MAST provided up to an additional $260 per student that could be used
for teacher salaries, performance awards, staff development, and hiring master teachers
and specialists (Lopez, 2005, August 18). The Central State budget did not allocate
enough money to fund every district in the state, so it allocated the money on a firstcome, first-served basis (Mathur, 2005).
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This plan had the potential to create competition among teachers and districts for
limited dollars. However, while the state allocated $86 million in the first biennium of
implementation to fund districts’ participation in MAST, the Central State Department of
Education (CSDE) expected to spend only $51.4 million, because school districts were
slow to adopt the program (Honawar, 2007, January 17). A year and a half after MAST
was unveiled only 34 of Central State's 339 school districts were participating (Honawar,
2007, January 17). As of the time of this research, 44 of the state’s 338 school districts
had implemented MAST or were approved to implement it (CSDE, 2010). This amounted
to approximately 13% of the school districts in the state. However, since a few of the
largest school districts in the state participate in MAST, CSDE preferred to cite the
participation rates in terms of students impacted, which was just over 30% in 2010
(CSDE, 2010).
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CHAPTER TWO: RECENT POLICY AND RHETORIC ON PUBLIC EDUCATION
REFORM

Recent, Related Educational Reforms
Every president elected since 1983 has passed broad education plans including “A
Nation at Risk,” America 2000, Goals 2000, No Child Left Behind (NCLB), and most
recently, Race to the Top. These education programs have focused on short-term results
to satisfy policymakers and voters rather than the 15 to 20 years it would likely take to
achieve true and meaningful education reform (Seashore-Louis, 1988).

No Child Left Behind
The most significant catalyst in modern education reform occurred in 1983 during
the Reagan administration when the National Commission on Excellence in Education
released “A Nation at Risk,” a scathing report on public education that called for broad
and significant reform (Chubb & Moe, 1990; National Education, 1994). “A Nation at
Risk” had little hard data or analysis, but was successfully written for the public and
designed to create public opinion that would demand education reform (Viteritti, 2004).
Some of the reform initiatives that spawned from “A Nation at Risk” included school
choice, state and national standards and assessments, site-based management, and NCLB
(Viteritti, 2004). These reforms marked a critical period of questioning public sector
governance and increased regulation of public schools.
Through standardized testing, NCLB promoted a national curriculum (Apple,
1996). Apple (1996) believed that the creation of a national curriculum may be the first
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step in privatizing public education. A national curriculum along with standardized
testing would make it easier for parents to compare schools enabling them to be more
informed when making the decision of where to educate their children (Apple, 1996).
National standardized testing would also enable colleges and employers to more
effectively choose which students to enroll or hire (Apple, 1996).
More recently, in June 2007, Senators Norm Coleman (Republican, Minnesota),
Mary Landrieu (Democrat, Louisiana), and Joseph Lieberman (Independent,
Connecticut) proposed adding incentives for states to look at merit-based teacher
compensation programs to attract teachers to under-performing schools as part of the
reauthorization of the NCLB Act (Honawar, 2007, August 1). The Coleman-LandrieuLieberman Bill, the All Students Can Achieve Act of 2007, proposed to require states to
create data systems to track students’ academic progress and link student achievement
data to teachers, allowing states to measure teacher effectiveness (Honawar, 2007,
August 1). This bill would have also awarded grants for programs that changed teacher
compensation from a uniform salary schedule to a compensation model that could include
better pay for more effective teachers and incentives for the best teachers to teach in
high-need schools (Honawar, 2007, August 1). According to Senator Landrieu’s
spokeswoman, Stephanie Allen, "We are not trying to set up a merit pay system. We are
trying to give states an option" (Honawar, 2007, August 1, p. 20). However, the similarity
of components between the plan and similar merit-based compensation plans and the
political discourse surrounding the bill indicated otherwise. Ultimately, Congress
deferred action on reauthorization of the NCLB Act, which was scheduled to expire in
2014.
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Race to the Top
Race to the Top was a national program that was highly supported by President
Barack Obama. Race to the Top was the latest plan to promote performance-based pay
and centralized educational control (CSDE, 2009h). It was a federal program that was
initially awarded via competitive grant process to 13 out of the 48 states that applied for
the grant (NASSP, personal communication, December 7, 2009). Central State was
among the states that applied for the grant, but its application was not accepted for
funding in the initial round. According to correspondence sent from CSDE to Central
State school district administrators, Governor King planned to apply for the second round
of funding in the summer of 2010, but did not have the support of the Central State
Legislature to make the statutory changes necessary to fulfill the Federal requirements for
Race to the Top grant approval, and ultimately, Central State did not submit a second
application (Fox News, 2010).
Initially, Central State was optimistic about its chances to be a first round
recipient of Race to the Top funding. CSDE (2009h) believed it was doing many of the
things necessary to secure the grant and that the grant may have been an incentive for
statewide MAST implementation (CSDE, 2009h). Having a performance-based
compensation plan for teachers and principals was one of the requirements of Race to the
Top (CSDE, 2009h). However, at a regional informational meeting, school leaders were
not enthusiastic about the program that featured national standardized testing, state-wide
curriculum development, a state-wide teacher and principal evaluation system, stateinvolved student data analysis, and performance-based pay for teachers (CSDE, 2009h).
Despite these objections, the majority of these school leaders indicated that they would
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pursue locally implementing the Race to the Top Program in order to receive the funding
because if Central State was awarded Federal Race to the Top Grant funding, Central
State planned to require all districts statewide to implement many of the components.
However, only districts that signed on in support of Central State’s grant application
would receive any funding to implement these components (CSDE, 2009h). Districts
receiving Race to the Top funding would also be required to implement additional
programs, with the main one being MAST (CSDE, 2009h).

Familiar Rhetoric

Desegregation
Although desegregation was not directly related to MAST in terms of policy, it
was directly related to MAST in terms of policy rhetoric. In 1973, Central State had a
statewide policy for implementing desegregation in public schools that was based on a
quota system to achieve racial balance (Lavorato, 2007). In the mid 1990s, the policy was
revised due to changing demographics, changing case law, legislative mandate, and the
effects of the former desegregation policy on students (Lavorato, 2007). The rhetoric
regarding desegregation was that it was going to close the achievement gap between
White and minority students; however, the program failed at closing that gap, and the
achievement gap still existed at the time of this research.
To conclude that any and all types of racial imbalance caused harm and must be
remedied through racial quotas was premised on erroneous legal and sociological
theories. Moreover, this interpretation has lead to negative educational
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consequences. As a result of dramatic changes in demographics, the current rule’s
emphasis on a particular degree of racial balance has resulted in the loss of
flexibility for districts struggling to maintain a certain racial balance that is not
required by the Constitution and that is questionable as an educational goal. It has
meant that students of color have been turned away from enhanced magnet
programs specifically designed to serve them. It has also lead to considerably less
student and parental choice for the students who most need assistance (Lavorato,
2007).

Despite the implementation of policies aimed to lessen the racial achievement gap
for more than 35 years, the gap still existed at the time of this research. In Central State,
according to statewide Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) data, in 2011, 62.7% of White
students scored as proficient in math compared to only 28.5% of Black students (CSDE,
2012b). In reading, 80.3% of White students scored as proficient compared to only 52.1%
of Black students in 2011 (CSDE, 2012b). Additionally, according to Ikpa (2003), it was
found that 8% of White 17 year-old students can read and interpret technical data
compared to 1% of Black students. Additionally only 30% of Black students could solve
fractional computations versus 70% of White students (Ipka, 2003). In short, Ipka (2003)
found an achievement gap so large that, by the time they completed high school, Black
students had comparable skills in reading and math to those of eighth grade White
students, and that White students were twice as likely to complete a bachelor’s degree
than Black students. Clearly, the policies implemented to close the racial achievement
gap were not effective.
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Although many schools may have been more racially balanced at the time of this
research than before defacto segregation, the promised parity in educational achievement
has not been realized and the debate has shifted from establishing a racial balance in
schools to increasing standards and expectations for minority students. Guthrie and
Springer (2004) proposed that the focus on closing the achievement gap between races
should shift away from mandated busing and focus instead on increasing standards and
achievement expectations and developing an effective method of accountability for
schools and students, as well as increasing educational funding. Other studies (Klein,
2002) also promoted smaller class sizes as a way of closing the racial achievement gap.

Vouchers
Voucher programs also have a strikingly similar rhetorical pattern to that of
MAST. Educational vouchers, simply put, allowed parents to divert the portion, or part of
the portion, of their tax dollars that would normally go to their local public school district
to the public or private school of their choice. The rhetoric of voucher programs was
framed in discussions of neighborhood schools versus school choice and a free market
approach to education—two topics that will be discussed in more detail later in this
paper.
From the standpoint of using a free-market approach to improve educational
effectiveness and maximize student achievement, researchers have argued that public
schools have no incentives to use resources efficiently and, therefore, do not use them
wisely (Finn, Jr., Hentges, Petrilli, & Winkler, 2009). To support their claims, researchers
have cited the minimal improvements in student achievement when compared with large
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increases in education spending (Belfield, 2005). Critics challenged that changing student
demographics and increased school responsibilities to provide services beyond the
fundamentals of education were the causes of the increased costs (Belfield, 2005).
Most economists believed that the free-market approach was superior to the
government-sponsored approach to public education because the free-market approach
would create a market that would make schools compete for students and, as a result,
would provide incentives for schools to outperform other schools (Finn, Jr., et al., 2009).
Critics of this approach argued that while it may hold true for goods and services
markets, it was not effective in markets such as education that yielded important social
benefits that extended beyond the individuals who received that education (Bracey,
2008). Although no studies have found that voucher programs negatively impacted
student achievement, the data was mixed on whether or not vouchers had a positive
impact. Study results ranged from non-voucher students performing slightly better than
their voucher counterparts to the opposite result (Lewis, December 2008). Even the
Friedman Foundation, a firm supporter of vouchers, reported being uncertain of
vouchers’ impact on student achievement (Lewis, December 2008).
In the voucher debate, there were four main goals that stakeholders tried to
achieve: freedom of choice, efficiency, equity, and social cohesion (Belfield, 2005).
Freedom of choice emphasized the private benefits of education and helped families
choose schools that had philosophies most closely aligned with their preferences
(Belfield, 2005). Efficiency promised the largest educational impact for the fewest
resources. Equity was a goal of achieving fairness in educational opportunities so that all
students could have their educational needs adequately met (Belfield, 2005). Social
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cohesion provided for a common educational experience that would orient all students
into being productive participants in the social, political, and economic responsibilities of
a democratic society (Belfield, 2005).
Social and fiscal conservative groups favored school choice as an educational
model. Groups that held the goals of freedom of choice and efficiency at the top of their
educational values included the Milken, Broad, and Friedman foundations. The rhetoric
of these groups strongly promoted choice and efficiency, but was largely silent on equity
and social cohesion (Belfield, 2005). Additionally, their practices were reported as
potentially unethical. The Friedman foundation was accused of using questionable
research claims to promote the use of vouchers (Bracey, 2008) and donated $200,000 to
advance voucher legislation in Utah that would have been the most comprehensive
voucher program in the U.S. (Lewis, February 2008). Ultimately, Utah voters rejected the
position of their governor and Legislature and defeated the voucher proposal (Schneider,
2008).
Groups such as the NEA, AFT, the National School Boards Association (NSBA),
People for the American Way, and most civil rights groups such as the Urban League and
the NAACP focused their rhetoric most heavily on the goals of equity and social
cohesion (Belfield, 2005). They believed that the goals of freedom of choice and
efficiency undermined equity and social cohesion (Belfield, 2005).
Despite a lack of evidence regarding a significant positive impact of vouchers on
student achievement, the rhetoric used by the groups promoting choice and efficiency
seemed to resonate best with the general public. According to Belfield (2005) a major
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public opinion poll found that approximately 80% of respondents supported voucher
programs, but two thirds did not possess an even basic knowledge of what vouchers were.
It seemed reasonable to ask the question, “Why, if there was no evidence that
vouchers were achieving the desired outcome of increased student achievement, were
people so strongly supportive of the program?” One significant reason was that vouchers
had the potential to allow private businesses to gain entry into the public education
market. Since the Reagan administration opened the door for private firms to carry out
government duties, businesses saw an opportunity to capitalize on the virtually untapped
education market. Private and supplemental education providers had an opportunity to
access government education dollars in addition to the private sector funds from parents
they were already accessing, and lobbied legislators to gain that access. In my experience
as a local school district administrator in Central State, I encountered various
representatives for these companies waiting to speak with legislators I was waiting for
while visiting the Central State Capitol. In March of 2011, I observed two representatives
from Teach for America present information about their company and the services they
could provide to the Senate Education and Finance Committee.
In the context of MAST, it was also important to note that to date, like MAST,
voucher programs had been implemented on a relatively small scale. With the rise of
Race to the Top and its required component of districts having a performance-based pay
system for teachers, it was important to note that small-scale programs could serve as
stepping-stones to large-scale programs. However, the costs and outcomes of a national
program may differ greatly from that of a small-scale program (Belfield, 2005).
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Un- and Underfunded Mandates
According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (2004), the 1995
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act’s (UMRA) threshold for defining a mandate as unfunded
was an unfunded cost of $50 million for intergovernmental and $100 million for private
sector mandates in any of the first five fiscal years of the mandate. In 2001 and 2002, 28
of 420 federal statutes and 161 of 187 federal rules were at or above these thresholds
(GAO, 2004). However, if a mandate exceeded the threshold, there were exemptions that
prevented federal statutes and rules from being labeled as unfunded mandates. These
exemptions included any legislation that related to national security or ones for which it
was not feasible to estimate the cost of implementation (GAO, 2004). For comparative
purposes, I will briefly demonstrate how the UMRA assessed government mandate status
for a number of education-related programs.

NCLB
One of the mandates reviewed, but not classified, by the GAO (2004) as an
unfunded mandate was 2001 version of NCLB still in effect at the time of this research.
There were requirements associated with NCLB, including the requirement for state
standardized testing (GAO, 2004). However, the GAO (2004) found that NCLB did not
meet the criteria for an unfunded mandate because participation was not required.
Districts were only required to participate in standardized testing to receive federal
dollars connected to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), of which
NCLB was a part. Districts were not required to accept federal dollars. This position was
upheld by an 8-8 decision in a 2009 Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals case to dismiss

Pay-for-Performance Page 53 of 299
school districts’ claims to abolish NCLB because of a lack of funding to implement its
objectives (Walsh, 2009). The ruling to retain NCLB was based on the provision of the
statute that stated that nothing in the act shall be construed to mandate that states or
school districts spend any money to implement NCLB beyond what was provided by
federal funding (Walsh, 2009).
This decision ignored the current status of state and federal funding for public
education that has no strings attached. Increasingly, public school districts were hard put
not to sign up for whatever additional money they could attract, regardless of how much
merit they saw in the associated programs. Technically, states and local school districts
could elect to forfeit their federal ESEA-related funding and opt out of standardized
testing. In Central State, the reality was that the districts’ funding for the testing came
from CSDE’s budget and the funding the local school districts received through ESEArelated programs was enough that its loss would cause significant cuts in educational
programs for at-risk students at the district level. In the district where I worked, these
funds were approximately four percent of our operating budget (CSDE, 2012a). In the
school district where I worked, multiple teaching and teaching support positions would
have to be eliminated if we lost this funding source, so we felt that we had to participate
in the testing, even though technically, we did not.

Special Education and Response to Intervention (RtI)
Local school districts were required to provide special education services to
students who required them. Based on my personal experience as a school and district
administrator, special education was an underfunded mandate, yet it was not officially
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labeled as such. At the time of this research, school districts in Central State received
both federal and state funding to help meet the needs of special education students. At the
time of this research, the federal government promised to reimburse school districts for
40% of approved special education expenditures, but the actual reimbursement was closer
to 17% (Arc of Central State, 2011). Additionally, Central State was also supposed to
allocate special education funds to cover the cost of educating students with special
needs; however, Central State set aside approximately $530 million, but the funding
districts needed from the state to cover their cost was approximately $632 million (Arc of
Central State, 2011). In my six years as an administrator and in attending numerous
meetings throughout Central State, I had never encountered a district representative who
stated that his/her district did not have to subsidize its special education funding with its
general fund dollars. Despite the pledge to fully fund the Individuals with Disabilities Act
when it was passed in 1975, special education programs were actually funded by the
federal government at a rate of closer to 50% (“Bush Budget,” 2004).
Response to Intervention (RtI) was an early intervention program that districts
were required to use in order to try to implement effective interventions for individual
students that would enable them to be successful in the mainstream classroom without
special education support (Samuels, 2008). RtI could include educational interventions
such as students having tests read aloud to them or being able to provide oral responses,
having modified assignments, and being provided with lecture notes. Each intervention
took time on the part of educational staff to adapt or modify the curriculum as was
appropriate for each student. Legislation allowed school districts to use up to 15% of
their special education funding to fund RtI programs; however, with special education
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funding already in short supply, districts supplemented their RtI programs with general
education revenue (Samuels, 2008).
Despite these sizeable loopholes in how unfunded mandates were classified, the
GAO (2004) touted the UMRA legislation as a success. The GAO (2004, p. 19) claimed
that this legislation changed the way other legislation was written, “This [the UMRA
legislation] is like a shoal out in the water. You know it is there, so you steer clear of it.”
In practice it most likely had changed the way legislation was written. Legislators did
seem to know that the UMRA legislation existed, and, in my opinion, seemed to have
been careful to ensure that legislation drafted conformed to one of the many loopholes in
the UMRA legislation.

Budget Cuts for Effective Programming
In addition to the expense of complying with new government mandates, at the
time of this research most public school districts faced cuts to effective programs.
Although these programs were not legislatively mandated, they had been effective and
their reduction or elimination also hurt school districts and, ultimately, students. For
example, in 1987, the Central State Legislature eliminated funding for summer school
(House Research Department, 2009). Educators understood the benefit of extended time
programs such as summer school and extended day programs. These programs were the
educational equivalent to batting practice and shooting extra free throws. As batting and
free throw practice enhanced specific athletic skills, summer school and extended day
programs promised to enhance specific academic skills and helped to fill gaps in learning
according to the many emails and brochures I received during my tenure as a school
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district administrator. This was especially true for poor children who may have
experienced little or no intellectual challenge throughout the summer. School districts
fought to keep programs that were beneficial to students, so when the Legislature cut
funding to summer school, many school districts began using the learning year program
as a method to fund summer school until the Legislature closed that loophole in 2003
(House Research Department, 2009).
Additionally, due to the economic conditions that existed at the time of this
research, many states cut funding to K-12 education in general and in specific programs
like technology (Klein, 2009). This prompted school districts to eliminate or reduce
programming in libraries, social services, counseling, extra-curriculars, and electives, and
in addition prompted them to increase class sizes. There were also federal cuts to the
Head Start program, a program designed to help at-risk preschoolers get ready for
kindergarten (Lewis, March 2008).

Privatization of Public Education

Neighborhood Schools versus School Choice
Historically, students attended schools based on geography, attending the school
that was closest to his/her home, thus the term, “neighborhood school.” Due to a variety
of factors, there was an inequity between neighborhood schools in terms of resources and
needs for those resources. It was reasonable to believe that, if given the opportunity, a
parent of a student in a neighborhood school where needs were high and resources were
scarce would choose to send their students to a school where needs were low and
resources were plentiful.
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In being able to choose a school based on criteria other than proximity was a
relatively new phenomenon. Proponents of school choice relied heavily on Adam Smith’s
and Milton Friedman’s theories to promote their position that students should have
expanded options beyond their neighborhood public school. Smith believed that people
could judge their own needs and determine local information about their schools and
make choices about what would be best for them better than politicians (Muller, 1993).
To encourage people to become educated, Smith recommended that the government pay
and award students who did well in school and required entrance exams for some
occupations, but required that students find the means to achieve these goals, because
they would do it most efficiently (Muller, 1993). Proponents of school choice believed
that the over-governance of education denied parental control directly through choosing
and paying for schools their children attend and indirectly through local political activity
(Friedman & Friedman, 1980). They also believed that increasing centralization
benefitted teachers, administrators, and union representatives, but it diminished parental
choice and that schools would improve when parents had greater control (Friedman &
Friedman, 1980).
However, public school choice was becoming reality for many. Central State
pioneered “open enrollment and charter schools” (King, 2006, August 16). Open
enrollment was a program that allowed families to choose the schools to which they
would send their children. Charter schools were schools that were public schools by
definition; however, they were exempt from many of the legislative rules that applied to
regular public schools. Charter schools were seen as schools that catered to the needs of a
specific population of students. In the 1998-1999 school year, Central State had 347
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school districts (CSDE, 2005). By the 2008-2009 school year, the number of school
districts in the state decreased to 339 (CSDE, 2009i). By comparison, the number of
charter schools in Central State grew from 40 in 1998 (CSDE, 2005) to 155 in 2008
(CSDE, 2009i).
There was also considerable movement nationally on this issue. One provision of
NCLB allowed parents of children in failing schools to choose to send their children
elsewhere to receive what they perceived as a higher-quality education (Dobbs, 2003,
September 15). Although the legislation did not pass, Reagan's tax credits and school
choice vouchers were a Friedman-type market mechanism designed to eliminate failing
schools through competition (Viteritti, 2004). It was argued that a free-market approach
provided parents with more information to be good consumers of education options for
their children (Paige, 2006). School choice was a key component of NCLB and was seen
as the ultimate step in accountability (Paige, 2006).

Free Market Approach to Education
A popular belief was that if schools had to compete for resources and students,
they would be more effective. Privatization was seen as an effective way to break the
government's monopoly on educating students. In the 1980s, the Carnegie Forum
reported that the cost of meaningful public education reforms (reforms that would
significantly increase student achievement) were approximately $47 billion and included
raising teacher salaries to attract better teachers (Chubb & Moe, 1986). This was far more
than the funding for any of the educational reforms to date, and since taxpayers were
already dissatisfied with the growing cost of public education, the more likely position
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legislators would take was that quality of education depended more on learning
environment than teacher compensation (Chubb & Moe, 1986). In a survey of 11,000
teachers and principals at 500 public and private schools, Chubb & Moe (1986) found
that private and parochial schools made the greatest achievement gains, but paid their
teachers the least (Chubb & Moe, 1986). They also found that public school teachers
were constrained by rules, bureaucracies, confused over purpose, alienated from
colleagues, and compromised in the classroom, but private and parochial school teachers
experienced less of this (Chubb & Moe, 1986). Promoters of a free market approach to
education used these results to support paying teachers less and privatizing education.
Rod Paige (2006), former National Secretary of Education, believed that
monopolies did not work in business or in schools and that reform in public education
would not happen until the monopolistic status of public education was removed.
Proponents of privatizing public education believed that a privatized education system
would provide a better education at a lower cost through competition and minimal
regulation (Shaker & Heilman, 2004, July). Beliefs such as these spawned an increasing
number of private organizations and brain trusts that attempted to shape public education
through reform efforts and tied school funding to initiatives developed by these
organizations. Some of the more prominent private organizations hoping to influence
public education included: the Milken Foundation, the Broad Foundation, the
Comprehensive School Reform Department, the Center for Teaching Quality, the
Carnegie Foundation and Forum, the New American Schools Development Corporation,
and the Teacher Union Reform Network.

Pay-for-Performance Page 60 of 299
For example, the Chartwell Education Group, Milken Foundation, Broad
Foundation, Friedman Foundation, and the National Council on Economic Education’s
Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce (NCEECSAW) were conservative
networks that stood to benefit significantly from having the $712 billion in education
funding available to the private sector. The Friedman Foundation benefitted from
donations from education.com, Parent Further, and partnered with Stanford University to
provide on-line learning opportunities for students as young as kindergarten (Friedman
Foundation, 2011). The NCEECSAW sold its own curriculum, promoted its own
motivational speakers, and sold examinations to ensure fidelity to its curriculum
(NCEECSAW, 2011). It was also supported by four like-minded foundations, including
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (NCEECSAW, 2011). Additionally, Michael
Milken, one of the founders of the Milken Foundation, helped to start Knowledge
Universe, a company that owned several other education-related consulting and
manufacturing companies, including the company that makes the LeapPad (Phelps &
Lehman, 2005), a popular at-home learning tool marketed to parents at the time of this
research that made Time Magazine’s list of the 15 smartest toys of 2011 (Townsend,
2011).
As an example of the magnitude of the importance of these connections, consider
the following example. As a result of NCLB testing requirements, Pearson Educational
Measurement Solutions was the sole contractor of the United States Department of
Education to deliver and score the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP),
more commonly known as the Nation's Report Card since 1989 and was awarded a fiveyear contract extension in 2007 (Pearson, 2007, October 29). Nationwide, Pearson
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employed 14,045 people and had annual revenues of $1.6 billion (Indeed, 2008). In
Central State, Pearson operated facilities in three cities (Pearson, 2006, March 7). The
organization’s responsibility for providing testing related services in Central State was
nothing short of a monopoly (CSDE, 2008a).
As a result of the educational reforms and changes advocated for by the powerful
groups advocating for privatization, Pearson gained access into the education market and
captured $1.6 billion that might have otherwise gone to educating students. Its revenue
stream also enabled it to support foundations that supported its agenda and helped it gain
further access to the education market. In fact, this had already happened. During the
period of this research, Pearson began selling curriculum to help students perform better
on the tests they created (Pearson, 2012).
Rod Paige (2006), former U.S. Secretary of Education in the George W. Bush
administration (2001-2005), cofounder of the Chartwell Education Group, and member of
the Broad Foundation and the NCEECSAW, defined public education as a crisis because
standardized test scores “rank[ed] near the bottom in science and math among the
industrialized nations of the world” (back cover). Paige (2006, inside front jacket) offered
a simple solution conveniently located on the inside front jacket of his book dramatically
entitled, The War Against Hope: How Teachers’ Unions Hurt Children, Hinder Teachers,
and Endanger Public Education—“accountability, transparency, and choice are the keys
to excellence in education.” Additionally, Paige (2006) named teachers’ unions as the
greatest obstacle to education reform, clearly labeling the National Education Association
as the villain. Paige (2006) stated that there were many special interest groups, such as
teachers’ unions, that would not benefit if our current system of education was reformed,
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but failed to acknowledge how the organizations with which he was affiliated would
benefit from his proposed solution.

Central State K-12 Education Finance History as an Illustrative Case
Prior to 1956 education funding in Central State came primarily from local
property taxes; however, in 1957 foundation aid, state funding paid to school districts on
a per student basis, began (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). At this time, the per-pupil
formula allowance accounted for 84% of school district funding (Thorson & Anderson,
2006). However, this funding did not grow fast enough to keep up with inflation and
increasing costs, and as a result the percentage of costs covered by the state funding
formula dropped to below 43% in 1970 (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). The lack of
adequate state funding caused increased costs to local taxpayers and cuts in educational
programming in virtually all school districts in the state.

Central State Salvation Education Funding Plan
Because the increased portion of public education was funded by local school
districts that had great differences in property wealth and thus the amount of money that
could be raised from property taxes to fund local school districts, there was a significant
disparity in the funds available to school districts across the state. In October 1971 a
federal district court judge ruled that the Central State school finance system was
unconstitutional, finding that the level of spending for students’ education must rely on
the wealth of the state as a whole rather than on the wealth of individuals or individual
school districts (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). As a result, in 1971 the Central State
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Legislature passed an omnibus tax bill that became known informally as the “Central
State Salvation” in response to the legal challenge and in an effort to reduce property
taxes (Thorson & Anderson, 2006).
The Central State Salvation bill shifted the main source of education funding onto
the state and off of local property tax payers. This increased the state's share of school
funding to 93% in 1972 (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). Despite the shift of funding to the
state, wealthy districts were still able to levy local taxpayer dollars to improve their
school districts, thus still leaving school districts in Central State with a funding gap
between wealthy and poor districts.

The Great Equalization
In 1991, Central State passed a referendum equalization initiative that was
designed to reduce the effects of discrepancies in property values between districts and to
provide property tax relief to residents of poorer districts (Thorson & Anderson, 2006).
However, the equalization aid from the state was tied to the ability of the local district
pass a local levy as the state would match a portion of the local levy (Thorson &
Anderson, 2006). If school districts were not able to pass the local levy, they were not
able to receive state equalization aid.
In 2001, subsequent legislation was passed that effectively reduced each school
districts’ voter-approved referendums by $415 per student (Thorson & Anderson, 2006).
This legislation required the state to pay up to $415 per student to school districts and
reduce the amount levied on the local taxpayer by the same amount. Under this plan, the
funding to school districts did not increase, but the burden on local property tax payers
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was reduced. In FY 2003, on the state funding formula it appeared that state aid increased
from $4068-$4601 per student (a 13.1% increase); however, without the local $415 per
student that was subtracted by statute, the actual funding increase was only $186 per
student (a 2.9% increase) (Thorson & Anderson, 2006).
Beginning in FY 2003 the state purportedly planned to pay the entire amount of
the general education formula allowance to districts without any contribution from local
taxpayers. However, it did not have enough funding to accomplish that goal. The result
was an even larger funding gap between wealthy and poor districts (Thorson &
Anderson, 2006). After 2001, the Central State economy slowed and the state in turn
slowed education spending. From 2003 to 2007, there was a total of an 8% increase on
the Central State education funding formula (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). While overall
inflation increased a little more than 6% during this period, the cost of employee health
care and fuel, two major expenses for school districts, rose even more (Thorson &
Anderson, 2006). In the school district where I worked, employee health care increased
160% and fuel costs increased 35% between FY 2000 and FY 2010 according to district
budget documentation.
During the same period more than 75% of school districts lost some of their
student enrollment due to population shifts and student loss to private and charter
schools, with the most severe decreases occurring in the smallest districts in the state
(Thorson & Anderson, 2006). In order to help struggling school districts, the state
increased the local levy amounts that would be eligible for equalization. After enacting
the $415 per student roll-in 2001, the amount decreased to $126 per student in 2002
through 2004 before it began increasing again, thereby creating incentives for schools to
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once again fund themselves locally (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). Sixteen years after its
inception, the great equalization initiative was essentially eliminated, and the funding gap
between rich and poor districts worsened (Thorson & Anderson, 2006).

After the Great Equalization
Between FY 2008 and FY 2010, Central State’s contribution to education funding
remained fairly flat, increasing a total of $150 per student (3%) (House Research
Department, 2009). The gap between net funding and inflation increased from $62 per
student in FY 1993 to $1,161 in FY 2011 (AMSD, 2009). One of the major reasons for
this funding failure could have been that Central State took on the responsibility of
funding public education without identifying a revenue stream to fund it, thus leaving
public education in a state of structural under-funding (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). This
lack of dedicated funding was also one of the main reasons why performance-based
compensation historically failed (Cameron, 2005).

Liberalist Ideology
It was argued that the interest in changing how teachers were paid was political in
nature. Liberalism, neoliberalism, and neoconservatism were three competing political
ideologies that impacted public education and are described here. Amin (2004) stated that
a “liberalist ideology” was developed in conjunction with capitalism and equated social
effectiveness with economic success; however, there was a conflict between social and
market interests. He argued that liberals believed expansion of capital meant
development; however, expanded capital did not necessarily improve or develop society
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(Amin, 2004). As capital expanded, it was accompanied by political force (Amin, 2004).
That political force was felt in the guise of education reform aimed at serving the needs
of capital and appeared to be the case in Central State. An expanding chasm between
haves and have-nots was a necessary result of global liberalization (Amin, 2004).
Similarly an influx of revenue from the business sector and the malfunction of Central
State’s education funding was reinforcing a system of wealthy and pauperized schools
based on capitalist ideals.
Consequences of global liberalization included pauperization and what Amin
termed “low-intensity” democracy. Low intensity democracy is a democracy that no
longer has any restriction or controls over the market (Amin, 2004). According to Amin
(2004), the decisions in our low-intensity democracy were made in the market. This
meant that U.S. democratic practices have been reduced to harmless rituals, because the
American liberal ideology served the interests of capital (Amin, 2004). As capitalists
became increasingly more involved in public education, the shift from governmentcontrolled public education to capitalist-controlled education was becoming more
apparent.
At the time of this research, the definition of neoliberalism was evolving with
some disagreement among theorists regarding a specific definition and even the spelling
of the word. Based on the work of Amin, “neoliberalism” in the context of this research
refers to the doctrine that emphasizes a free market economy with limited government
involvement as well as personal choice and freedom. However, it also promotes making
progress on social issues such as education through an increase in government regulation.
Regarding the spelling of “neoliberalism,” the more recent research seems to favor
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dropping the hyphen (neo-liberalism). Therefore, I have chosen to use the nonhyphenated spelling in this work. The same spelling issue also applies to
“neoconservatism” in this work as well.

Neoliberalism and Education
Privatizing public education was a goal of neoliberal policy makers for some
time. At the time of this research, people still had common access to public education, but
that may not always be true. In England, enclosing land once considered to be public
space served to benefit the capitalists and was detrimental to the common and poor
people (Shiva, 2005). Without too much imagination, one could extend Shiva’s concept
of enclosures to the enclosing, or privatizing, of public education, thereby excluding nondominant groups from accessing the same level of education as those of the dominant
group. For example, if parents who lived in neighborhoods that had high needs and few
resources had the means to transport their children to schools that had many resources
and few needs, they would. However, the students whose parents did not have the means
to transport their children to a different school would have to attend the high-need, lowresource neighborhood school. Essentially this would create or reinforce a segregated
school system according to socio-economic status. Although school choice programs
were designed to alleviate this problem, attending a school other than the student’s
neighborhood school still relied on someone other than the school district being able to
provide transportation for the student to the school of their choice.
As public education has become privatized and nationalized, some have argued
that only the voices and histories of the dominant group would be heard (Apple, 1996).
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The United Kingdom had a national curriculum and national testing that was introduced
by the Thatcher administration (Apple, 1996). In the U.K., the national curriculum
legitimized long-standing forms of structural inequality and disempowered and deskilled
teachers (Apple, 1996). At the time of this research, there already was a sort of national
curriculum in the U.S. through textbook adoption states like California and Texas that
controlled 20 to 30% of the textbook market (Apple, 1996). It could be argued that in the
U.S., the move toward a national curriculum was likely to have the same effect of
legitimizing inequality and deskilling teachers as it had in the U.K.
In addition to a movement to privatize and nationalize education, neoliberals also
favored non-unionized labor. President Reagan was widely touted as representing an antigovernment stance during his presidency and it was argued that his successful attempt to
weaken the air traffic controllers’ union impacted the stance of neoliberals and
neoconservatives regarding organized labor. During the “anti-government” Regan era,
the number of government employees in the United States rose from 16.2 million in 1980
to 18.4 million in 1990 (Barr, 2004; Cohen & Eimicke, 2000). While the size of the
federal government shrank during Reagan’s first term, the size of government overall
(including states, counties, etc.) grew with local and state governments and government
contracts with private and nonprofit organizations picking up some of the work
previously done by the federal government (Barr, 2004; Cohen & Eimicke, 2000). In
part, the state government growth was a result of the increased capacity needed to make
up for the federal down-sizing, but also because of the need to coordinate with private
sector businesses and non-profit organizations working for the public sector. The
increased collaboration between the public and private sectors was a result of the belief
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that public policy would be implemented more effectively if some governmental
functions were privatized (Cohen & Eimicke, 2000).
One roadblock to this functional shift was the unionization of governmental
employees. Reagan diminished the strength of federal labor unions when he fired 13,000
striking air traffic controllers (Barr, 2004). Within his first nine months in office, the
Reagan administration laid off approximately 15,000 other federal employees and
another 75,000 positions were cut between 1981 and 1985 (Barr, 2004). This action not
only reduced the strength of unions in the public sector, but in the private sector as well
(Barr, 2004). Minimizing the strength of the unions was important because unionized
workers had a greater likelihood of earning higher wages and having more job security
than their non-union counterparts (Perrucci & Wysong, 1999). Higher wages reduced the
generative capital available to the elite so that they could grow their own wealth and
power (Perrucci & Wysong, 1999).
The Reagan era also marked a critical period in the shift in what we defined as
civil and individual rights. The increase in governmental size was accompanied by a
reduction in individual rights and a redefinition of what was included in those rights for
some groups (Bradford, 2004; Paul, 1987). Reagan was deeply connected to economic
policy, so much so that his version of capitalism was given its own name—Reaganomics.
His devotion to capitalism through the advice of Milton Friedman helped to popularize
the belief that economic freedom or laissez-faire capitalism was a right (Bradford, 2004;
Paul, 1987). This position was also commonly linked to neoliberalism.
The neoliberal position centered on the relationship between government and the
economy and focused almost entirely on the latter. It promoted the idea that the
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expansion of capital meant development and progress (Amin, 2004). Like Reagan,
neoliberals believed the state must be minimized, reducing all politics to economics
(Apple et al., 2003). Neoliberals also favored tying education to economic needs (Apple,
1996) and equated social effectiveness with economic success (Amin, 2004).
Therefore, neoliberals thought that government sponsorship of education reduced
its quality and diversity, increased educational bureaucracy, and rendered schools
ineffective places to learn (Friedman & Friedman, 1980). Conversely, they believed that
if schools competed for resources, they would have incentive to move toward more
efficient and effective organizational systems (Chubb & Moe, 1986). Neoliberals blamed
public schools for failing to produce a labor force that was skilled, adaptable, and flexible
enough to meet corporate needs (Apple, 1996). They also believed that education should
be privatized and marketized, favoring the efficiency and democracy of Smith’s invisible
hand approach (Apple, 1996; Apple et al., 2003). Additionally, neoliberals thought that
teachers’ methods were out of date and that substantial reforms were necessary to
effectively educate students (Fermoyle, 2005).

Neoconservatism and Education
Neoconservatives, many of whom also identified strongly with the Reagan
administration’s policy and rhetoric, believed that schools should teach conservative
values, norms, and pedagogies (Apple, 1996; Apple et al., 2003). They also believed that
schools should have strong accountability measures through a free market system (Finn,
et al., 2009). According to former Education Secretary during the Regan administration,
William Bennett (1994), who succeeded Terrel Bell, was a neoconservative leader who
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believed that all students should know certain cultural and national ideals in order to reestablish a common culture in the U.S. Neoconservatives promoted the idea that schools
should have much greater accountability through marketization (Bennett was also a
proponent of school vouchers) and that parents should be able to choose the school to
which they send their children. Bennett (1994) also stated that education belongs to the
public and that the public should be making educational decisions instead of teachers’
unions. State or nationwide standardized testing would help parents be informed enough
to be able to make good decisions and hold schools accountable for properly and
effectively educating students (Bennett, 1994). Like neoliberals, neoconservatives wanted
public education to teach only the basics and leave the rest of educating children to
families, communities, and the private sector; (Montani, 2005, August).

Conservative Modernization
According to Apple (1996) policies of “conservative modernization” were a
compromise between neoconservative and neoliberal policies. Conservative
modernization freed individuals for economic purposes and controlled them for social
purposes (Apple, 1996). This means the wealthy would be loosely controlled, but the
poor would be tightly controlled (Apple, 1996). In conservative modernization,
combining marketization and a strong state removed education policy from public debate,
left choice to parents, and allowed the unintended consequences of the invisible hand to
take care of the rest (Apple, 1996). A conservative modernist approach to education
reform also included a state or national curriculum and testing and school choice (Apple,
1996).
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Similarly, Kumashiro (2008) described the government as a “strict father.” In this
analogy, the father figure led his family in an authoritarian manner and promoted
“traditional” values while encouraging his children to be self-sufficient. It could be
argued that education reforms such as pay-for-performance compensation and NCLB fit
within this philosophy. Additionally, Kumashiro (2008) also suggested that the political
differences of neoconservatives and neoliberals often coexist well within the right-wing
politics in the U.S.

The Single Most Significant Factor in Determining Student Achievement
With more than 150 years of failed educational policies aimed at improving
student achievement (mostly by attempting to link it to merit pay for teachers), one has to
ask why all of these policies failed, and what chance MAST had to succeed. The first
question will be addressed here and the latter will be addressed in the analysis section of
this work.
Throughout decades of studies on student achievement, the single-most important
indicator of student success was repeatedly identified as socio-economic status. Holland
(2007) reported that the influence of social class on determining student achievement was
likely to be so powerful that even with the best educational programs and most highly
trained teachers, schools could not overcome it. Holland (2007) also noted that, despite
this evidence, schools were doing what they could to close the achievement gap and were
making modest gains.
Lee and Burkham (2002) also supported this position. They reported that students
entering kindergarten already had significant differences in achievement based on factors
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associated with socio-economic status (Lee & Burkam, 2002). They also reported that
students with lower socio-economic status entered into poorer performing schools that
exacerbated the problem of the achievement gap (Lee & Burkham, 2002). Given the
consistency of student achievement data related to socio-economic status, I personally
wondered if these lower-performing schools performed lower as a result of their student
demographics more than as a result of the quality of their academic programs and teacher
quality.
Despite this evidence, at least one study did find a correlation between teacher
effort and student achievement for French-Canadian high school students. Bergeron,
Chouinard, and Janosz (2011) found that when students had strong, positive beliefs in
their competency and a strong relationship with their teacher, they were less likely to
drop out of high school. However, when controlled for socio-economic status, they found
that the likelihood of dropping out of high school for students with high socio-economic
status decreased significantly when they held positive beliefs in their competency and a
strong relationship with their teacher; however, when students in the same scenario but
with low socio-economic status became more likely to drop out although not by a
significant amount (Bergeron et al., 2011).

Pay-for-Performance Rhetoric
Despite what the research showed about socio-economic status and educational
reforms, various stakeholders had their own ideas of what educational objectives were
important and how public education should function. All of these various stakeholders
used some form of rhetoric to establish and promote their views on how public schools
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should operate. Philanthropists, politicians, unions, and educators all established their
positions on merit-based pay, largely through the use of the media. This section reviews
the position of each of these main players in the teacher compensation debate.

Philanthropies’ Involvement in Public Education
Philanthropists were those who desired to benefit humanity through the
improvement of social systems like public education. Some of these philanthropists
declared that public education was obsolete and did a poor job of educating students.
They used their wealth and influence to spread their message by sponsoring research,
funding scholarships, creating curricula, starting education-related companies, and other
activities to legitimate their policy agenda and implement change (Colvin, 2005).
Philanthropies were the organizations founded by philanthropists to help carry out the
work of the philanthropists. The range of the involvement of these Philanthropies varied
greatly. Some foundations simply promoted staff development as their pet project, while
others tried to overhaul the education system in general (Colvin, 2005). Because
foundations received little oversight and few, if any, external evaluations, it was difficult
to measure the validity of their claims (Colvin, 2005).

Milken Family Foundation
The Milken Institute was founded as a part of the Milken Family Foundation that,
according to the Milken Institute home page (2008) “is a publicly supported, nonpartisan
economic think tank whose work makes a difference in the lives of people worldwide by
helping create a more democratic and efficient global economy. This Institute’s scholars
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use capital-market principles and financial innovations to address social and economic
challenges, from energy independence to poverty, here in the United States and around
the world.” Michael Milken, Chairman of the Milken Institute and Co-founder of the
Milken Family Foundation, was not only known as a philanthropist, but also as a
financier nicknamed the “Junk Bond King” who, in 1990, was charged with racketeering
and securities fraud including bribery, insider trading, and stock manipulation resulting in
a $600 million fine, a 10-year prison sentence, and permanent prohibition from engaging
in securities business (Phelps & Lehman, 2005).
The Milken Family Foundation website (2008) promoted its TAP program as
being in “high demand.” In terms of real numbers, high demand in this case means 220
schools encompassing 6,200 teachers and 72,000 students nationwide (Milken, 2008). To
put those numbers in perspective, in 2008 Central State, the case site of this research,
employed nearly 53,000 teachers (CSDE, 2009j) and educated more than 82,000 students
(CSDE, 2009k). When using real numbers, the “high demand” claim seemed to be
exaggerated. According to Blair (2000), TAP was implemented in eight states,
representing approximately 30% of K-12 students in the U.S. However, how the 30%
figure was calculated was not disclosed. It is possible that in 2000 that many students
attended schools that participated in TAP, but that many of those schools had dropped
their TAP programs by 2008. That would align with other research that showed the lack
of longevity for teacher pay-for-performance compensation programs (Viadero, 2007).
As a result of TAP’s “high demand,” Lowell Milken established the National
Institute for Excellence in Teaching (NIET) as a separate charity in order to ensure TAP’s
effectiveness and sustainability (Milken, 2008). NIET established partnerships with
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federal, state, and local governments as well as other foundations and corporations
(Milken, 2008). In 2005, the Milken Family Foundation (2005) launched TAP as a
separate 501(c)(3) non-profit organization. The TAP organization received grants and
appropriations from the federal government “to sustain and expand TAP as a welldocumented teacher quality reform” (Milken Family Foundation, 2005). The
establishment of NIET and TAP as separate entities from the Milken Family Foundation
obscured the link between TAP and the organization created to promote it. This in turn
promoted the illusion that TAP was supported by multiple independent organizations that
were dedicated to “excellence in teaching.”

Broad Foundation
In 1999 Eli Broad, Founder and Chairman of AIG Retirement Services and KB
Home, and his wife, Edythe, started The Broad Foundation (2008). The Broad
Foundation’s (2008) mission was to “dramatically improve urban public education
through better governance, management, and labor relations.” The Broad Foundation
Brochure outlined the steps toward achieving this mission quite simply on its cover—
“Public education needs: (a) more money, (b) better teachers, (c) privatization” (Broad
Foundation, 2008). The Foundation also claimed that “public education is the key civil
rights issue of the 21st century” (Broad Foundation, 2008, p. 4).
The Broad Foundation had three main initiatives to help accomplish its mission.
First, it awarded one urban school district a half-million dollar grant for having the
greatest gains in academic achievement while reducing the achievement gap (Broad
Foundation, 2008). Second, it established a national training and support program for
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new urban school board members (Broad Foundation, 2008). It also had a leadership
center for superintendents (Broad Foundation, 2008).

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
Perhaps the most widely known foundation with a hand in education reform in the
early twenty-first century was the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. It was the largest
contributor to education causes and allocated billions of dollars toward education through
a range of specific reforms (Colvin, 2005). While the Foundation did not focus on teacher
compensation, it was responsible for creating thousands of new high schools and dividing
hundreds of large high schools into smaller schools and increasing the number of college
courses offered in high schools for both high school and college credit (Colvin, 2005).
Should the Gates Foundation choose to pursue teacher compensation as a cause, I believe
that the influence of this foundation could significantly affect a change in teacher
compensation.

Presidents

President George W. Bush
During his presidency, and like many other Republicans, George W. Bush was a
supporter of merit-based pay for teachers and for school choice (Honawar, August 2007).
Bush proposed spending $50 million on the Choice Incentive Fund, a fund that provided
states with funding to start or expand voucher programs so that students could attend
charter, private, or a public school rather than their neighborhood school (“Bush Budget,”
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2004). He also proposed spending $500 million on the Teacher Incentive Fund; however,
this amount was significantly reduced by the time the bill was passed (Keller, 2005).
Bush’s plan for teacher merit-based pay was to link teachers’ compensation to students’
performances on standardized tests (Phillips, 2005).

President Barack Obama
President Obama was also a supporter of merit-based pay for teachers (Honawar,
November 2007). This was important because previously, most notable supporters of
merit-based pay were Republicans (Honawar, November 2007). As a senator, Obama
introduced two bills that incorporated merit-based pay models for teachers (Hoff, 2008).
While campaigning for President, he proposed a plan that would allow districts to
implement a merit pay plan without the input or consent of the teachers’ unions (Hoff,
2008).
President Obama also supported school choice through the development of charter
schools (Aarons, 2009). He made increasing the number of charter schools in a state as
well as merit-based pay required components of Race to the Top funding for states and
local school districts (Aarons, 2009). Through the Race to the Top program, Obama also
supported centralization of public education in keeping with neoconservative ideals.
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Unions

National Education Association (NEA)
Joel Packer, the chief NCLB lobbyist for the NEA, said that the union was firmly
opposed to the federal government getting involved in merit pay, even with proposals that
made participation voluntary for states or districts (Honawar, 2007 August 1). Packer
noted that even models that tracked student growth over a period of years and were based
on growth on test scores did not account for differences between individual students, and
that one or two test scores based on NCLB test requirements were not a comprehensive
or a fair way to evaluate teachers (Honawar, 2007 August 1). The NEA would rather the
federal government focused on providing hard-to-staff schools with a variety of tools and
resources to improve student achievement and working conditions in those schools
(Honawar, 2007 August 1).

American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
In 2001, the AFT believed the first priority of teacher compensation should be
adequate compensation levels aligned with what professionals in other professions make.
The AFT came out in support of merit-based systems as an augmentation of the
traditional salary schedule in order to increase teacher compensation (American
Federation of Teachers, 2001). However, by 2007, the position of the AFT changed.
Edward J. McElroy, the President of the AFT, said that the Association no longer
supported systems that used student test scores or where principals decided which
teachers were rewarded (Honawar, 2007 August 1). In 2008, the AFT supported U.S.
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Presidential Candidate, Hillary Clinton, largely because she opposed reauthorization of
NCLB and merit pay for teachers (Hoff, 2008).

Analytic Theory

The Rise of Global Capitalism
Global capitalism was usually defined as the expansion of a market economy
around the world (Amin, 2004). It was argued that the economic theories and policies that
had strong influence over it were the theories advanced by Adam Smith, Milton
Friedman, and Fredrich Taylor. Smith (1982) believed that free trade had a better longterm effect on society than monopolies because monopolies could control supply and
limit output, thus increasing demand. Another reason Smith (1982) favored an open
market was that people tended to do things that would maximize their own benefit. In
doing so, people more frequently promoted a greater benefit to society than when they
intentionally tried to promote it, and their drive to achieve their own benefit and fulfill
their ambition served to fuel individuals to work harder than they would otherwise
(Smith, 1982). Smith also believed that, "In every profession, the exertion of the greater
part of those who exercise it is always in proportion to the necessity they are under of
making that exertion" (Muller, 1993, p. 152). In other words, merit pay models, to at least
some extent, increased the necessity of making a greater exertion in one’s work.
Because people tend to seek what would benefit them, Smith (1982) also believed
that people could determine their own needs better than politicians attempting to do that
for them. His “invisible hand” was a metaphor for the negative unintended outcomes
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from the perspective of the individual that were positive from the perspective of society
(Smith, 1982). It was believed that this argument was the basis for much of the drive to
privatize public education.
Proponents of privatizing public education were also able to use Smith’s theories
to explain why teachers’ unions were so strongly opposed to a free market approach to
education. Smith (1982) believed that the self-interests of individuals inherently opposed
a free market. In other words, they wanted to protect their turf. Those who wanted to
privatize education believed that teachers did not want to give up the job security and
control they had in their monopoly over public education and did not want to face the
accountability that the open market would demand.
Despite Smith’s (1982) preference toward an invisible hand to guide the
economy, he also believed that sometimes creating preconditions for a market to exist
and compensating for negative effects required government intervention. However, as the
world increasingly embraced capitalistic ideals, it was argued that the government
initiated and regulated monopoly of the U.S. public education system remained at the
center of the cultural and economic tapestry of the nation—a situation most difficult for
laissez-faire capitalists to accept.
Milton Friedman shared the view that the U.S. public education system was
troubling to the nation’s pursuit of free market capitalism. He labeled the public schools
as “Socialist” and held that they violated the premise of the free market and voluntary
exchange (Friedman 1980). Because Friedman’s political and economic theories that
were strongly advanced during the Reagan administration greatly resembled the theories
of Adam Smith, Friedman’s theories were also used to drive the push toward a free,
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capitalist economy and privatized education system. Although Friedman used the term
“economic freedom” in his 1962 book, Capitalism and Freedom, the concept was only
widely popularized during the Reagan administration after Friedman was appointed to
Reagan’s Economic Policy Advisory Board in 1980. Friedman (1962, 1980) advocated a
laissez-faire economy with a minimalist government in order to advance economic and
political freedom. Similar to Smith, as his theories applied to education, Friedman (1980)
believed that increasing centralization benefitted teachers, administrators, and union
representatives, but diminished parental choice and that schools would only improve
when parents had greater control.
Frederick Taylor’s principles of scientific management were also important to the
rise of global capitalism. Taylor’s work in this area was focused on manufacturing;
however, over the years since the first publication of The Principles of Scientific
Management in 1911, principles of scientific management have been applied to the
service sector as well. One of the main guiding principles of scientific management was
the objective of maximizing profit for both the employer and the employee (Taylor,
2004). In order to achieve this, employers needed to create external pressure to ensure
that employees would put forth their best effort and work hard, otherwise workers would
slow to the pace of the worker who was the slowest and least efficient (Taylor, 2004). In
scientific management, managers were charged with scientifically determining and
recording the best, most efficient way to work, training workers how to do that, and
supervising the work to ensure that it was being done in the manner prescribed (Taylor,
2004). After it was determined what needed to be done to achieve maximum effort and
efficiency from employees, Taylor (2004) recommended managers focus on the benefit
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the employees would receive, such as higher wages, rather than the hard work they had to
do to receive the benefit. He found that when workers could work in an “every person for
themselves” environment and not be subjected to the peer pressure of conforming to a
lower output, workers worked harder and more efficiently (Taylor, 2004).
This theory of scientific management was also applied to public schools through
the implementation of pay-for-performance models and piece-rate rewards; however,
teachers were not successfully insulated from the peer pressure to conform—one of the
critical components of achieving maximum effort and efficiency under this theory
(Taylor, 2004; Harris, 2007). Under a privatized education system, reformers believed
that efficiencies such as those used in scientific management would be used to improve
education as a result of competition. The latest merit pay models were touted as a simple,
fair, and revolutionary idea. Reward good teachers, keeping the best and brightest in the
profession and encourage the others to work in other sectors (Paige, 2006). However, it
was argued that the idea stemmed from the work of Taylor, Friedman, and Smith.
On a more global scale, as part of his Cold War strategy in his speech to the
House of Commons, Reagan (1982), relying on the economic theories of Friedman, set
out to create capitalist economies in multiple countries where the threat of communism
was thought to exist. Reagan believed that if people lived in capitalist economies, they
would choose a democratic form of government (Friedman, 1962; Reagan, 1982). Given
the relatively high wages of workers in the U.S., a world economy had the potential to be
problematic for the U.S. economy. “A Nation at Risk” threatened that Japan and other
countries would pass the U.S. economically and served to persuade the public that public
education in the U.S. was in crisis (Shaker & Heilman, 2004; Viteritti, 2004). However,
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the global economy created an economic challenge for the U.S. because workers in
developing countries worked for far less money than workers in the U.S. (King, 2006).

Deskilling Teachers
As a result of the rise of a global economy, public education was tasked with
preparing workers and itself for this new reality. Therefore, most recent educational
innovations were consistent with the dominant paradigm of accountability, costeffectiveness, and meeting industrial needs (Pappagianis, et al., 1982). The deskilling of
teachers would increase the number of people available to become teachers and could
serve to attract people to the profession who would work better under a scientific
management model. Deskilling teachers, as defined by the principles of scientific
management, meant that as much thought as possible was removed from their work, and
that thought was reduced to policies and procedures (Braverman, 1998). Thus, employing
scientific management techniques served to deskill educators in the process of creating
labor divisions.
The principles of scientific management could help explain the move toward
implementing state and national curricula and standardized testing. For example, in
Central State, there were 52 pages of high school social studies standards and 150
standards each in math and science in addition to standards in every other core subject
area that students had to master prior to graduation (CSDE, 2011). This, combined with
standardized testing as part of NCLB, served to standardize education content across
Central State. This standardization limited the need for teachers to decide what to teach in
their courses, and enabled teachers and students to move from one district to another
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more freely. This allowed for school choice on the part of students and increased
competition on the part of teachers and school districts.
The result of these innovations served to devalue teachers. For example, the use
of prepackaged curriculums with almost complete specification of a teacher's every move
in the classroom de-skilled the teacher in terms of curriculum and pedagogy. This
allowed the teacher to be re-skilled into a less autonomous classroom manager, using
techniques of behavioral modification (Pappagianis, et al., 1982). The de-skilling of
teachers would lead to paying teachers less, thus reducing the cost of education
(Pappagianis, et al., 1982).
There were several factors that could have encouraged a move to deskill teachers.
One, ironically, was that as people became more educated the gap between professionals
and the general public decreased, resulting in a public sector that was more likely to
question the authority of professionals (Friedson, 1986). A second factor was that
professionals tended to be employed in bureaucracies that became subject to strict
controls that routinized and de-skilled work (Friedson, 1986). School systems were a
prime example of this because they had bureaucratic characteristics because they were
large, public, and accountable to state and federal mandates (Friedson, 1986). Despite the
need to adhere to a curriculum and fulfill a specialized role, teachers experienced
considerable autonomy in the classroom until recently, and more reforms were aimed at
removing the autonomy that remained.
One such example was the Purple COW. In 2004, the Austin, Texas-based firm,
Ignite Learning, founded by Neil Bush (brother to former Texas Governor and U.S.
President George W. Bush), launched the Purple COW initiative in Texas public schools
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(Ignite Learning, 2012). COW stands for Curriculum on Wheels and was designed to
provide whole class learning via a purple COW shaped like a cow (Ignite Learning,
2012). The COW featured a variety of instructional videos in math and science that the
COW would play on its own projector (Ignite Learning, 2012). The teacher only had to
plug in the COW and push play (Ignite Learning, 2012).
The Houston Independent School District accepted a $115,000 donation from
Ignite-related donors with the requirement that the money be used to purchase COW
technology and curriculum (Garza, 2006, March 23). The Houston district put COWs in
each of its classrooms, but the donation only covered half of the cost. In another case of
“making the right donations,” former First Lady, Barbara Bush made a donation of an
undisclosed amount to the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund with the requirement that the
money be used to buy COWs for students in New Orleans, Louisiana schools (Garza,
2006, March 23).
Since the launch of the Purple COW, Ignite Learning (2012) has launched many
other similar products including Ingite!Science, Ingnite!Math, Ignite!Special Education,
Ignite!Class, and Sparkito, a Spanish heritage English language learner program just to
name a few. At the time of this research, Ignite Learning (2012) technology was widely
used throughout Texas public schools.
Arguably, technology and programs like the Purple COW served to deskill
teachers by limiting the how their pedagogical knowledge was able to enter the
classroom. It could be perceived that if a teacher was only required to plug in a device
and press “play” to teach content, the required skills of the teacher then became lessened
in the area of content and greater in the area of student behavior management. I have
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worked with hundreds of teachers in my education career, interviewed hundreds more,
and have reviewed the credentials of thousands. Never once had any of them stated that
they pursued a career in education to have policing student behavior as the focus of their
practice. As this type of reform expands, I believe that the type of individual seeking a
career in public education will be significantly different from what it was at the time of
this research.

Policy as a Pre-fabricated Solution
A social problem is an ambiguously stated issue that is used to further a group’s
ideology by solving it with a pet policy or legal initiative (Edelman, 1988). Defining an
issue as a social problem induced an audience to support measures they may have
otherwise found painful, unwise, or irrelevant (Edelman, 1998). According to Edelman
(1988), the point of constructing a social problem then was not to solve it, but rather to
signify who was virtuous and useful and who was dangerous and inadequate by virtue of
the problem. This could be done by discussing how a problem originated. Put differently,
and particularly in political discourse, a specific leader or political party’s “problems”
were a summation of its opponents and the most favorable ways to cast them as
incompetent or worse.
Important considerations when choosing which group to target via a prefabricated solution to a social problem included the size and diversity of the group
targeted (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989) and the amount of power the group held
(Edelman, 1988). Smaller groups that were more easily isolated and defined generally
made better targets (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989). It was also important that the target
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group did not have the power to effectively fight against being labeled the cause of the
problem (Edelman, 1988).
When a policy was created as a simple solution to a complex problem, using tools
such as social problems and effective discourse helped the chance of achieving rhetorical
success (Edelman, 1988). Typically, the policy used to “solve” a social problem was
developed first, and then a social problem that seemed to fit within the aims of the policy
was attached to it (Edelman, 1988). The most common course of action to solve a
problem was a gesture such as enacting a law that promised to solve or lessen a problem,
even if there was little chance it would do so because conflicting interests usually resulted
in perpetuation or intensification of the problem (Edelman, 1988).
This was evidenced in the many education reforms passed since the 1980s and the
persistence of the perceived student achievement problem. For instance, neoconservatives
and neoliberals likely wanted to privatize education before defining student achievement
as a problem and engaging in rhetoric to promote policies that would address this
problem. In Central State, teachers were a much smaller group than the general
population of the state. Additionally, they were a highly definable group that was easily
controlled through policy as they were state employees. This made them an appropriate
target group for a policy solution to the student achievement problem. However, despite
years of rhetoric and additional legislation aimed at solving the problem, the problem
persisted.
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Leadership 101
Being able to effectively navigate the political waters of education reform
initiatives was arguably an important part of the work of local school district leaders.
Despite having numerous demands on their time and energies, effective leaders must pay
attention to all aspects of leadership of an organization (Bolman & Deal, 2008). In one of
the most commonly used texts in school administration and MBA coursework, Bolman
and Deal (2008) divided these aspects of leadership into four frameworks: structural,
human resource, political, and symbolic. The structural framework included the structure
of an organization and its strategic mission (Bolman & Deal, 2008). A leader who
operated in the structural framework would be focused on implementing the strategy,
experimenting with organizational structures, and adapting the organization to meet
future needs. The human resource framework was focused on aspects of the organization
relating to people (Bolman & Deal, 2008). A leader who functioned in the human
resource framework would most likely have had a servant leadership style and would pay
attention to advocating for and empowering workers (Bolman & Deal, 2008). This leader
would have been visible throughout the organization and accessible to others and would
have used collaborative decision-making strategies. The leadership style used in the
political framework was one of advocacy and coalition building and these leaders were
able to build connections between stakeholders (Bolman & Deal, 2008). The political
framework viewed organizations as arenas and also involved the leader’s use of
persuasion, negotiation, and coercion when necessary (Bolman & Deal, 2008). The leader
who was operating in a symbolic framework would be inspiring (Bolman & Deal, 2008).
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The symbolic framework involved using symbols to gain attention, sharing experiences
and impressions, and communicating vision (Bolman & Deal, 2008).
Bolman and Deal (2008) argued that effective leaders had to be skilled in all four
frames. To operate in less than all four frames would have meant that the leader was
ignoring one or more important aspects of the organization. Additionally, effective
leaders needed to not only know their organization, but all of the organizations with
which the leader’s organization interacted (Bolman & Deal, 2008). Bolman & Deal
(2008) contended that leaders often misread situations because they were not able to
understand the situation from all four frameworks and from the perspectives of others.
Therefore, being able to operate from all four frameworks from a variety of perspectives
was essential for an effective leader.
Along complimentary lines, Northouse (2009) ascribed the following
characteristics to leadership. It: (a) produces change and movement; (b) establishes
direction by creating a vision, clarifying the big picture, and setting strategies; (c) aligns
people by communicating goals, seeking commitment, and building teams and coalitions;
(d) motivates and inspires by energizing people, empowering subordinates, and meeting
unmet needs. Another way to look at leadership is as a transactional process between the
leader and others through which the leaders tries to influence the others toward achieving
a common goal (Northouse, 2009). Leadership involved influence and groups. According
to Northouse (2009) leadership must occur in a group setting because influence is a
critical component of leadership. Leaders must get followers to work toward a common
goal.
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Northouse (2009) explained the importance of being able to attend to both tasks
and relationships. Effective leaders not only attended to the tasks associated with leading
an organization, but could also cultivate the relationships necessary to a successful
organization (Northouse, 2009). This attention to relationships helped the leader to get
members of the organization collectively focused on common organizational goals rather
than primarily on members’ individual goals (Northouse, 2009). The ability to be able to
get teachers, administrators, and school board members working toward the same goal of
implementing MAST even though each of these groups sometimes held different views
of MAST, was critical in effectively implementing MAST at the local level. In short,
leadership was an important aspect of moving the four districts in this study through the
MAST process.
Additionally, Northouse (2009) noted that effective leaders needed to be
visionary, as well as attentive of administrative tasks and conceptual ideas while having
strong interpersonal skills. The truly effective leader would demonstrate all of these
characteristics and behaviors.
With the increased demands on local school district superintendents, this type of
effective leadership became increasingly difficult in Central State as local school districts
reduced their budgets by limiting the amount of administrators and administrative support
available. However, this type of effective leadership was exactly what was needed to
successfully lead a district through adopting and implementing MAST.
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Summary of Analytic Theory As Applied to This Research
The rise of global capitalism, the deskilling of teachers, using policy as a prefabricated solution to solve a social problem, and the importance of effective leadership
were all factors that influenced the implementation of MAST in Central State. There was
a perception that globalization expanded the competition for jobs for U.S. workers and
that public schools needed to do more in terms of educating future skilled workers to
keep jobs in the U.S. It could be argued that the push for more school choice and the
drive to keep the costs of public education low, that curriculum could be standardized,
thus eliminating the level of skill required for teachers to develop their own curriculum
and increasing competition between schools for students and between teachers for jobs. It
was likely that MAST was created as a pre-fabricated solution to improve student
achievement through the weakening of teachers’ unions. Additionally, the impact of local
leadership was important to MAST implementation.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

Theoretical Traditions

Grounded Theory
Grounded Theory was a flexible but systemic methodology used to collect and
analyze data in a way that allowed the theory to arise from the data itself (Charmaz,
2006). It could be used in either qualitative or quantitative research, but it was used more
frequently in qualitative studies (Charmaz, 2006). Although most qualitative research
methodologies allowed researchers to decide what data to gather as they proceed,
Grounded Theory also allowed researchers to determine how to collect and analyze the
data (Charmaz, 2006). In this study, I began with data and some opening questions, but
did not have a specific theory to prove, or disprove, making Grounded Theory an
appropriate methodological choice so that the data gathered could direct the analysis.
Using Grounded Theory, I was able to: (a) collect and analyze data during the
same time frame, constantly comparing new data with that which was previously
collected; (b) construct codes as themes emerged in the data; (c) develop and adjust
theories as data was collected; (d) define relationships between districts and identify areas
where additional data was needed; and (e) use an ideal type sampling method to develop
a theoretical framework. Grounded Theory would have allowed me to develop the
literature review after gathering and analyzing data (Charmaz, 2006); however, I found it
more useful to draft the literature review and revise it as necessary to include relevant
research as determined by the emerging theories developed as a result of the study data.
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The process of this study began by gathering data from public sphere discourse
from multiple sources that included newspapers, magazines, transcripts from public
appearances, and stakeholder websites. I then interviewed participants from four school
districts in Central State between 2008 and 2011, although all interviews in each
individual district were completed in a one-year period with the exception of Blue Lake.
Participants from Blue Lake were reluctant to participate, and it became necessary to
locate and interview participants who were no longer employed by the district in order to
obtain a clearer picture of the data for that district. Interviews with politicians took place
in 2011. Information regarding the viewpoints of private organizations and philanthropies
was gathered through their websites. This process of inquiry followed Dewey’s method
of gathering data and reflecting on that data through consideration of multiple viewpoints
(Dewey, 1944). This type of consideration was essential in any educational study where
there were so many stakeholders with varied interests.

Exemplar for Case Study Model
This study analyzed to what extent MAST, one policy in a much broader scope of
education reforms, was likely to change public education and to determine the
implications of that change. Wirt, Mitchell, and Marshall (1988) used critical policy
analysis, a methodology that incorporates multiple perspectives on policies, to analyze
how the political histories of two states influenced their education statutes based on four
values—choice, efficiency, equity, and quality. The two states were chosen because of
their close geographical proximity, but strong contrast in education statutes (Wirt, et al.,
1988), essentially using a form of ideal typology. This study used their research as a case
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study exemplar, but diverged from this research in the method of analysis. Whereas Wirt,
et al. (1988) used Critical Policy Analysis as an analytical framework, this research used
Grounded Theory.
Discourse theory helped to analyze contradictions. There was no shortage of
contradictions in political discourse regarding education reform. Marx, Lincoln, and
Edelman were theorists who supplied a theoretical background to this analysis, while
Freidman and Freidman, Apple, and Chubb and Moe provided a more issue-specific lens.
Some researchers, such as Ainsworth and Hardy (2004) combined discourse theory with
critical theory to form critical discourse analysis and compared that data against data
systematically analyzed through other theoretical lenses. This type of multi-lens analysis
helped to add validity and reliability to the results (Ainsworth & Hardy, 2004). In fashion
with other discourse analysis studies, e.g. Lincoln (1989), this study attempted to
synthesize the discourse of the constituents rather than promote a single, core theory.

Data Collection

Multi-case Research Using Ideal Typology
Ideal typology was a method of case subject selection whereby characteristics of
subjects were categorized and divided into representative types of the phenomenon
studied (Becker, 1998). Ideal types accentuated characteristics of phenomena for the
purpose of dividing those characteristics for study. The early history of this method for
selecting variations within case data is often associated with Max Weber’s work. Weber
was one of the first proponents of the ideal type methodology. He used it to determine
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primary differences between Protestants and Catholics in Germany in relation to their
ownership of capital (Weber & Kalberg, 2002).
By sorting subjects into these types, Weber was able to determine a relationship
between people’s religious beliefs and their views on capitalism to explain why
Protestants owned significantly more capital than Catholics (Weber & Kalberg, 2002).
Wirt et al. (1988) used ideal types in their multi-case research to select states for their
study regarding the role of cultural values in state education policymaking. Additionally,
Berliner (2000, November-December) used ideal typology to study teacher proficiency.
Teachers were divided into four categories as follows: one teacher weak in subject and
pedagogical knowledge, one teacher weak in subject knowledge but strong in
pedagogical knowledge, one teacher strong in subject knowledge but weak in
pedagogical knowledge, and one teacher strong in subject and pedagogical knowledge
(Berliner 2000, November-December).
Sociologists selected cases they believed to be typical in a certain area of study
(Becker, 1998). Studies that looked at programs, organizations, society, or culture
typically used some sort of case study format (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). This study
focused on a program (MAST) within multiple organizations (school districts) that were
part of a larger organization (public education) that was engrained as part of our society
and culture (expectations for a “free” K-12 education for all). Because there was a long
tradition of using a case research format to study this type of phenomenon, using a case
approach gave validity to the research. Because there were differences between the types
of school districts that implement MAST, looking at multiple cases helped to determine
what, if any, factors were present that motivated some districts to be early adopters and
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others to resist, and to learn about the life expectancy of MAST. Using a multi-case
format allowed for the possibility of finding a negative case—a case that went against
expectations (Becker, 1998). Additionally, since school districts had a variety of
characteristics that may have impacted their decision to implement or not implement
MAST, it was necessary to use a multiple case format.
I used ideal typology as a method for selecting case districts in choosing four
school districts. Two of these were suburban districts with student populations greater
than 6,500 students; one that had and active MAST program at the time of the study and
one that did not. I also chose two regional center districts with student populations less
than 4,500 students; one that had and active MAST program at the time of the study and
one that did not.
By sorting school districts into ideal types, I was able to establish a relationship
between characteristics of districts that successfully adopted MAST and the impact of
MAST in that district while controlling for differences in school size and type. This ideal
typography was the basis of my research here.
Blue Lake and Pine Springs were two school districts located in regional centers
in Central state. Both districts had fewer than 4,500 students, which was typical for this
type of school district. Blue Lake was not implementing MAST at the time of this
research, but Pine Springs had an active MAST program.
Conversely, Cotton Grove and Winter Valley were both suburban school districts
with student populations above 6500 students, which was a typical size for suburban
school districts in Central State. At the time of this research, Cotton Grove was not

Pay-for-Performance Page 98 of 299
implementing MAST, but Winter Valley had what participants defined as an effective
MAST program (See Fig. 1).

Small

District Size

Large

Fig. 1. District Participants Based on Ideal Typology

District: Cotton Grove
Suburban
Student Population > 6,500
No Currently Active MAST Program

District: Winter Valley
Suburban
Student Population > 6,500
Currently Active MAST Program

District: Blue Lake
Regional Center
Student Population < 4,500
No Currently Active MAST Program

District: Pine Springs
Regional Center
Student Population < 4,500
Currently Active MAST Program

MAST Implementation
No

Yes
Sources

Sources for data collection included historical research, information disseminated
through formal communication channels, and interviews of stakeholders. Data sources
incorporated viewpoints of multiple groups of stakeholders including the following: (a)
non-partisan foundations, (b) policy makers, (c) political insiders, (d) elected political
officials, (e) district administrators, (f) school administrators, (g) school board members,
(h) school finance officers, (i) teachers, and (j) union representatives. The various data
sources collected from these stakeholders were gathered via the methods described
below.
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Historical Research
In this study, formal communication sources provided insight into the position,
strategy, and rhetoric of stakeholders, especially the views of non-partisan foundations,
policy makers, national union representatives, and elected political officials. These
formal communication sources included official collateral material and websites of
organizations that were stakeholders in performance-based compensation for teachers.
These websites included but were not limited to those sponsored by CSDE, state and
national teachers’ unions, Central State government, Milken Foundation, Chartwell
Foundation, TAP Foundation, Broad Foundation, National Center for Education
Accountability, and Public Agenda Foundation. Local, state, and national newspapers,
and education and policy journals helped to determine strategies and rhetoric specific to
MAST. A review of legislative session tapes helped to establish the rhetoric used and
how the compromised merit pay model called MAST was passed into law. This
information was public domain data and available to anyone wishing to see it.
Other studies have used historical analysis to analyze discourse. Wirt et al. (1988)
found that analyzing state statutes based on the four cultural values they studied helped
them identify contrasts between the two states studied and enabled them to determine
relationships between the states’ political histories and the values present in their
education statutes. Analyzing the discourse carried out in the public sphere helped to
determine whether mystification or manipulation of public opinion existed and to what
extent (Wirt et al., 1988).
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Politician Interviews
Three politicians, one Republican senator and two Democratic congresspersons,
were interviewed in order to gain insight into the origin of MAST and policy creation in
one state and to ascertain their impressions on the adoption patterns of MAST. Interviews
began with open-ended questions such as “Tell me about your relationship to the
development of the MAST Policy” and “How do you envision MAST affecting public
education?” The answers to these open-ended questions led to follow-up questions based
on the information provided.

School Data
This study tracked public domain school data to further determine what if any
changes in the district were attributable to MAST implementation. This type of data
included financial data, aggregate student achievement data, teacher attendance data, and
teacher salary data.

District Administrator, Teacher, Union Representative, and School Board Member
Interviews
Interviews of school district administrators, teachers, union representatives, and
school board members were conducted in order to gain insight into how the district went
about implementing, not implementing, or implementing and dropping MAST. Initial
interviews were approximately 45 minutes in length and began with open-ended
questions such as “How was the decision made to implement MAST in your
district/school?” “How has MAST implementation affected your district/school?” and
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“How will your district evaluate the effectiveness of MAST as a program locally?” The
answers to these open-ended questions led to follow-up questions based on the
information provided.
As the study proceeded, additional questions arose based on data collected and
changing conditions for MAST implementation within school districts. Therefore, an
additional interview with district personnel was scheduled toward the end of the data
collection. Each of these interviews was approximately 30 minutes in length. They began
with open-ended questions like “Since our last interview, how has your district/school
changed as a result of MAST implementation?” and “What has your district learned
regarding MAST implementation since our last interview?” and included other openended questions based on trends in the data gathered, gaps in data, and the responses to
the initial interview questions.

District Finance Officer Interviews
School finance officers were interviewed to validate the public domain financial
data gathered and to determine the financial impact of MAST implementation on the
district. Initial 45-minute interviews were scheduled with school finance officers at the
beginning of the study. Interview questions included items such as “How was the
decision to implement MAST made?” “How has MAST implementation affected the
district financially?” and “How has the public supported the local tax burden as a result
of MAST implementation?” and other open-ended questions based on the responses
given to these initial questions.
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As the study proceeded, additional questions arose based on data collected, and
changes to the districts’ financial pictures. Therefore, school finance officers were
interviewed a second time toward the end of the study as needed and based on
participants willingness to participate. These follow-up interviews were scheduled to last
approximately 30 minutes and included questions like “Since our last interview, how has
your district’s financial picture changed as a result of MAST implementation?” and
“What new knowledge has been gained as a result of MAST implementation as it relates
to school district finances?” and other open-ended questions based on the data collected
and the responses to the initial interview questions.

Modes of Data Analysis

Grounded Theory
Initial Grounded Theory-based coding was based on early data gathered from
historical research and interviews and entered into NVivo, an electronic tool designed to
aid qualitative data collection. The data was summarized and categorized in order to
simplify retrieval and enhance analysis following the data analysis steps of Grounded
Theory: defining data, analyzing the meaning of data, and categorizing it (Charmaz,
2006).

Single- and Multi-case Analysis
Data was gathered during a three-year period from 2008-2011. Analysis of the
data began as soon as initial data was collected and continued as it became available until
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all data was collected and analyzed. Data was analyzed using a constructivist and critical
theoretical lens. Coding of data was initially based on trends found in relevant literature,
but evolved to encompass data trends found in the participant interview data collected in
this study. As new codes were identified, all previous transcripts and data were reviewed
to look for evidence of the newly identified code. Additional follow-up interviews were
conducted prior to the conclusion of the data-gathering phase to gain additional data
regarding new themes that emerged in the data.
Data was analyzed both at the local level within a single district to attempt to
reconcile the data gathered for each district as well as comparatively among all of the
districts studied to determine what if any relationships existed to develop a conceptual
framework based on the emerging themes present in the data.
At the conclusion of the data-gathering phase, all data was re-read, proofreading
for coding additions or errors. Data was entered into NVivo, a computer program
designed to sort data by themes. Themes emerging from various perspectives were
compared, looking at trends, patterns, similarities, and differences.

Content Analysis
The content analysis phase began with the start of the study as historical data was
collected and continued through the end of the study as new information became
available on this topic. This historical research was reviewed for emerging trends in the
data and to clarify the perspectives of stakeholder views relevant to the data gathered.
This data was also used to help determine the public and political discourse trends
regarding MAST and its role within public education policy.
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Multi-modal Analysis
The multi-modal analysis phase began as data from local districts became
available and continued through the end of the study. In the multi-modal analysis phase, I
compared the data gathered from the single-case, multi-case, and historical research
phases. I attempted to use this information to build a logical chain of events depicting the
local implementation of this educational policy and develop a coherent theory regarding
the policy’s early adoption patterns from this data.

Validity

Researcher Bias
I did my best to present the data and research in a fair and balanced manner. I do
not currently have a vested interest in whether districts choose to implement MAST or
not. At the beginning of the study, I was not sure whether or not the implementation of
MAST would benefit public education. As the study progressed, I began to form an
opinion, but tried to not let that interfere with the data-gathering or analysis. I did not try
to interfere with or influence any district’s decision regarding MAST implementation.
Additionally, when reviewing communication and public discourse, I was sure to include
all perspectives in the MAST debate.

Reactivity
In order to minimize reactivity, I constructed open-ended interview questions that
minimized the risk of leading the interviewee to believe that there was a desired answer.
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Additionally, I asked questions in a variety of ways to look for consistency in the data
gathered. As with minimizing researcher bias, when reviewing communication and public
discourse, I included all perspectives in the MAST debate. When observing participants
at meetings and other events, I remained as unobtrusive as possible, but was aware of the
possibility that participants may have been putting on a show for my benefit so they
would look more favorable in the research. However, because the debate was public and
my presence was not a major factor in the discussion, reactivity did not appear to be a
factor.

Involvement and Data
By following school districts for one year, I hoped to achieve a long-term
involvement that not only minimized reactivity to my presence, but would also provide
rich and varied data for analysis and deeper understanding of the data. However, I found
that in each case MAST was either running smoothly and not a topic of discussion at
public meetings or that MAST was not implemented and not discussed in the district. As
a result, several participants felt that the situation in their district had not changed and
that they had nothing new to add, so the second interviews in these instances were short
and added only minimal additional data. Additionally, as districts and politicians reacted
to legislative and financial changes, I thought that their situations regarding MAST might
have changed as well, especially for the districts that were not actively participating in
MAST at the time of this research. However, this was not the case. Nonetheless,
following the districts for a period of time did provide a better sense of their culture and
leadership and how it may have impacted MAST implementation at a local level.
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Respondent Validation
I recorded all interviews and observations via note taking. After completing
interviews and observations, transcriptions were shown to participants for their input and
feedback on the validity of the evidence.

Discrepant Evidence and Negative Cases and Comparison
At the time of this study there were two school districts in the state that adopted,
and then rejected, MAST. Including one of these districts provided data on a negative
case where the pay-for-performance model did not work as a long-term teacher
compensation model for that district. Using ideal typology as a basis for case selection
provided a variety of data to either confirm or reject emerging theories through a process
of comparison.

Triangulation
By conducting interviews with politicians, teachers, union representatives,
administrators, and school board members, a variety of perspectives were included.
Observing politicians, teachers, and administrators also gave a good variety of
perspectives regarding implementation of MAST at a local level. Incorporating historical
research and official discourse also provided a broader, balanced, and reliable insight into
policy development and implementation.
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Generalizability
Since this study used a multi-case format based on ideal typology selection, there
were probably many districts in the state that would share some traits with one or more of
the four districts included in this study. School districts may use this study to help them
decide whether or not to implement MAST, and other state officials may use this data to
decide whether and/or how to implement their own merit-based teacher compensation
model. However, it was still early in the life cycle of MAST and generalizations
regarding its long-term future and sustainability were premature. Additionally, there was
not sufficient data to compare MAST to other education reform policies and make
generalizations about the implementation and early adoption of other educational
policies. In addition, this mostly qualitative cross-comparison of MAST districts by
logical type was not intended to be broadly generalizable; this was certainly true beyond
the state in which the research was conducted.

Ethics and Confidentiality
All participating districts and individual participants remained anonymous. School
data was presented in aggregate so that no individual or district was identifiable in the
study. Reference citations that included the names of individuals, schools, districts, or the
state studied were altered to reflect the pseudonyms used in this document and to further
protect participant anonymity. Since Central State was the only state implementing a
statewide teacher pay for performance program at the beginning of the study and the only
one implementing MAST, anonymity cannot be guaranteed to the governor or state
agencies. However, this study sought information that was already a matter of public
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record. In order for others to replicate or build from this study, the names of relevant
foundations that have participated in the creation or promotion of performance-based
teacher pay were included in this study. However, it was important to remember that all
information contained in this study regarding these organizations was public information
provided by the organization themselves or through published media and was part of the
public domain.
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLICY DISCOURSE ON MAST

There were many stakeholders involved in MAST implementation from its
inception to implementation at the local level. This chapter provides background
information about the MAST phenomenon, the stakeholders, and the discourse involved.

MAST as First Introduced
Governor Sam King, a rising star in the Republican Party strongly supported the
neoconservative position favoring school choice, raised academic standards, mandated
teacher and student competencies, state-wide common curriculum, standardized testing,
and schools meeting the perceived needs of business. Governor King promoted the idea
that public education in its current state was a danger to children and the future of the
U.S., but the problem of inadequate student achievement could be solved through the
implementation of policies that included school choice initiatives and MAST, (Johnson,
2005).
Success for Central State in a global economy also demands that we develop the
potential of all of our citizens. Disparities in graduation rates and academic
performance between white students and students of color continue to be a moral,
social, and economic crisis… Ninety-three percent of the students at Johnson
Charter School [(a school students can attend by choice)] are disadvantaged and
come from homes where English is not the first language. Last year the school
joined the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) and it’s now part of MAST.
Teachers are paid for performance, meaningful professional development is
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provided for staff, and rigorous evaluation of instruction is conducted. The results
are remarkable. In just over one year, the students have improved on every
measurement. The number of students passing the Basic Skills Test went from
38% to 62% (King, 2006).
Through rhetoric like this, King identified the social problem as inadequate student
achievement and teachers as the cause of that problem. However, King attributed the
increase of students’ scores on one standardized test to an increase in meaningful student
achievement based on the school’s participation in two pay-for-performance programs for
one year each without regard to whether or not the test adequately measured student
achievement or if TAP and MAST caused the increase in test scores or if there were other
factors that may have attributed to the increase in test scores. Additionally, the 2009
evaluation of MAST by Hezel Associates found that MAST’s impact on student
achievement was inconclusive because MAST had not been implemented long enough.
However, these details did not seem to derail the implementation of school choice and
MAST initiatives in Central State.
Governor King also implied that teachers and their unions were the biggest
problem in public education, thus establishing their position as the villain and a justifiable
target in the student achievement policy solution.
The number one school related factor of how our children are going to do in
school is the quality, preparedness, and effectiveness of their teachers…. The
quality of our teachers has eroded to the point where we should all be quite
concerned about it. And the factors that go into it are these: our colleges of
education in the United States of America are not nearly sufficient and rigorous
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and relevant to the subject matter mastery that our teachers have to have. Number
two, we are not attracting the quality people that we need into teaching for a
variety of reasons. Once they arrive into teaching as new teachers we are not
sufficiently developing, supporting, and training them particularly in the first five
years… We need to move to a system where we pay for performance. We have
done this in Central State. It is controversial. Does anyone who works outside of
government get paid just for seniority? No one. The world has moved on. Eightyfive percent of all the money that goes into schools goes into what? Salaries and
benefits and operating budget and you know what? And do you know what it’s
aligned to? Seniority. And do you know what the correlation is between seniority
and the effectiveness of the teacher and student learning? Almost zero…. [The
main strategic objective of schools] isn’t whether we all feel good about it. It’s
whether students are learning, what they’re learning, and how fast they’re
learning. We need to have some part of the increased funding for schools, as
much as possible in my view, aligned to whether that strategic objective is being
met in measurable and accountable ways (King, 2011).

Again, this rhetoric ignored some relevant research. The relevant research in this
case was that which showed that socio-economic status was the most important factor in
determining student achievement (Holland, 2007; Lee & Burkam, 2002). Arguably,
teachers were a much smaller and less diverse group than parents, so teachers made a
better target group than parents for a policy solution. This fact was not lost on Governor
King as he addressed the Central State Association of School Administrators in 2006.
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We can't legislate good parents so we've got to focus on other stuff. We were the
first state to implement PSEO, so who better to lead the nation in reform. Let's
regain the mantle of education innovation in Central State (King, 2006, August
15).

His early rhetoric on MAST demonstrated a belief that incompetent and lazy
teachers were seemingly everywhere and immune to termination through union
protection. Governor King’s plan was to “fix” public education through increased
competition and the weakening of the teachers’ union (Weber, 2008). At this point,
inadequate student achievement was labeled as the social problem that was the result of
poor teaching done by incompetent and lazy teachers that were protected by their unions
(Johnson, 2005). It could be argued that this labeling served to name teachers and their
unions as the “villains” and the neoconservatives, including Governor King, who were
going to stop this practice as the “heroes.” The student achievement problem needed to
be solved and getting rid of ineffective teachers and their unions was the pre-fabricated
solution to the problem as described by Edelman (1988). Arguably, the “fix” to this social
problem had no research to support that eliminating or weakening teachers’ unions would
improve student achievement.
With student achievement labeled as a problem and teachers and their unions as
the cause of the problem, the Central State Governor and sympathetic legislators were
able to propose multiple legislative initiatives including MAST that were aimed at
weakening teachers’ unions. These legislative initiatives also included allowing
alternative pathways to teacher and administrative licensure that would have allowed
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business professionals to obtain their teaching and administrative licensure with little or
no training in education. The pay-for-performance rhetoric associated with MAST made
it appear to be another piece of union-busting legislation to many Central State educators,
but the rhetoric resonated with much of the general population of Central State.
Governor King strongly supported the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP)
advanced by the Milken Foundation and worked to bring the concept to Central State on
a statewide scale. The previous Central State Governor had introduced TAP in the state,
and in the few years of its existence only a handful of districts had ever used it, and about
one fourth of them had already dropped the program or were in the process of dropping it
when Governor King took office. Despite the failure of TAP to gain widespread approval
in Central State, Governor King introduced MAST, which was based on TAP, during his
first term as Governor. As a result of the similarity of MAST and TAP and TAP’s dismal
showing in Central State, MAST appeared to lack research and data that supported its
potential as a successful performance-based compensation model in Central State.
During both of his terms as Governor, both the Central State House and Senate
were controlled by Democrats, but the relationship between the Governor and the
Legislature during his first term were relatively good. However, in order to get the MAST
legislation passed, a lot of compromises were made, and the final legislation was
significantly different from the Governor’s initial vision (M. Voss, personal
communication, October 24, 2011). When Governor King first proposed MAST, he
presented it as a way to “professionalize” teacher compensation and as the first state-wide
teacher pay-for-performance compensation program in the U.S.
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When the MAST bill was first introduced in the Legislature in March of 2005, by
a Republican Congresswoman representing an urban area of Central State, the language
regarding alternative teacher compensation included the following provisions.
The alternative teacher professional pay system must: …use a professional pay
system that replaces the lockstep steps and lanes salary system and allows school
districts and charter schools to compensate teachers for satisfactory service and
completion of annual performance goals; include performance compensation for
teachers in districts or charter schools based on, at a minimum: (i) student
achievement gains and school achievement gains…, locally selected standardized
assessments, or both; and (ii) results of individual teacher evaluations based on
classroom observations by a locally selected evaluation team (Central State
House, 2005a).
The Republican Senator from the same urban legislative district introduced an identical
“companion bill,” four days later team (Central State Senate, 2005a).
As initially introduced, the legislative language provided only $150 per student in
funding for the program, required the elimination of the traditional step and lane salary
schedule and tied all of the salary increase teachers would receive to student achievement
and their performance evaluation. As first introduced, MAST very closely resembled how
salary increases in the private sector worked. Both bills also required that MAST salary
compensation plans be developed by regular local school districts and become part of an
adopted collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of understanding between the
school district and teachers’ union, or some other legally binding agreement.
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Arguably, the Governor and these legislators overestimated the desperation of
local public school teachers for a salary increase and the willingness of teachers to
abandon their traditional compensation model. He likely thought that the rhetoric of
“professionalizing” teacher compensation would serve to pressure teachers’ unions to
adopt MAST. After all, teachers would want to be seen as professionals and parents
would want their children taught by professionals. Additionally, as school districts were
claiming to be desperately in need of additional funding, the MAST carrot held financial
incentives as well.

Mast Metamorphosis
As is almost always the case, MAST legislation was not signed into law in the
same form as it was introduced. At the time MAST was introduced, both the House and
Senate were controlled by the Democrats and compromises had to be made in order for
MAST legislation to pass. During the legislative process, various stakeholders lobbied
legislators to alter or eliminate the legislation. As a result, compromises were made and
MAST legislation was revised (Central State House, 2005a; Central State Senate, 2005a;
Central State Statute, 2005). This process of compromise was similar to the process
described by Edelman (1988) where competing interests forced compromises to the
policy solution.
The Senate version of the MAST legislation was referred to the Education
Committee where it died (Central State Senate Education Committee, 2005; Central State
Senate, 2005b). The House version was referred to the Education Committee where it
passed with amendments adding school-wide achievement gains to the list of criteria for
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teachers to meet in order to receive MAST compensation (Central State House Education
Committee, 2005; Central State House, 2005b). The House then amended the bill to
increase the amount of compensation to $260 per student (Central State House, 2005b).
However, the amendment was referred back to the House Education Committee where it
too died (Central State House Education Committee, 2005). The regular legislative
session ended, and the MAST bill was not passed in either the House or Senate (Central
State House, 2005b; Central State Senate, 2005b).
Other legislative work was not completed, and the Governor called a special
legislative session (Central State Legislative Reference Library, 2012). The Governor and
the Republicans were determined to pass MAST, and it was resurrected in July of 2005 as
part of the education omnibus bill (Central State House, 2005c; Central State Senate,
2005c). The education omnibus bill was a bill that typically contained numerous smaller
bills that were largely non-controversial in nature and were all acted upon as one bill
(Central State House, 2005c; Central State Senate, 2005c). However, because of a variety
of factors related to omnibus bills including their large size, their presentation at the end
of the legislative session (when legislators are tired) and their typically innocuous
language, at least some legislators reported that they did not read these bills carefully (M.
Wilson, personal communication, January 18, 2011; M. Voss, personal communication,
October 24, 2011; C. Sampson, personal communication, February 9, 2011). This may
have made it easier to pass MAST.
When MAST was presented in the omnibus bill, it had undergone some
significant changes to the language regarding teacher compensation.
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The alternative teacher professional pay system agreement must:… reform the
“steps and lanes” salary schedule, prevent any teacher’s compensation paid
before implementing the pay system from being reduced as a result of
participating in this system, and base at least 60 percent of any compensation
increase on teacher performance using: (i) school-wide student achievement
gains …or locally selected standardized assessment outcomes, or both; (ii)
measures of student achievement; and (iii) an objective evaluation program
(Central State Statute, 2005).

In this version of MAST legislation, the MAST funding to school districts
remained at $260 per student, but the state only would provide all of the funding the first
year. The second year, a portion of the funding would come from local property tax
levies. The steps and lanes no longer needed to be eliminated, just reformed. The amount
of MAST compensation tied to student achievement, standardized test scores, and teacher
evaluation was reduced from 100% to a minimum of 60%. The legislative language did
not describe to what extent the steps and lanes had to be reformed or what percentage of
teacher compensation had to be tied to student achievement versus teacher evaluation. As
a result, this vagueness led to a great deal of debate after MAST became law.
During the special session, there was a motion to remove MAST from the
omnibus bill, because it was not historically the type of bill that would be included in the
larger omnibus bill due to its more controversial nature. However, interestingly, the
House and Senate floor debates about MAST were not always reflective of the latest
revision that was included in the omnibus bill. On both floors, legislators debated the bill
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in terms of 60% to all of a teacher’s total compensation being tied to student achievement
with no mention of the possibility of a good portion of that being tied to teacher
evaluation by other measures. In the House, the discussion was not in terms of how much
of a teacher’s salary should be tied to student achievement, but whether or not tying
teachers’ compensation to performance was a good idea at all. Representatives talked as
if all of teachers’ compensation, not just MAST compensation, would be based on
performance as could have been interpreted from the initial version of the legislation.
When MAST was discussed in the Senate, the discussion went much the same way as it
did in the House until one senator clarified that under MAST only 30% of a teacher’s
salary would be tied to performance. However, this clarification was also inaccurate as
the legislation did not tie any specific percentage of the MAST increase to student
achievement versus teacher performance. Further, MAST legislation had no impact on
tying non-MAST compensation to teachers’ performance in any way.
Ultimately, when the motion to remove MAST from the omnibus bill was up for a
vote in the Senate it failed in a tie vote. The omnibus bill passed the House and Senate
and was signed into law with MAST legislation intact, although I was not sure that the
legislators really knew exactly what they had just passed.
Thus far, the legislative process fit precisely with Edelman’s (1988) work in so far
as the competing interests of the legislators and the constituents they represented served
to modify MAST legislation, making the legislative “solution” ambiguous and
contradictory. It also seemed to have left all of the stakeholder groups at least somewhat
dissatisfied. The legislation as a pre-fabricated solution sought to weaken teachers’
unions, but allowed for voluntary participation and union approval at the local school
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district level, thus limiting its effectiveness in that regard. Local teachers were not likely
to adopt a plan that they believed would not be of benefit to them. The legislative
language was also vague and left the definition of “reform” as it applied to teacher
compensation subject to a variety of interpretations. A third area of vagueness in the
legislative language was the extent of teachers’ compensation that was actually tied to
student achievement. With the minimum of 60% of MAST compensation tied to a teacher
evaluation combined with local student achievement measures or state standardized test
scores, no set amount was required to be tied to test scores. As a result, districts in
Central State attached very little of the MAST compensation to test score criteria. I have
seen ranges from one to five percent of MAST compensation tied to state standardized
test scores, although it is possible that some districts in Central State attached
a greater percentage of MAST compensation to this measure.
The three legislators who participated in this research shared their thoughts on
MAST legislation. Senator Mary Voss was a Republican who represented a legislative
district that encompassed both small, rural towns and outer-ring suburbs of a large
metropolitan area. Cotton Grove, one of the case districts in this research, was included in
her legislative district. Her professional background was in small businesses. She served
on the K-12 Education Finance Committee when MAST was passed into law and served
on the Higher Education Committee and as Chair of the State Finance Committee. She
has served in the Senate since 1997. Throughout the interview process, she strongly
echoed the sentiments of Governor King and his neoconservative approach to education
policy, with her strongest support of MAST being in its original legislative version prior
to the compromises made in order to get the legislation passed.
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Representative Max Wilson was a Democrat who represented a regional center,
small towns, and rural areas in southern Central State. He had been a state representative
since 2006. Although he had not served on any K-12 education-related committees, he
did have work experience as a college professor, and was familiar with K-12 education.
His views on education appeared to lean toward the neoliberal point of view of the
education policy debate, but were not entirely consistent with the neoliberal education
policy agenda.
Claudia Sampson had been a state representative since 1992. She was a Democrat
who represented a wealthy suburban area. Prior to her election as a state representative,
she served on the board of her local school district. As a state representative, Sampson
chaired the House K-12 Education Finance Committee, and was an author of the New
Central State Salvation legislation, legislation designed to adequately fund K-12 public
education in Central State based on the original Central State Salvation legislation from
1971. At the time of this research, the New Central State Salvation legislation had been
brought before the House several times, but never passed. Although Representative
Sampson believed that performance-based compensation was a good thing, she thought
that the larger issue impacting student achievement was a general lack of funding for
public schools, representing more of a traditional philosophical stance among Democrats
in Central State.
There was little consensus among these three legislators about what the important
components of MAST were, and even if the program should continue. The only
component of MAST that all three legislators interviewed agreed upon was that a very
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important component of the MAST plan was the voluntary participation on the part of
school districts.
Although Representative Wilson thought that there were important components of
MAST, he would prefer that MAST was discontinued.
If it were up to me, I’d eliminate MAST in favor of the National Board of
Teaching approach. It’s the same model that I think Stanford, the University of
Minnesota, and the Bush Foundation use for pay increases. It puts more
responsibility on the teacher to do a good job and not just collect a paycheck no
matter how good of a job they do. That’s why the voluntary nature of MAST is so
important to me. I don’t think we can force a compensation model on a school
district when we know there are better models out there…The local levy funding
is important for two reasons. One, we could never afford to pay all of it, and, two,
there has to be some buy in from the local district that they are committed to it. If
they have to pay for some of it, they’ll be more likely to follow through (M.
Wilson, personal communication, January 18, 2011).

Representative Sampson (personal communication, February 9, 2011) thought
that career advancement, performance-based compensation, professional development,
state funding, teacher observations, and voluntary participation were all very important
parts of MAST, but again, reiterated that the overall lack of reliable, consistent, and
adequate funding was a much more significant issue.
Senator Voss (personal communication, October 24, 2011) thought that the only
very important part of the MAST plan was its voluntary nature. She noted that the
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voluntary nature was important because the data from MAST was inconclusive as to its
effectiveness regarding student achievement. However, she also rated local levy funding,
performance-based compensation, and teacher observation as important. The local-levy
funding and performance-based compensation fit tightly with the neoconservative
position of Governor King. These two components of MAST served the neoconservative
view that unions harbored poor performers and served to decrease allocation of state
resources to local programs. Like Representative Wilson, she believed that the local levy
was important to show that districts “buy-in to the MAST plan and aren’t just going
along with it to get some additional money from the state” (M. Voss, personal
communication, October 24, 2011).
Senator Voss was a supporter of the original legislative language and was greatly
disappointed with the compromised version of MAST that ultimately became law.
There was a lot of compromising done to get this [MAST] passed. It was very
political. Governor King had a plan, the Democrats (in the Senate in particular)
had their plan. The union [CSEA] had a lot of influence in the program. It was
softened to the point where I’m not sure it’s worthwhile. If we had to do more
budget cuts, I would be willing to freeze participation for a few years and see how
we’re doing. I’m not advocating for eliminating it though. I’m not sure we can get
better results without changing the program. Its purpose was to get teachers off
steps and lanes, but it never did that. I want performance-based compensation for
teachers, but not in its present form—not watered down. We need to strengthen
the compensation system. It was really intended to get rid of steps and lanes. We
won’t ever get it if unions [local teachers’ unions] get to approve the plan. They
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might like the outcome, but they don’t want to give up control (M. Voss, personal
communication, October 24, 2011).
Senator Voss’s statement seemed to confirm MAST as a pre-fabricated solution as
promoted by Edelman (1988) to the extent that MAST’s purpose, as explained by Senator
Voss, was really about getting rid of traditional step and lane teacher compensation and
implementing performance-based pay rather than increasing student achievement.
One of the results of compromise and the extensive lobbying done to secure that
compromise was that no one got everything they wanted. Senator Voss’s sentiment could
have mirrored that of the Governor regarding the version of MAST that was passed based
on what followed during the initial implementation phase of MAST. In fact, Senator Voss
seemed to have gotten little of what she wanted out of the MAST legislation, but a
compromised version of the legislation appeared to be a greater political “win” than a
failure of the legislation to pass at all. The legislative metamorphosis of MAST also
echoed Edelman (1988) in describing why the legislation that was ultimately passed had
little hope of solving the problem it was intended to fix as a result of the competing
interests and resulting compromises made. The MAST legislation passed, but retained
little power to do what it was intended to do.

MAST Implementation Debate: Reform versus Elimination
In MAST’s implementation, there was a great deal of debate about the meaning of
“reform” and “alternative” in the teacher pay system. The lack of a clear definition of
these terms in the legislation left stakeholders to develop their own definitions. As a
result, the definitions between stakeholders varied. The differing viewpoints of various
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stakeholders and their lack of ability to reach consensus on the definitions caused
dissatisfaction for multiple stakeholders as they discovered that MAST implementation
differed from their vision of what it would be like.
The actual MAST legislation did not tie any specific portion of the MAST dollars
a teacher was able to receive solely to student achievement. However, 60% of MAST
compensation was tied to teacher performance, and student performance was one
measure of teacher performance. In implementation one effect of this ambiguity was that
the amount of compensation tied to standardized test scores varied by district. MAST
legislation did not impact other compensation teachers received from districts except that
districts were required to develop a reformed alternative teacher professional pay system.
MAST legislation did not freeze a teacher’s salary, but could deny the teacher any
additional compensation through MAST. Additionally, the way MAST was interpreted
by most districts meant that teachers could earn 40% of the MAST dollars without
meeting any performance goals. Similar to Edelman’s (1988) research, this ambiguity
fueled an intense debate between local school districts and CSDE, with multiple districts
actually suing CSDE over its interpretation of the legislation (Owen, 2006; FindLaw,
2007).

Governor King
When MAST was signed into law in 2005, Governor King promoted MAST as a
“grass-roots” initiative that would come from the teachers themselves. In a sense, MAST
had to come from teachers because a district could not adopt MAST without local
teachers’ union approval. Governor King predicted that teachers of half of the students in
Central State would come into the program during the first two years; the other half
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would participate by 2009. At first it looked like that might happen. It was argued that
overtly informing districts that only half would receive funding for the program may have
briefly sparked a shortage mentality among districts and the majority quickly sent nonbinding letters of intent to participate in MAST to CSDE (CSDE, 2010). This echoed the
free-market principals of supply and demand advanced by Freidman and Smith, and
seemed to be effective in the early days of MAST. The Governor was energized and
spoke as if this version of MAST was the program he’d hoped for, with no signs of how
much he had compromised to get it passed (M. Voss, personal communication, October
24, 2011). Although the Governor remained enthusiastic about MAST, local school
district interest diminished quickly (CSDE, 2010).
When Governor King talked about MAST during the first few years of its
implementation, he talked about how MAST would professionalize teacher compensation
and pay high-performing teachers for their performance while freezing the pay of lowperforming teachers, ultimately driving them out of the profession (Weber, 2008). He
talked about how MAST awarded teachers raises based on their performance and student
achievement instead of longevity (Weber, 2008), and was quick to point out that MAST
caused the improvement in student achievement in Metropolis (“Governor Delivers,”
2006). However, in an interview for Education Week, the superintendent of Metropolis
attributed the gain to new professional development initiatives implemented in the district
during the same time period and not to MAST (McNiel, 2006).
In the end, MAST floundered. Teachers did not rise up and demand that their
district participate in MAST like the Governor predicted. In fact, relatively few districts
actually implemented the program. Six years after MAST was unveiled only 12% of
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Central State school districts encompassing 30% of the students were using MAST.
MAST seemed to be suffering the same fate as the TAP program that came before it in
Central State (CSDE, 2010).

CSDE
MAST was floundering, and was not turning out to be what the Governor
originally wanted. However, all was not lost for the Governor’s pet education project. In
Central State, the State Education Commissioner was appointed by the Governor,
essentially making CSDE an education policy implementation extension of the
Governor’s office. The SCDE championed MAST and its implementation. CSDE
published press releases on its website and ensured photo opportunities with the
Governor and or Commissioner of Education handing the involved district an oversized
check contributing to the political spectacle as described by Edelman (1988). Each press
release contained general information about the district’s MAST plan and about how
excited the district was to be participating in MAST (CSDE, 2006, 2007). Each press
release listed all of the districts that had signed on to participate in MAST (that were still
participating at the time of the press release) (CSDE, 2006, 2007). It was reminiscent of
advertisers using peer pressure techniques to get people to buy products, and seemed to
be a strategy as described by Spector and Kitsuse (1977) to get the audience, in this case
local school districts, to act.
CSDE also helped to spread the Governor’s pay-for-performance rhetoric. Both
the Governor and CSDE used words like “professional” and “modern” to describe the
compensation method in MAST (CSDE, 2006, 2007; King, 2006). This language served
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to convey the message that the traditional steps and lanes salary schedule was outdated
and unprofessional without overtly attacking it. In the early years of MAST, the Central
State Education Commissioner preached that the public did not support automatic pay
increases for employees because industries no longer operated in that manner (Hanson,
2006). CSDE employees, including the Commissioner Mahoney, also helped to paint
MAST as a successful program because it tied teacher education to student learning, in
effect, although it was not usually the case, as school districts that had implemented
MAST did not have substantially different gains in student achievement than those
districts that did not (Weber, 2009). The early rhetoric from CSDE focused on pay-forperformance and professionalization of teacher pay so that teacher compensation would
be aligned with how private sector professionals were compensated.
In a 2007 interview with Education Week, Commissioner Mahoney stated the
following.
There are not many industries anymore that give employees and automatic pay
increase just because they worked another year. That's not the way of doing things
anymore, and the public doesn't support that anymore (Honawar, 2007, January
17).

In interviews for Central State Public Radio and the Tribune, Commissioner
Mahoney also noted that teachers and districts were not guaranteed MAST dollars once
their applications were approved.
We don't want to send the message that this is something that you can game and
think you can just pick up $260 per student and have something that's not going
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to be a very significant change in the way you pay your teachers and the way you
structure their professional development (Pugmire, 2005).

The legislation says we can take money away if districts are not following
through with their contracts. We will have monitors going into the school
districts to see if they're doing what they're saying (Draper, 2005,1A).

In keeping with the idea of MAST as a pre-fabricated solution, CSDE offered no
research or data that showed that changing how teachers were compensated would
increase student achievement. From CSDE’s rhetoric, MAST’s intended purpose seemed
to be eliminating step and lane compensation and replacing it with performance-based
compensation.
After the initial onslaught of letters of intent to apply for MAST, the actual
applications barely materialized. Commissioner Mahoney accounted for the lack of
districts participating two years after the launch of the program by explaining that local
districts were taking time to explore and understand the various aspects of MAST
(Honawar, 2007 August 1). CSDE was firmly supportive of the Governor’s agenda
regarding MAST. Having lived in Central State for more than 25 years, including the
entire time since the inception of MAST through the completion of this research and
regularly watching, listening, and reading mainstream news, I could not recall nor find in
the mainstream media any reports of wide-spread public-initiated outrage or even
concern about how teachers were paid. This statement seemed to me to echo Edelman’s
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(1988) research regarding using media to establish public opinion by attributing the
neoconservative education policy agenda to the mainstream population of Central State.
CSDE also advanced the Governor’s agenda in its oversight of the
implementation of MAST. The legislation gave responsibilities for oversight of the
program and approval of individual school districts’ implementation plans to CSDE.
CSDE essentially ignored the revisions the legislature made to MAST when approving
applications, especially in the areas of reforming versus eliminating the traditional step
and lane salary structure and how much of the compensation would be tied to student
achievement through standardized testing. When districts complained that CSDE’s
approval requirements were not what were stated in the legislation that passed, CSDE
claimed that eliminating the traditional salary schedule was the only way to reform it and
that was what was intended by “reform” (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5,
2009). CSDE also contended that the expectation was that a significant portion of the
MAST dollars were intended to be paid based on student performance on state
standardized tests (J. Gleason, personal communication, January 14, 2011). Districts that
did not meet CSDE’s self-imposed criteria either had their plans rejected or had great
difficulty getting their plans approved (J. Gleason, personal communication, January 14,
2011). Some districts sued CSDE over its approval criteria. In one case, the district sued
over the requirement of having full-time peer coaches (Owen, 2006). The lawsuit was
settled and the districts’ plans were approved (Owen, 2006). This helped loosen the
approval criteria somewhat, but this was short-lived. In the other lawsuit, the judge sided
with CSDE regarding the definition of “reform” and found that CSDE did not overstep its
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authority to require the step and lane compensation schedule be eliminated (FindLaw,
2007).
Another factor that made MAST implementation challenging was that CSDE was
subject to budget cuts over several years to an even greater extent than local school
districts. At the time of this research, only approximately 80% of the employees at CSDE
were state workers. The other 20% were federal employees overseeing state
implementation of federal programs (D. Gomez, personal communication, August 9,
2011). CSDE was plagued by years of staff reductions through hiring freezes. When an
employee resigned, the position was not filled and the work was divided among
remaining employees. This made responsibility for staffing and overseeing the various
programs fluid (D. Gomez, personal communication, August 9, 2011). It created an
atmosphere where employees were over-worked and not always knowledgeable of the
programs they oversaw (D. Gomez, personal communication, August 9, 2011). New
programs like MAST were added to the workload of employees who did not necessarily
have the time, and possibly the desire, to learn about and oversee another new program
(D. Gomez, personal communication, August 9, 2011). This helped to create an
environment where responses to district questions about MAST varied widely based on
which CSDE employee answered the question (J. Frodo, personal communication,
January 5, 2009).
In addition to the program’s tepid support among educators and vague language,
the MAST application process was oppressive. It included a forbidding application form
(CDSE, 2012c), advice that changed depending on which person at CSDE answered the
question (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009), and a culture at CSDE that
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required revision on every application as reported by the CSDE employee who presented
at the 2006 MAST workshop. The application needed input from the local teachers’
union, administration, and the school board, which required hundreds of man-hours spent
in each district writing a plan that districts were uncertain would be accepted (G.
Camden, October 1, 2009). As was expected with new legislation, those drafting plans to
implement MAST in their districts had questions about what was needed in their plans
and how the legislation was being interpreted by CSDE.
At a 2006 CSDE-sponsored workshop I attended that was held to answer district
questions about implementing MAST, the presenter told us not to be disheartened when
our application was rejected or required revision. She added that Commissioner Mahoney
felt that CSDE employees were not doing their jobs if they let applications through
easily, so all plans would be returned for revision at least once.
The bureaucratic approval process arguably had a chilling effect on the number of
letters of intent that turned into actual districts that implemented MAST. The first year,
there were only a handful of districts that implemented MAST, and some of them had
special encouragement to participate (CSDE, 2007; J. Frodo, personal communication,
January 5, 2009; Metropolis Superintendent, personal communication, March 2, 2011).
The hard-driving MAST rhetoric was not attracting customers. The Governor’s pet
educational project and his hopes of moving on to a national stage were fading. Thus a
new strategy was implemented.
CSDE and Governor King wanted districts to participate, so in some cases, the
Governor’s agenda and even the legislation was compromised to get districts to try
MAST. The hope was that more districts would join the list of MAST participants,
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thereby causing more districts to be motivated by these districts joining the program.
Despite language stating that all aspects of the MAST program needed to be implemented
by October 1 of the year the district implemented MAST, Blue Lake (one of the districts
that participated in this study) submitted a MAST plan to CSDE that did not have any
adjustments made to its traditional step and lane salary schedule. Nevertheless, CSDE
approved Blue Lake’s plan, waiving the October 1 full implementation requirement and
giving Blue Lake one year to get rid of its traditional salary schedule (B. Adams, personal
communication, September 23, 2008). Ultimately, Blue Lake was not able to reach an
internal agreement between the teachers’ union and the district on a new or revised salary
schedule, so Blue Lake’s MAST program had to be discontinued after its first year (B.
Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008).
Pine Springs (another participating district in this study) submitted a MAST
application that did not get rid of its traditional step and lane salary schedule, but rather
added MAST dollars on top of it. Pine Springs contended that the legislation required that
the salary schedule be altered, not eliminated (J. Frodo, personal communication, January
5, 2009). Pine Springs argued that adding career ladder compensation, MAST dollars to
all teachers’ salary if the district as a whole made AYP targets, and piece-rate based
MAST dollars for completing professional development tasks amounted to altering the
district’s salary schedule because it did not previously have those items (J. Frodo,
personal communication, January 5, 2009). This was certainly one way to interpret the
MAST legislative call for “reforming” teacher compensation.
A battle of wills ensued between CSDE and the district. Still, the Governor’s
fishing opener was in Pine Springs that year, and he and CSDE wanted the photo
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opportunity with the Governor, the district, and the over-sized check. Therefore, Pine
Springs’ MAST plan was approved just in time for the fishing opener photo with the
salary schedule as Pine Springs submitted it intact (J. Frodo, personal communication,
January 5, 2009).
A few years later, the Pine Springs’ superintendent gained responsibility for a
second school district, Bear Creek. Bear Creek was a regional center located about 120
miles southeast of Pine Springs. Dr. Frodo worked with staff at Bear Creek to adapt the
Pine Springs’ MAST plan to the new district. CSDE rejected the plan with the salary
schedule being a major factor in the rejection, and Bear Creek ended its pursuit of MAST
dollars (J. Frodo, personal communication, October 16, 2009). It appeared that CSDE
was still attempting to enforce its interpretation of the MAST legislative language.
Although not participating in this research, the superintendent of Metropolis, an
urban school district in Central State that had several schools participating in MAST, and
I were talking during a break from a meeting we attended in 2010. We were talking about
the subjects of our dissertations. When I told her that mine was about MAST, she
lamented that when it was first passed they had legislators and people from CSDE
coming to the district every day trying to get them on board. She quipped that the district
had to adopt MAST just so the people lobbying them to adopt MAST would go away and
the district could go back to getting some work done. Interestingly, this school district
was represented in state government by the two original authors of the MAST legislation.
Conversely, some felt that their districts were unfairly excluded and that CSDE
did not provide them with any assistance or encouragement to participate. Representative
Sampson viewed MAST both through the point of view of a legislator and from the
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perspective of a local school district when describing what she would change about
MAST.
The law changed and we had the feeling that it was partisan [regarding] who got
[MAST] and who didn’t. At the beginning there were accusations about
applications not being fair. Some school districts [that] sent in the same
application as another district got rejected. Center City [the district where
Representative Sampson was a school board member and still represents
legislatively] was represented by all Democrats and was turned down [for not
meeting required timelines]. We brought documentation that we met deadlines
and then we were approved. Small, rural schools didn’t have administrators who
had time and couldn’t put forth the plans, so it was mostly metro districts that got
it (C. Sampson, personal communication, February 9, 2011).
Representative Sampson’s statement combined with the experiences of Pine Springs,
Bear Creek, Blue Lake, and Winter Valley seemed to support her view that MAST
applications may not have been impartially reviewed.

Legislators
The Central State Legislature was less enthusiastic about MAST than the
Governor. The legislature preferred to spend the state’s limited budget to fund financially
strapped school districts in general than to expand MAST (Honawar, 2007, January 17).
It capped state MAST funding at $86 million, enough to cover only half of the teachers in
the state. In addition, since MAST initially was signed into law the state portion of
funding steadily decreased from being fully funded (when the legislation was passed) to
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being increasingly funded through local property taxes. In 2008, the state only picked up
the tab for $171 per student of the $260 per student tab. This is similar to the financial
path of other pay-for-performance initiatives that had come and gone before MAST.
Additionally, legislators were not seeing the overwhelming increase in student
achievement they thought that they would see due to MAST. They wondered if state
funds were being well spent on the program or if MAST was just a ploy to get more
money for teachers and a debate about whether or not the state should continue to fund
MAST ensued (M. Wilson, personal communication, January 18, 2011).
I found it interesting that legislators considered that MAST might be a ploy on the
part of teachers’ unions and some Democrats to get more money for teachers. MAST was
introduced by neoconservative Republicans in the House and Senate, promoted by a
neoconservative governor, and opposed by state and local teachers’ unions. One possible
explanation was that through continued social interaction as promoted by Berger and
Luckmann (1966), neoconservatives were viewed as a group that did not support
providing additional education funding and teachers’ unions and Democrats were viewed
as groups that lobbied for education funding. Legislators interviewed for this study did
not seem to consider the possibility that MAST was a failed attempt at weakening the
teachers’ unions and changing how teachers in Central State were paid. However, at the
time MAST was passed, overt legislative attacks on teachers’ unions and teachers’
compensation were rare. Because overt attacks on teachers’ unions and teachers’
compensation were rare at the time of this research, this type of social interaction may not
have occurred or occurred so infrequently in Central State that the legislators may not
have recognized this aspect of MAST. This is because, according to Edelman (1988), the
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series of social interactions between the Legislature and teachers’ unions that needed to
happen for this meaning to be considered had not happened. That could have been why
legislative participants did not consider that MAST was a failed neoconservative
initiative.
Although Senator Voss and Representative Wilson supported the movement to the
local levy aspect of MAST, Representative Sampson disagreed.
When we first started talking about MAST, it was initially all state money, but
that has changed. I don’t think it was even all state money by the time it got all
the way through the Legislature. It’s become increasingly funded through local
dollars though. It’s a really good program, but I think it should be funded by the
state. I think education in general should be funded by the state (C. Sampson,
personal communication, February 9, 2011).

As part of the debate, legislators threatened to cut MAST funding. So CSDE hired
a firm to conduct an evaluation of the impact of MAST on student achievement. The
evaluation results stated that MAST might have a small impact on student achievement,
but the results were inconclusive (Hezel, 2009). The researchers stated that due to the
many different initiatives being concurrently implemented across Central State including
in MAST districts, it was impossible to tell what impact MAST had on student
achievement versus the other initiatives that were also implemented during the study
period. Despite the actual study results, the Governor, CSDE, and many legislators
publicly stated that the study was conducted and that MAST participation improved
student achievement (Mindeman, 2009). There were some legislators like Representative
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Sampson (personal communication, February 9, 2011) who accurately reported that the
study results were inconclusive, but their voices seemed to go unnoticed in the public
sphere and on their respective legislative floors, based on my observation of legislative
tapes of these sessions. This could have also been a type of mystification of the data on
the part of these neoconservatives in order to continue the implementation of their policy
agenda.
Whether or not MAST actually resulted in better student achievement was
important to the three legislators who participated in this study and would impact their
decisions on whether or not to continue funding for the program as it existed at the time
of this research.
I would also want to make sure that student achievement is measured properly. I
don’t know if I’m happy with it the way it’s measured now. There should be a
standard way of doing it. It may not matter though. Soon we’ll put a lot of it into
law with no funding if districts don’t participate [in MAST] (M. Voss, personal
communication, October 24, 2011).
Even when asked directly to comment on the student achievement aspects of MAST,
Senator Voss continued to emphasize the pay-for-performance aspects of MAST. Her
commitment to the pay-for-performance and teacher evaluation aspects of MAST
resonated strongly with the neoconservative agenda regarding public education at the
time of this research.
Representative Wilson thought that MAST compensation was significantly
different than what he thought it would be, making student achievement irrelevant to
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MAST. However, student achievement was very important to Representative Wilson, so
he preferred to discontinue MAST.
I like many of the concepts, but not the implementation…. I think it has merit and
accountability. There were also local levy dollars so it wasn’t seen as a gift from
the state, but MAST really doesn’t compensate based on student achievement or
teacher performance. If the school makes the goal, the teachers get paid whether
or not they had anything to do with achieving the goal. Some may have to show a
portfolio of what they did during the year at the end of the school year, but they
all get paid too. It really doesn’t change anything. I did expect that it would
simply be a “more compensation” tool that utilizes local property tax, but it was
primarily presented as merit pay. It didn’t work out that way. It was just a way to
bring more money to the compensation pool (M. Wilson, personal
communication, January 18, 2011).
Representative Wilson seemed to be able to intuitively identify some of the negative
aspects of pay-for-performance models. These included the difficulty in measuring
achievement and performance, and the unintended consequence of rewarding poor
teachers for the work of their higher performing peers through the use of group rewards.
Representative Sampson thought that MAST was working pretty much the way
she envisioned it, with the exception of funding.
I never thought we would have state funding forever. I thought by now it would
all be local levy. I’m surprised it’s hung on for as long as it has. For late comers,
it will be all local money. That’s not what I thought it would be at all. It should be
all state dollars. Everything about education funding should be state dollars. Local
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levy dollars are not equalized (C. Sampson, personal communication, February 9,
2011).

Representative Sampson also echoed sentiment about student achievement and
the potential of requiring districts to participate. “If the student achievement data is
favorable, then it should no longer be optional for districts, but if we can’t prove it’s good
for students and aren’t going to fund it, then we can’t require it” (personal
communication, February 9, 2011).
As a result of the inconclusive evidence relating MAST to student achievement,
although Central State faced an increasingly dire state budget deficit, the legislature
continued to fund MAST without definitive evidence that MAST was working. However,
the debate continued about whether or not MAST should be reformed or discontinued. At
the time of this research, several legislators, including Representative Wilson, were
calling for an end to state funding for MAST and new legislation requiring districts to
participate in the performance-based aspects of MAST.
When asked how MAST implementation differed from their vision of how it
would be when the Legislature approved it, the answers were again varied. Senator Voss
was a strong supporter of the original legislative language and was the most disappointed
with the compromised version of MAST that ultimately became law. “It hasn’t worked
out the way I wanted it to. All of them [MAST components] are disappointing” (M. Voss,
personal communication, October 24, 2011).
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All of the legislators had ideas of what they would do differently with MAST.
Similarly to the neoliberal stance, Representative Wilson would have eliminated MAST
altogether.
In Wheatfield [the largest city Wilson represented], we have National Board
certification. I think it has better merit and accountability. I would do a NBTC
[National Board of Teaching Certification] approach for “merit” pay and
implement the Teacher Performance Assessment for new teachers (M Wilson,
personal communication, January 18, 2011).

Senator Voss would keep the current MAST components, but strengthen the
requirements in each area.
I like the evaluation/observation requirement and the requirement for increased
student achievement, but they’re not as strong as I’d like them. I like the
performance-based compensation, but it’s not strong enough. The steps and lanes
have to go. I guess I don’t mind the steps so much, but the lane thing really gets
me. Teachers get paid more just because they take a class or get an advanced
degree. It doesn’t even have to relate to what they’re teaching. I would also not let
the unions vote to approve the plan; or if they have to vote, not allow more than a
50% plus one vote. Right now they’re [local unions] requiring 67% and 75%
votes to approve the plan (M. Voss, personal communication, October 24, 2011).
Again, Senator Voss was clearly promoting the rhetoric of the neoconservative education
agenda.
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With the exception of Representative Wilson, the legislators thought that MAST
had some positive points. For example, Senator Voss (personal communication, October
24, 2011) believed that the greatest impact MAST had on education was professional
development. “The staff development has been the best. Staff development should, in
theory, relate to increased student achievement. The teacher mentoring can also help.”
Representative Sampson also shared her thoughts on what was good about
MAST. She included its voluntary nature and encouragement of tinkering with the
relationship between teacher professional development and pay.
Having it [MAST] be voluntary at the beginning was a good thing. There was not
enough money to fund it for everyone, so why not have the ones who want it do
it. Then we could build data to prove it’s a good thing. Then other school districts
will want to do it. There’s also something to be said for professionalizing
teaching, and it seems it wouldn’t harm students. I hope the greatest impact of
MAST is student achievement and how teachers love the professionalization of
teaching with peers giving advice and peers helping peers. It’s not threatening;
it’s being able to help others. Sometimes I think Governor King liked the test
scores piece best, but test scores aren’t the be-all end-all or even the biggest
measure. It started out as being a feared measure passed by legislators, but they
[legislators] aligned with teachers’ unions, and now they [teachers] want it. They
[teachers] feel it’s an injustice that they don’t have it. It could have been uprooted
if Governor King wasn’t so passionate about it. Governor Ritchell [current
Central State Democratic Governor] would be a goat if he tried to get rid of it
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now, but four years ago, he would have been a hero (C. Sampson, personal
communication, February 9, 2011).
That most people would probably no longer have referred to Governor Ritchell as a hero
for ending MAST was not because people were starting to get excited about the benefits
of MAST. It was more of a case that people had largely stopped talking about MAST and
moved on to focusing on other issues. Additionally, Representative Sampson and Senator
Voss both seemed to appreciate the unintended outcome of MAST in terms of showing
promise as an effective professional development model.

Supporting Local School Districts
Local school districts throughout Central State were financially starved and
willing to try just about anything to keep their districts viable. This accounted for the
overwhelming number of districts that submitted a non-binding letter of intent to
participate in MAST. However, the bureaucracy associated with the approval process, the
confusing and contradictory information CSDE disseminated, and the need for union
approval stifled the attempts of many districts to secure additional funding for teacher
compensation.
In Central State, state funding of school districts funding had always been
somewhat unpredictable. State funding increases and decreases were made at the
discretion of the legislation with the Governor’s approval. At the time of this research,
there was not enough money or desire on the part of the legislative body to fund school
districts consistently or adequately. At one House Education Finance Committee meeting
I attended, the committee chair asked a researcher who was there presenting her findings
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on public school funding how much the state could cut in K-12 public education funding
without risking being sued by districts. The researcher responded that the state was in
danger of being sued now and would most likely lose (Seashore & Alexander, 2010).
Since then, Central State only reduced funding to school districts one year when that
funding was supplanted by federal stimulus dollars. However, Central State did use some
creative borrowing strategies over a period of several years.
In times of shortages of state cash flow, the state would delay making its
payments to school districts so that the state would not have to borrow money for cash
flow purposes. This was different than the shifting of payments to the following year.
This type of delay was when the state announced to school districts that they would not
be receiving all or some of the money owed to them that year (Weber, 2010). This forced
many fiscally responsible school districts to have to borrow money to maintain district
cash flow. The state would then pay the districts the delayed payments when the state had
more cash on hand, typically after state income taxes were collected in mid-April. The
legislature did this in 2010, but prohibited the practice in a special legislative session
during the summer of 2011 (Central State Statute, 2011).
Another borrowing strategy used by Central State was to delay state aid payments
to districts. When Central State was fully paying districts, the state paid districts 90% of
the funding in the current year and approximately 10% in the following year. This was
done to allow the state to double check student enrollment for each district to ensure that
the state was distributing the correct amount of aid to each district. Twice during the time
of this research, the Central State Legislature voted to shift more of the current year’s aid
to districts to the following year. The first shift delayed 20% of aid and the second shift
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delayed 27% of aid. That meant that under the latest shift districts only received 73% of
what the state was obligated to pay them. Again, this caused some districts to need to
borrow money to maintain district cash flow (Weber, 2010).
Districts used to be able to levy more local dollars to off-set the instability of state
funding. However, beginning in the 2002-2003 school year, Central State made a promise
to districts to more fully fund public education. In doing so, the amount of funds districts
could levy locally was reduced and the amount of state funding increased. Since then,
when adjusted for inflation, the per-student state funding for each of the case districts I
studied decreased every year with the exception of Cotton Grove in the 2006-2007 school
year (CSDE, 2008b, 2009l; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). That year Cotton Grove
moved a special education program into the district that had served by a special education
co-operative. The related increase in high needs students in the district thus increased the
district’s per student state revenue that year. However, during all other years, Cotton
Grove’s per-student inflation-adjusted state funding decreased similarly to each of the
other three districts.
In addition to a lack of stable and sufficient funding, districts themselves were
also important in the success or failure of MAST implementation. Having strong,
effective district leadership and a positive relationship between the teachers’ union and
district administration were important factors for MAST implementation in districts.
However, in the face of diminishing funds, districts often cut administrative and
administrative support positions, trying to keep budget cuts from impacting classrooms.
This resulted in over-worked administrators who were focused on tasks to be
accomplished with little or no time left to attend to the cultural and symbolic leadership
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frames necessary for implementing initiatives like MAST that would impact the culture
of a district.
John Fitzgerald, an education policy fellow with Central State 2020, a nonpartisan educational think tank, succinctly summarized public school districts’ financial
position on the organization’s website.
Schools are in the worst financial shape they have been in decades. Many
Minnesota districts signed on not because they love MAST, but because they can't
afford not to sign up. State aid accounts for more than 80 percent of districts'
budgets, yet state aid has dropped an inflation-adjusted 14 percent since 2003.
This has forced districts to marshal citizen support to run levy elections to support
schools. The state has also made several large accounting shifts in the past year
that have forced many districts to borrow money to pay their bills and incur
interest and fee charges. As a result, class sizes have risen dramatically, programs
have been cut, teachers have been laid off and the quality of education in Central
State has dropped (Fitzgerald, 2010).
Because districts really were motivated to provide students with the best education they
could, and districts’ budgets were being squeezed by the state, all four districts in this
study attempted to capture available dollars for their districts.
School districts and the people who work within them wanted very much to help
students succeed. In tough economic times with frozen or decreased funding and delays
in receiving funding, it became increasingly difficult to develop and implement the
programs needed to effectively teach an increasingly diverse student population. It was
no secret to education professionals throughout the U.S. that innovative and best-practice
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education programs took time, personnel, and money to develop and implement. Because
of this, even though there were strings attached, the allure of needed funding had many
financially strapped districts turning to alternative funding sources. In Central State
districts’ most obvious option was to turn to MAST for additional financial support.
This need for financial support was not lost on local legislators. Central State
legislators that participated in this research all agreed that the lack of funding of Central
State’s public schools was a serious issue. Whether Democrat or Republican, legislators
acknowledged that K-12 public education funding was inadequate. When Representative
Sampson began her legislative career, Central State was in the process of paying back
school districts for an earlier funding shift.
It took us three bienniums to pay it [tax shift] off. Now we owe schools more than
we ever have. If you factor in CPI [Consumer Price Index inflation rate] and
factor out special education and building expenses, then funding has been flat
since ’84. New funding is needed…Any increases in funding schools have
received has been going to healthcare and special ed. costs. We owe schools $2.5
billion--$1.4 billion in late payments, $0.5 billion is funding shift, and $600
million, soon to be $700 million is how much we owe in special ed. cross subsidy
combined with flat funding since 1984…I represent a property-wealthy district
and we sometimes feel that we don’t have enough money, so I think about the
property-poor districts and how they’re doing (C. Sampson, personal
communication, February 9, 2011).
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State Senator, Mary Voss agreed.
Local property tax payers used to pay a higher percent to schools. The burden was
heavier on the property tax payers. The state’s share was about 60%. Then it went
up to about 82% during the Ramirez [former Governor of Central State from
1999-2003] administration, but it’s now sliding back. We’re working to correct it.
We had many lawsuits because funding wasn’t equitable. Some districts couldn’t
pass referendums and others were property-poor districts that couldn’t raise much
money even if they did pass a referendum. In rural communities, ag[ricultural]
land is exempt from taxes on levies, so that property doesn’t even count at all.

Property-rich districts could raise more [money, but] we had levy caps and then
caps with an inflationary adjustment. Then we had equalization aid for a while,
but districts had referendums anyway. I can’t see us ever being able to raise
enough money to be able to fund all schools to the level of Beachside [a propertyrich suburban district with a large operating levy], but it’s not fair. I live in
Cranston [a property-poor, rural town 10 miles outside of a suburban area] and a
$500 per student levy costs us a lot, but in Shoreline [property-rich, suburban,
neighboring district], that same levy only costs them half of what it costs us. That
makes it really tough for us to pass referendums (M. Voss, personal
communication, October 24, 2011).

MAST did not come close to closing the funding gap, but when districts had a
“we have to do this to get the money” mentality, participation in new initiatives where

Pay-for-Performance Page 148 of 299
there was money attached, became a viable funding option for school districts in Central
State. MAST was just one example of this phenomenon.
MAST was one pay-for-performance plan in one state; however, paying teachers
based on their performance rather than based on education level and years of experience
was an idea that was catching on across the U.S. The resurgence of performance-based
pay could be seen in programs like MAST, the Teachers’ Incentive Fund, and Race to the
Top. What was once a Republican, neoconservative initiative quickly gained bipartisan
support as our Democratic President was a strong supporter of performance-based pay for
teachers. The dismal financial picture of school districts had many considering any option
that would bring additional dollars into the district. To some extent, all four school
districts studied considered the financial impact an additional $260 per student would
have on the district when making the decision whether or not to implement MAST (J.
Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009; B. Adams, personal communication,
September 23, 2008; J. O’Connor, personal communication, October 1, 2009; A.
Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008).

Implementation Redux
The relationship between the legislature and Governor King was more
challenging during his second term. He was accused by legislators and the media of
developing a budget that did not match his education goals (Demko, 2009). Even with
incentives and “unofficial waivers of rules,” districts were not flocking to MAST as he
had hoped or predicted. The legislature was straining to balance the state’s budget, while
MAST dollars sat in reserve, unused (C. Sampson, personal communication, February 9,
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2011). Gradually the Governor softened his use of the pay-for-performance rhetoric and
began focusing MAST’s success as a professional development initiative for teachers. In
the early stages of MAST, Governor King rarely spoke of the professional development
aspects of MAST, focusing on the professional pay aspect instead. However, when
describing his budget plan for the 2007 legislative session, he described MAST as “the
MAST performance and professional pay initiative, aimed at encouraging professional
development and rewarding quality teacher performance” (King, 2007). The softening of
the rhetoric was subtle, but present. However, the damage of the hard-charging pay-forperformance rhetoric he used in his first term had already been done. Even with the
softened rhetoric, most teachers in the state did not want any part of MAST and the
program remained relatively stagnant in terms of participation.
CSDE, to a greater extent than the Governor, changed its rhetoric regarding the
purpose of MAST. At one superintendents’ conference I attended, Commissioner
Mahoney went as far as to say that MAST was always about staff development and that it
had never been about anything else. Although in a less dramatic manner, in a 2009 press
release Commissioner Mahoney also touted the professional development aspects of
MAST (CSDE, 2009m).
MAST will give participating teachers an opportunity to enhance their skills and
take part in real-time, research-based professional development, which will help
raise student achievement…MAST is designed to advance the teaching profession
by providing structured professional development and evaluation, as well as an
alternative pay schedule that compensates teachers based on performance, not just
seniority (CSDE, 2009m).
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However, at the time of this research communication from CSDE was still often
confusing or conflicting. Josh Gleason was the Acting School Improvement Director for
CSDE. As part of his duties, he oversaw the MAST program. According to Gleason
(personal communication, January 14, 2011), “MAST is all about school improvement
and increasing student achievement.” That seemed like a logical position, based on the
location of the MAST program within the CSDE hierarchy. However, on the CSDE
(2010) website, MAST was located under the “teacher support” section. Mr. Gleason
acknowledged the location of MAST on the CSDE website, but stated that he did not
know why MAST was in that location on the website. This may have been an intentional
attempt on the part of the CSDE at using mystification on educators by labeling “school
improvement” as “teacher support.”
Despite this softened rhetoric, participants in two of the three case districts that
had at least at one time implemented a MAST plan stated that they did not think that their
districts’ plans would be approved if they were initially submitted at the time of this
research. They said that it was much more difficult for districts that chose to submit
applications at the time of this research to have their MAST applications approved than
those that were early adopters. Josh Gleason’s comments seemed to support this view.
Even in CSDE’s softened rhetorical stance, the pay-for-performance aspect of
MAST continued to be legislated by CSDE. Although the legislation did not require a
specific dollar amount or percentage of MAST compensation tied to student performance
beyond its requirement the 60% of the MAST compensation be tied to a combination of
student achievement, teacher performance, and peer observation data, CSDE required
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certain unpublished minimum percentages of the MAST compensation be tied to student
achievement.
The average MAST pay is $1200 per teacher, but it ranges from $600-$2,000.
There is performance pay for meeting a school-wide student achievement goal.
Districts can set this goal, but CSDE has to approve it. It has to be a reasonable
goal, not just an increase of one percent. The performance pay needs to be about
10% of the [MAST pay] MAST (J. Gleason, personal communication, January
14, 2011).
Each of the case districts in this study that had MAST plans had goals of increasing
student achievement by 3.5% or less (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009;
V. Russell, personal communication, September 30, 2009; A. Mason, personal
communication, October 5, 2011). Josh Gleason was doubtful that a goal that small
would be approved if a district were applying for MAST for the first time in 2011.
However, given the research that showed that the greatest educational impact on students
was socioeconomic status and that schools only had the ability to make small,
incremental increases in student achievement, a goal of a 3.5% increase in student
achievement may likely have been a very reasonable goal.
Each of the case districts in this study that had MAST plans used MAST dollars
to pay teachers to serve as peer coaches, participate in professional learning and serve in
other quasi-administrative roles related to MAST. Each of these positions and the related
compensation was allowable by law. However, in an effort to advance the Governor’s
neoconservative agenda, CSDE tried tying this compensation to student achievement as
well.
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The individual performance pay is not merit pay for doing extra work like serving
on a committee or something like that. Performance pay is for the impact an
individual teacher makes on student growth. For example, a teacher sets a goal
and measures student achievement on that goal. Performance goals are based on
baseline data and student growth (J. Gleason, personal communication, January
14, 2011).
CSDE’s failure to realize that the “extra work” teachers were doing had a positive impact
on their job satisfaction and provided learning opportunities for them that may have had a
positive impact on student achievement may have impeded successful MAST
implementation for more districts. However, it was not possible to measure the direct
correlation between these activities and student achievement and this also could have
been why CSDE did not approve the use of MAST dollars for committee work.
Additionally, the professional development aspect was the aspect of MAST, in addition
to the extra dollars, that case districts liked the best, but according to Gleason, CSDE
seemed to be more focused on the pay-for-performance and student achievement aspects
of MAST.
Had CSDE been able to view MAST from the point of view of the other as
described by Bolman and Deal (2008), it may have been able to attract more districts to
MAST by focusing initially on the professional development aspects of the program.
That CSDE was out of touch with the views of the case districts was also exemplified by
its stance on what training was needed to have someone qualified to conduct peer
observations and coaching.
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The third component is peer observation scores. Teachers are observed by a
trained observer or coach. This is often the biggest hang up [to teachers agreeing
to participate in MAST]. They say, “What does he know better than me about
teaching? I’ve been doing this for x number of years. What does he know?” Well,
now he’s been trained for a week in observation and coaching so, yes, he’s
qualified to help. There’s no problem after that. Teachers get on board with it (J.
Gleason, personal communication, January 14, 2011).
Gleason’s dismissal of veteran teachers’ concerns about having their compensation tied
to performance reviews conducted by someone who had a week of training was
problematic. That this would often be the biggest barrier to teachers voting to approve
MAST was not surprising to me, based on the manner with which Gleason dismissed the
concern. That CSDE believed that one week of training would adequately provide a
teacher the skills necessary to effectively observe and mentor veteran peers and that
veteran peers would accept the feedback offered was incongruent with my experience,
especially if the observation and feedback was tied to the observed teacher’s
compensation. Judging by the reaction of districts across Central State in terms of lack of
participation in MAST and CSDE’s acknowledgement that districts found this stance
troubling led me to believe that it probably was. However, in the three case districts that
tried MAST, all reported that the peer coaching and observation became a part of MAST
that they really liked once they got used to it. If CSDE used rhetoric that was more in
touch with the experiences of local school districts, this part of MAST could have been
one of its greatest selling points rather than one of its greatest barriers.
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Another significant barrier to district participation in MAST was the application
paperwork and process. These remained bureaucratic. Most districts were not
participating in MAST and had no intention of pursuing an application, unless their
teachers’ unions pushed for it. Additionally, more schools that were participating in
MAST dropped the program. However, CSDE still appeared to be optimistic about the
future of MAST and blamed failures on the districts themselves without acknowledging
any culpability on the part of CSDE.
All districts must be implementing their plan by October 1st of each year. If
[MAST] is not working for districts, it’s because they’re not implementing it with
fidelity. Like with any program, in districts where they are implementing MAST
as it should be, it is working and very successful for them (J. Gleason, personal
communication, January 14, 2011).
CSDE continued to believe that most, if not all, districts would eventually participate in
MAST, and lauded MAST as a success. One might have thought that since MAST was
promoted as being all about school improvement and increasing student achievement that
school improvement and increased student achievement would have been the measures
that determined the success of the program. However, CSDE gauged the success of
MAST based on the number of school districts and students that participated in the
program.
CSDE was cautiously optimistic about the longevity of MAST as well, at least in
the near future. Despite a multi-billion dollar state deficit, Gleason believed that MAST
would endure for a while.
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As far as the likelihood of [MAST] funding to continue, I have no inkling as to
where we’re going with it. It is a state law and it would have to be repealed. That
would be a big deal. Even if the legislature wanted to repeal it, it would take at
least two years. This was initially a Republican initiative. We now have a
Republican majority in the House and Senate. I don’t think it’s going anywhere
anytime soon (J. Gleason, personal communication, January 14, 2011).
Gleason was likely correct in regard to the Republican majority and that MAST would
likely remain in statute. However, at the time of this research district administrators were
more aware of the costs to the district associated with MAST and were more likely to
only consider implementing MAST if the district’s teachers wanted to participate in the
program (S. Barnes, personal communication, October 1, 2009; L. Baker, personal
communication, October 16, 2009). Although CSDE was beginning to realize that MAST
was not going to progress as a voluntary pay-for performance measure, at the time of this
research it still did not acknowledge that the discourse regarding MAST had quieted not
because districts and teachers were suddenly more willing to participate, but that most
districts and teachers simply were not interested.

Summation of Stakeholder Interaction
Because of the vagueness of the language of MAST, each of the stakeholders
involved with MAST tried to use it to forward the agenda of their respective group. The
Governor wanted MAST to eliminate or severely weaken the power of the teachers’
unions in Central State by getting rid of the “guaranteed” annual salary increases awarded
to teachers under a traditional step and lane compensation model. This would have been
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accomplished by tying more of teachers’ compensation to performance measures that
could not be negotiated through a collective bargaining agreement.
By extension, CSDE wanted whatever the Governor wanted. Leaders of CSDE
were loyal appointees and used the vagueness of the statutory language to further the
Governor’s agenda rather than simply enforcing the legal mandates established under
MAST. The inconsistency with which CSDE approved the MAST plans of local districts
opened the agency to accusations made by legislators and school districts that it was only
approving MAST plans in school district located in areas represented by Republican
legislators. However, those claims were never proven. Additionally, the drop off between
the hundreds of school districts that submitted letters of intent to apply for MAST and the
handful that actually applied left CSDE pushing districts to participate in MAST
regardless of the political party status of their local legislators. In order to attract those
early adopters, CSDE suspended its enforcement of the Governor’s agenda and
sometimes the actual rules of MAST. The inconsistency between what MAST plans were
approved and what ones were rejected angered local districts. As more MAST plans were
approved, districts used them as models for their own applications. Those that were
rejected screamed, “Foul!” but CSDE contended that each MAST plan had to be unique
to each district and could not be copied from another district. This led to more claims of
pay-backs for some districts and punishments of others as well as claims of a CSDE
secret agenda. However, as CSDE waived rules for school districts like Pine Springs that
were exclusively represented by Democrats, the claims of favoritism faded.
Local legislators were split on their support of MAST, but many, and especially
Republicans, shared the Governor’s view of MAST. Legislators of both the Democratic
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and Republican parties who wanted their party’s support in a re-election campaign
needed to tow the party line while they were in office. At the time of this research, the
Republican Party line in Central State seemed to include teacher accountability and
performance-based compensation for teachers. MAST was seen as a way to bust the
union and enforce teacher accountability. However, due to the political nature of MAST,
when local representatives met with their constituents from local school districts, they
often codified this message into terms of increasing student achievement and using
MAST as a vehicle to achieve that.
The next two chapters share a glimpse into the interaction between the
stakeholders as MAST was considered in four Central State school districts. MAST was
deemed to be a success in two of the districts. One tried MAST for one school year then
the teachers voted to discontinue it. A fourth district had a CSDE- and local school boardapproved MAST plan, but the teachers did not approve it. At the time of this research, the
fourth district had not implemented MAST.
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CHAPTER FIVE: TWO ENDURING MAST DISTRICTS
Each District had a slightly different implementation structure for MAST,
although each plan needed to have the following components in order to be approved by
CSDE: (a) career ladder and career advancement opportunities, (b) job embedded
professional development, (c) performance-based pay, (d) comprehensive and objective
teacher observations, and (e) an alternative professional compensation schedule. A brief
description of each district, its MAST program, and how it was implemented follows.

Pine Springs
District Background
Pine Springs was primarily a blue-collar regional center, and the local school
district benefitted from tax revenue generated by industry. Although it was the largest
city in the region, Pine Springs was a geographically isolated, small community with a
school district that enrolled just under 1300 students (CSDE 2009c). The Pine Springs
school district’s financial struggles were greater than an average school district in Central
State, but were similar to those of other small school districts. Its unreserved general fund
balance was declining prior to MAST implementation (CSDE, 2009d). The average
school district property tax per home was $195 per year (CSDE, 2009d), indicating that
Pine Springs was not a property-wealthy district. Additionally, it did not have significant
operating or bond levies. Since participating in MAST, Pine Springs gained an additional
$260 per student from MAST funding that had to be used for teacher compensation
(CSDE, 2009d).
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At the time of this research, Pine Springs’ students scored as making adequate
yearly progress (AYP) on the NCLB goals in four of the past seven years (CSDE,
2009d). In terms of achieving NCLB goals, Pine Springs’ students achieved at the second
lowest rate of the four districts studied; however, it also had the lowest socioeconomic
status of the four districts based on the percentage of its students who qualified for free or
reduced lunch (CSDE, 2009d).
Pine Springs adopted MAST in 2006 and was still enjoying the benefits of the
program at the time of this research. The program gained in popularity with teachers,
administrators, and community members and became an important part of the culture of
the Pine Springs District.
Like in much of rural Central State, student enrollment in the district was
declining. Pine Springs experienced additional enrollment pressures due to competition
from Central State's Post-secondary Education Options (PSEO) program and online
learning options. PSEO programs allowed students to enroll in college courses while they
were a junior or senior in high school and concurrently earn high school and college
credit. Under this program the college received 88% of the school district’s funding for
each course hour for every PSEO-enrolled student unless an alternative agreement was
negotiated with the college. Pine Springs High School was located across the street from
a local community college and many of its high school students took advantage of the
PSEO program. Because of its relatively small size and limited budget, elective course
offerings were somewhat limited for high school students. Many of the students who did
not enroll in PSEO courses took courses via the Internet. The financial arrangement with
online course providers was the same as those through the PSEO program.
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Dr. James Frodo, Superintendent of Pine Springs, was an experienced
superintendent who was approaching retirement. At the beginning of the study Dr. Frodo
was employed full-time at Pine Springs. Due to budget constraints, however, Dr. Frodo
became a part-time superintendent at Pine Springs and a part-time superintendent in Bear
Creek, another school district approximately 120 miles southeast of Pine Springs. A
shared or part-time superintendent position was becoming increasingly more common
among small Central State school districts as these districts struggled to balance their
shrinking budgets.
Pine Springs was a proud and independent community, and, like many of the
smaller communities in Central State, was closely knit with a skeptic’s regard for
outsiders and the unfamiliar. Teacher and union president, Natalie Rose, summarized this
mentality well.
This is my 16th year of teaching. I’m not originally from Pine Springs, so I’m
kind of an outsider from that perspective. Pine Springs strives to be an exemplary
school district. It doesn’t accept anything less than what we can be because we are
small or remote. We are very proud of our district whether you’re a Stallion in
hockey or a graduate like one we had last year who was accepted to Harvard….
We want to be a model of what a good, small school district can be (N. Rose,
personal communication, October 22, 2009).

Natalie’s feeling of being an outsider after being a part of the community for 16
years was also indicative of the long memories of the community members in Pine
Springs and other communities like it. When asked to describe the core values of the Pine
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Springs School District, Richard Larson, Building Principal and Assistant
Superintendent, noted how the District’s history impacted its present core values.
We want to provide a safe environment, which is conducive to learning for all
students. We’re looking to provide the best education we can with what we have.
With MAST, we were looking to make improvements, and it was a way to get the
district and union working together. We had had two strikes in approximately 15
years with the latest being in 2001. We were not too far out from the strike in
2001 when we started MAST. The superintendent and union president worked
hand in hand to explore it and get it going. It was a great way to bring all of us
together—a great step and a great opportunity (R. Larson, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).

The tendency to hold onto the past and reject new people and ideas, especially in
smaller communities like Pine Springs, also helped to explain the lack of collegiality
between teachers and administrators at the time of the strikes and MAST
implementation. “The staff and administration, although both acceptably performing their
respective duties, were divided as a district as a result of the strikes” (R. Larson, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).
On the surface, the culture of the Pine Springs community made it a surprising
candidate to be an early adopter of MAST. At the time of implementation, the
relationship between teachers and administrators was strained. Dr. Frodo was new to the
district and the community. MAST was the brainchild of a Republican Governor from
another part of the state, and the political make-up of Pine Springs was strongly
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Democratic. However, the explanation was really quite logical. It was all about the
money.
With K-12 education funding not keeping pace with the rising costs to educate
students, and Pine Springs’ loss of a significant number of students to the Pine Springs
Community College through the PSEO program and online instruction, Pine Springs was
struggling financially. Its fund balance was in decline, making it difficult to grow or even
maintain the type of educational programming necessary to meet the criteria of the
district’s core values. When asked about the primary reasons for pursuing MAST, Dr.
Frodo (personal communication, January 5, 2009) replied, “$426,000” [the amount of
MAST revenue the district he projected the district would receive].

The MAST Plan
Dr. Frodo and the union president had some serious conversations about the
district and its future. They really thought that the money available through MAST would
help move the district in the direction they thought it should go (R. Larson, personal
communication, October 16, 2009) and Pine Springs was willing to do what they had to
in order to secure those dollars. “The truly substantive and immediate required
components of the MAST plan— specifically evaluation, professional growth plans, and
leadership/coaching positions within the faculty (i.e. career ladders) all were viewed
initially as ‘we have to do it to get the money’” (J. Frodo, personal communication,
March 22, 2007).
In an effort to secure nearly a half million dollars for the district, Pine Springs
developed an implementation plan for MAST with the following components: career
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ladders or career advancement opportunities for teachers; integrated, job-embedded, ongoing, site-based, and teacher-led professional development; a minimum of 60% of
teacher compensation increases within a performance pay system that aligned teacher
performance measures with student academic achievement and progress; an objective and
comprehensive teacher evaluation system based on the educational improvement plan,
the staff development plan, and multiple evaluations of a teacher’s performance
conducted by a locally selected and trained evaluation team that included classroom
observations; and an alternative professional pay schedule (J. Frodo, personal
communication, January 5, 2009).
Pine Springs’ career ladder included five positions—mentors, a learning team
leader, a learning content leader, a professional development team member, and a quality
oversight team member. In the Pine Springs plan, any teacher who received mentor
training received an additional $200 in compensation (J. Frodo, personal communication,
January 5, 2009). In exchange for this compensation, mentors needed to make weekly
contact with an assigned teacher and document that contact (N. Rose, personal
communication, October 22, 2009). All other career ladder positions received an
additional $1500 in compensation (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009).
The learning team leader had duties including moderating learning team meetings and
evaluating progress being made by staff members on their professional growth plans (N.
Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009). The learning content leader was
responsible for acquiring materials and best-practice information to be used by teachers
as they worked toward achieving site goals designed to improve student achievement.
The professional development team member was responsible for developing professional
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development forms and procedures and verifying that participants met their professional
growth plans and site goals (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009). The
quality oversight team member worked within the context of a team to attempt to resolve
MAST program issues, determine site goal achievement, coordinate professional
development, oversee MAST expenditures, and aid in establishing future site goals (N.
Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009).
Teacher training and development and achieving specific goals were also essential
components of Pine Springs’ MAST plan.
We started a mentor program and developed focused goals that were really
specific. We looked at one specific piece of math for our goal. We never focused
on specific goals before. We had general ones. It [MAST] was a way to
compensate people involved with that (R. Larson, personal communication,
October 16, 2009).

In Pine Springs professional development teams met. They used a variety of best
practice methodologies to strengthen teachers’ pedagogical skill including modeling
instructional strategies, demonstration teaching, team teaching, mentoring, content and
cognitive coaching, lesson study, and analysis of student work (R. Larson, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).
The teacher evaluation system included three formal evaluations each year. Peers
completed two of these evaluations and a building administrator completed one. Teachers
also conducted four self-evaluations. In addition, probationary staff received three formal
observations by a building administrator annually (R. Larson, personal communication,
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October 16, 2009). The district used a method of inter-rater reliability to prevent score
inflation by having all teachers and administrators trained on the Charlotte Danielson
evaluation model. The Charlotte Danielson model of teacher evaluation focused on four
domains of teaching. They were planning and preparation, classroom instruction,
classroom management, and professional responsibilities. The inter-rater reliability scores
were achieved through the process of having teachers score their own evaluation,
comparing their score with that of the formal evaluator, and having all scores available to
other team members to prevent score inflation (N. Rose, personal communication,
October 22, 2009).
The Pine Springs MAST plan had many components that required more of
teachers in terms of skill and time. This was evident based on Pine Springs’ commitment
to professional development and the increased hours teachers worked since MAST
implementation. A common concern amongst teachers in districts that considered MAST
was whether or not the additional compensation was worth the additional time teachers
would need to invest to make the MAST program effective in their districts.
We had things we wanted to do, but it was hard to get them done during the
school day. I think MAST is supposed to happen during the school day, but let’s
face it. There are things that have to happen outside of the school day. Whether
it’s enough compensation or not for that, some people would debate (R. Larson,
personal communication, October 16, 2009).
This questioning of whether the adequacy of the additional compensation in a district
where MAST was successful, was aligned with Honawar’s (2007) research that suggested
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that the relatively small amount of pay-for-performance compensation did not adequately
motivate teachers to significantly change their behaviors.

MAST Implementation
The Crucial Importance of Local Leadership
The leadership of the teachers’ union, school board, and the district administration
and the collaboration between these stakeholders was critical to the successful
implementation of MAST in Pine Springs.
After working with him [Dr. Frodo] for a few years, he wanted us to have
everything we deserved to have. He felt that we were an exemplary faculty and
should be getting in on MAST. We should be getting the accolades and money to
go with that. We had a supportive school board, union, and administration. You
know, we had been on strike a few years earlier. When we started MAST, we
settled [the teachers’ contract] before school started. We used to usually go past
the January 15th deadline. We’d seen things beyond settling our contract with
MAST. We were looking at school improvement. Dr. Frodo said we can do this,
and he put it to the union leadership. We thought that we should get people
together on this…Membership trusts the union officers very much. They’re
respected and trusted. We knew our leadership would never agree to anything that
would be bad for teachers (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009).

Richard Larson echoed the sentiment that teamwork between the teachers’ union
and an effective leader were critical to the district’s successful implementation of MAST.
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Definitely the team approach [was important to our success]. The willingness of
the superintendent at the time, the board, and union president to work together. If
this would have come along a few years earlier, our superintendent at that time
wouldn’t have had the vision. The union wouldn’t have picked up the ball. There
wasn’t a working together relationship at that time. It was adversarial. Each party
did their own job; they just didn’t work together (R. Larson, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).

The trust that Dr. Frodo was able to establish between the school board, the
teachers, and himself in such a short period of time as an outsider to Pine Springs
demonstrated that he excelled in the human resource and symbolic aspects of leadership
as described by Bolman & Deal (2008) and the relationship and interpersonal and
relational aspects of leadership as presented by Northouse (2009). Additionally, his
personal involvement in creating and negotiating the district’s MAST plan with internal
and external stakeholders showed his skill in the political arena as defined by Edelman
(1988) as well. Dr. Frodo was able to successfully translate “pay-for-performance” to
“reward teachers” in Pine Springs. His ability to codify the rhetoric of the Governor,
Legislature, and CSDE into language that was accepted by local stakeholders helped to
grow the trust Dr. Frodo was building in Pine Springs and aided MAST implantation
locally.
Despite the trust and teamwork between the current superintendent and teachers’
union, there were still concerns. Laurie Baker (the district’s Business Manager) and
Richard Larson shared some of the major obstacles from within the district.
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From the union side, there were ones who were hesitant and those who jumped in
right away. There have been many programs that have come and gone. There
were concerns about getting approved and if the program would be approved for
our district. We were concerned that it would be a lot of work to get the
application done and approved, and there was no guarantee that after we did all of
this work it would even be approved. But once we had the idea, we thought, let’s
see if it is a one- or two-year program. Let’s try it out. We can get out of it if we
want to, because it takes board and union approval each year. We do a MOU
[Memorandum of Understanding] format, and we vote on that each year. If either
side said, for whatever reason, we want to discontinue, we can. It’s not like it’s
part of the regular contract and that once it’s there, it’s there (R. Larson, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).
The oppressive application process was certainly a concern for Pine Springs when
considering applying for MAST. Because Pine Springs was a small district, the hundreds
of man hours needed to create and submit an application to CSDE was divided over
fewer people than would be the case in a larger district and therefore was a consideration
along with the $426,000.
Natalie Rose (personal communication, October 22, 2009) noted that there were
also obstacles to implementation within the district that needed to be overcome. “Number
one was fear of the salary schedule in the writing of the plan and getting it through. That
was a barrier as far as getting it approved.”
From a teacher’s standpoint there was a concern about the salary schedule.
[Before MAST] teachers were guaranteed the step each year. There was a concern
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if some would be favored and some would not and how this would affect who
would get paid (Laurie Baker, personal communication, October 16, 2009).

I remember that it was looked at like it’s the new buzzword. We’ve been down
that route before. There was a lot of skepticism. Will it work? Will we really get
the money? Will the board look at MAST in lieu of a salary increase? (L. Baker,
personal communication, October 16, 2009).

That’s true. There was skepticism, but there have been raises every year since.
People may wonder if instead of a 1 % raise, would we have gotten 2% if we
weren’t on MAST (R. Larson, personal communication, October 16, 2009).

The sentiments shared by Pine Springs participants regarding the salary schedule,
mirror the concerns shared by participants in other pay-for-performance models that were
studied by Honawar (2007). Pine Springs’ concerns about not getting the money once
they had done the work, reflected the experience of teachers studied by Cameron (2005)
and Harris (2007) who had done the work to earn pay-for-performance compensation, but
the districts either could not or would not pay the teachers as promised.
The teachers’ union, school board, and administration ultimately took the leap of
faith and worked to implement MAST under the direction of the superintendent. All
participants at Pine Springs attributed the success of implementation of MAST, at least in
part, to Dr. Frodo’s leadership. This success points to the importance of being able to lead
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from all four leadership frameworks and being able to integrate all of the aspects of
leadership described by Northouse (2009) as well.
In addition to the normal district responsibilities that Dr. Frodo needed to attend
to in order to keep the district functioning in the administrative aspect and structural
framework, he was also able to attend to the human resource, political, and symbolic
frameworks and attend to the tasks and relationships while promoting a vision that
teachers were already professional and that MAST was a financial accolade that they
deserved as well in order for MAST to be implemented in Pine Springs. Dr. Frodo’s
attention to the human resource frame and relationships helped mend the rift between the
district’s teachers, administrators, and school board. His praise and reassurance that Pine
Springs had an “exemplary staff,” for example, helped to ease tensions, build trust, and
paved the route to be able to work collaboratively.
The political framework, both as discussed by Bolman & Deal (2008) and
Edelman (1988), was no less important in this case. Dr. Frodo was not only able to put
the right stakeholders together and negotiate a successful plan within the district, he was
also able to negotiate successfully with CSDE. His unwavering view that Pine Springs’
MAST compensation plan fit the requirements of the legislation and his refusal to give
into CSDE’s or Governor’s interpretation of reform was critical to the success of MAST
on two fronts. One, it reinforced the human resource frame and relationships as
participants from Pine Springs witnessed their superintendent “taking on” CSDE and the
Governor on their behalf. Two, it allowed Pine Springs to use a compensation plan they
felt would work for them. Although there was an emerging culture of trust, it was not a
culture of blind faith, and the Pine Springs’ teachers were not likely to approve a MAST
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plan that eliminated the traditional steps and lanes. In addition, it was important that Dr.
Frodo had considerable experience dealing with CSDE in Central State. He understood
the need to be aggressive yet reasonable in his attempt to get CSDE to adhere to the
legislation as passed rather than how it was envisioned by the Governor.
Evidence of Dr. Frodo’s work in a visionary manner and in the symbolic frame
was demonstrated by his ability to lead the cultural change from a district where teachers
did not work outside of their duty day to one that put students first with teachers working
extra to ensure that they were performing at their best. He accomplished this through
vision, inspiration, motivation, and keeping people focused on the district mission and
purpose and the steps necessary to fulfill them. These were all essential aspects of
leadership as related by Northouse (2009).

District Costs Associated with MAST Implementation
Although MAST was seen as a way to get dollars into a district, and it was, the
money went exclusively to teachers and none of it could be used to cover the
administrative costs associated with administering the program. As a result, teachers in
Pine Springs received more money, but the district had to budget money from its general
fund, the fund that is most stretched in school districts across Central State, to cover
administrative costs.
Really the district doesn’t benefit from [MAST]. It goes right to teachers. It’s not
treated as a reserved account. It’s undesignated, but we do track it. We do keep
the money separate. There have been overages in the fund, but we keep that for
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the teachers and they can use it in a later year (L. Baker, personal communication,
October 16, 2009).

If anything, it has cost the district money. Administrators are sitting on numerous
committees, planning in-services. There’s extra work there. Administrators have
followed the plan too and have gotten an extra stipend for doing those things. It
can’t come out of MAST so it comes out of the general fund (R. Larson, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).

With the staff development money we had set aside, there was some money for
developing the plan. There was time spent out of school. There were about a
dozen people involved—that’s just a rough number. There were people who were
allowed days or partial days to work on it. On an in-service day we don’t charge
all of our teachers’ salaries out to staff development, so that has helped the district
save some money over the years in that fund. If we didn’t have those funds
available, it would have been a roadblock. If it had been all on your own outside,
it wouldn’t have happened or at least not be as good as it is (R. Larson, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).

As a result of MAST implementation, Pine Springs also saw a need for more
professional development time. However, the perceived cost associated with having more
days where teachers were paid, but students were not in school, was also a concern.
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Now we saw a need for extra days for professional training, not knowing if the
board and community would accept more time for teachers not teaching. We were
concerned about how the public would view this because there is a levy portion
[of MAST] that the taxpayers pay (R. Larson, personal communication, October
16, 2009).

During the initial phase of MAST, districts may not have realized there would be
an extra cost to the district in terms of MAST plan development and administration.
According to Pine Springs participants, it was a negative consideration in the decision to
implement MAST. As the general funds of districts across Central State dwindled, it was
not surprising that many districts would only consider implementing MAST if the
teachers approached the district for its support as they learned of the unfunded costs
associated with MAST. Districts that looked to MAST to help balance their budget could
have been disappointed in the result. MAST dollars would have been helpful to districts
that had no money for teacher salary increases and wanted money for that purpose,
provided the district understood and budgeted for the unfunded administrative costs
associated with MAST. Although MAST most definitely did not meet the criteria of an
unfunded mandate at the time of this research, the local administrative costs were
unfunded. Sometimes when districts applied for grants, a portion of the grant money was
able to be allocated toward administrative costs, sometimes, as was the case with MAST,
there was no such provision. Districts pursuing any grant needed to be aware of and
account for administrative costs for implementation. Additionally, as more of the MAST
funding was supplied at the local level, districts needed to be aware of the impact on their
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local taxpayers and the impact that a local MAST levy would have on their ability to pass
a general operating or bond levy.

Communication between CSDE and Pine Springs
The trust between local stakeholders was important in getting MAST off the
ground in Pine Springs, but that same type of trusting relationship based on strong
communication and understanding was lacking between the district and CSDE. This was
evident in the approval of Pine Springs’ MAST plan and the bureaucracy related to its
implementation.

Salary schedule: Augment versus eliminate.
The debate between Pine Springs and CSDE regarding what “alternative,
reformed salary schedule” meant provided an excellent example of Edelman’s (1988)
work regarding how groups with competing interests interact politically. In the Pine
Springs model, 80% of MAST dollars were awarded for using research-based
professional standards and completing classroom observations and the professional
growth plan. The additional 20% was awarded for teacher evaluations relevant to student
achievement and school-wide student gains (R. Larson, personal communication, October
16, 2009). The alternative salary schedule used in Pine Springs focused on using MAST
dollars to augment their existing salary schedule (J. Frodo, personal communication,
January 5, 2009). However, the definition of an “alternative, reformed salary schedule” in
terms of MAST legislation was an area of contention between CSDE and local school
districts throughout Central State.
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The focus of this debate was what had to be done with the traditional steps and
lanes when a district implemented MAST, and Pine Springs was no different. As with all
of the districts in this study that implemented MAST, along with all others I have
encountered in my professional career as an educator, all but one expressed a concern
about abolishing the traditional salary schedule. This concern led Pine Springs to look
beyond the rhetoric and focus directly on the legislative language.
The Legislature said that the salary schedule had to be “changed or augmented.”
CSDE came to lobby to us, and said that we had to get rid of the schedule. [But]
that’s not what we have (L. Baker, personal communication, October 16, 1009).

At the time of this research, Pine Springs still had the traditional step and lane
salary schedule and used MAST dollars to compensate teachers for work they did over
and above what was traditionally compensated. The Governor also wanted Pine Springs
to eliminate its salary schedule; however, the legislative language was vague enough to
allow Pine Springs to augment its traditional salary schedule with career ladder and goalbased compensation rather than replace the steps and lanes (R. Larson, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).
The Governor wanted us very much to change our salary schedule. [But,] the
Governor wanted to have his fishing opener in Pine Springs and wanted the photo
op with Pine Springs and the big check. There may have been some pretty
significant political pressure to get this done and allow our plan to go through.
Other plans like ours haven’t been approved since (N. Rose, personal
communication, October 22, 2009).
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We’ve been pointed out several times—I think even in legal cases—about how
we’ve augmented teacher salaries above and beyond steps and lanes [without
getting rid of them]. We didn’t replace our salary schedule. In our plan, if you
accomplish your goals, you receive [MAST compensation] (R. Larson, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).

One of the factors we joke about is that MAST is very political and very
politicized. One of the problems we had was the salary schedule. There was
debate about whether it had to be changed versus gone. The Legislature said
“changed or augmented.” CSDE came to lobby to us, and said that we had to get
rid of the schedule. That’s not what we have [because the legislative language was
not written that way] (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009).

The salary piece was a big problem. Several people [from CSDE] came up and
worked with us on the whole plan. If we had to cut the steps and lanes, the union
would have walked away, and the district would have walked away (R. Larson,
personal communication, October 16, 2009).

The vagueness of the legislative language on this issue fueled the debate. The
legislation did not use the terms “eliminate” or “augment;” however, it did not adequately
define “reform.” The legislation also did not define to what extent the traditional steps
and lanes had to be reformed. To CSDE and the Governor, reform meant eliminate. To
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Pine Springs, reform meant augment. Each of these stakeholders had a valid position
based on their own interpretation of what reform meant.
Using analysis of how political discourse shaped leaders and policy, I was able to
analyze how Pine Springs could have such different definitions of “alternative” and
“reform” than the Governor and CSDE. Because people and groups tended to view things
based on their experience, their interpretations focused more on what they wanted to see
in the legislation. The vagueness of the legislation presented itself to these stakeholders
similarly to a picture on an ink-blot test. The Governor and CSDE wanted to eliminate
steps and lanes from teacher compensation so that is how they established their
definition. Pine Springs wanted to retain steps and lanes, but also obtain the MAST
money for their teachers, so augmenting the salary schedule was how it defined the
legislative language. Because the relationship between local districts and CSDE was
more adversarial than cooperative at the time, each of the stakeholder groups was
determined to hold on to its respective definitions of “alternative” and “reform” rather
than work together to find common meaning. The collaborative environment that was
created in Pine Springs could not be replicated among these three stakeholders, so they
performed the same political dance as they had done for years—local school district
versus state control. In this particular battle of David versus Goliath, David won, but the
district had many headaches yet to come as a result of the victory.

Murphy’s Law of implementation.
Pine Springs ultimately prevailed on the “augment versus eliminate”
interpretation debate, but that was not the end of the obstacles Pine Springs faced in
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implementing its MAST plan. In the words of Dr. Frodo (personal communication,
January 5, 2009), “Every problem we envisioned was encountered.” The majority of
obstacles encountered were the result of a lack of experience with MAST implementation
on both the part of the district and CSDE and a lack of working models from which the
district could learn.
There was a presumption that the “MAST model” was a model. In fact the
“MAST model” was nothing more or less than a description of components and
was incomplete with the interaction of components completely ignored by the
“MAST model” (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009).

It [MAST] was a big unknown. There was the plan the state had and forms to fill
out—the required pieces. There were districts in the process that had things
accepted. There were districts, and this was just rumor, we didn’t talk directly
with them, that we heard about who were rejected (R. Larson, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).

With the rush to get MAST implemented quickly, neither CSDE nor Pine Springs
had much time to research and learn how the list of requirements presented in the MAST
legislation would work together cohesively to promote student learning and a positive
district culture. The lack of consistent communication from CSDE to Pine Springs led to
frustration due to several instances of a “trial and error” implementation model. Pine
Springs had to make a significant number of changes to its district structure in just over
four months to meet the October 1 full-implementation deadline, so there was little to no
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time for reflection during this period. Initial implementation was a daunting task that Pine
Springs had to accomplish largely on its own.
If we turn to year one and implementing, we took on a lot. We never had a
mentorship plan, teams, or PGPs [professional growth plans], or observed each
other, and we were starting to do that….A lot of other districts going into MAST
had these components already in place. Pine Springs had none of that, but we
were confident that we could do it all. The first year I was on the Oversight
Committee. The Oversight Committee has three teachers and three administrators.
We had to figure out how do we develop teams, and so forth. The ideas were in
the written plan, but the nuts and bolts were all in the first year. The Oversight
Committee was given the authority to implement the plan. We made it work. It
was important to have the Oversight Committee and know where to go with
questions. It was also important that it [the Oversight Committee] was balanced
between teachers and administration. All of the key players were together.
Without a united faculty and leadership it could fracture (N. Rose, personal
communication, October 22, 2009).
Given the natural obstacles of being an early adopter combined with the roadblocks
established by CSDE and the number of sub-programs embedded within Pine Springs’
MAST plan that had to be put in place, it was amazing that a small district like Pine
Springs was able to accomplish such a large task in a relatively short period of time.
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Benefit of Hindsight in Plan Improvement
Although the Oversight Committee was important to the success of the plan, its
members were not properly trained or prepared for the job they had to do. If Pine Springs
had to implement its plan again, there were some things it would have done differently
based on its experience. These included altering the Quality Oversight Committee, being
more knowledgeable about MAST before writing an implementation plan, and making
the plan more equitable amongst staff members who qualified for the additional
compensation.
We would redefine the role of the Quality Oversight Committee. The Quality
Oversight Committee is three teachers and three administrators. They are the
appellate body. We were not adequately trained and the authority was not
adequately defined. We corrected that for 2008-2009. With the Quality Oversight
Committee we start treading a fine line with decisions affecting employment and
compensation and those only affecting classroom and performance. It's a tough
line to define (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009).
Although, for the most part, Pine Springs had been able to successfully negotiate that
balance, having teachers’ compensation based in part on observations conducted by
minimally trained teachers was unsettling at first for the teachers who were observed as
well as for the ones who were observing.
Another thing the district would have changed about MAST was the initial
decision that non-tenured and part-time teachers would not be eligible to receive the full
amount of MAST compensation.
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The only change we made from the plan to the implementation was that new
teachers wouldn’t have the opportunity to earn the same as a tenured teacher.
When we got to the end of the year, they were like, “What? We did the same
amount of work and we get paid less?” We looked at it and said, “Yeah, you’re
right. If you’re doing the work and going the extra mile, you deserve the same
compensation.” We immediately changed it that spring so those teachers got the
same compensation. We also had the same issue with part-time teachers. We had
it where part time teachers only got part of the money, so if they were working
half time, they got half the money. But they did the same work and went to the
same meetings, so we changed it. There are always struggles with personalities
and issues, but we had a lot of things thought out and in place to deal with it (N.
Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009).
Had there been more time to develop the MAST plan, some of these issues could have
been avoided.

Education Reform Hash
As with most initiatives in public education, MAST was not the only initiative
that districts were encouraged to adopt. At the time of MAST implementation in Pine
Springs and in the years following while they were trying to perfect their MAST plan, the
district was also charged with implementing other initiatives.
We get one thing started and then there’s another and another thing. We just got
MAST going and then we started “Charlotte Danielson,” [a comprehensive
teacher observation model]. In year two, because of the testing piece, we added
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NWEA [Northwest Evaluation Association] testing and had to learn about testing
and data. Now it’s RtI [Response to Intervention] and we have to learn about that.
There have been so many things that have been thrown at us in the last four years.
How to do peer observations, mentor a new teacher, form a PLC [professional
learning community], and now there are other things [we are expected to
implement]. They’re happening, but not at the level they could be because of how
much has come at us. We could learn more about PLCs but we’ve got too many
other things going on (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009).

As the Charlotte Danielson model was the currently accepted “gold standard” of
teacher evaluation, the Rick DuFour model of PLCs was the equivalent in the realm of
professional development. PLCs essentially were groups of staff members coming
together to solve a professional dilemma, for example increasing student achievement in
reading. They researched professional literature to learn more about an issue and
collaborated on ways to solve it. PLCs were the core element of the DuFour version of
teachers’ professional development.
We also saw a need for increased in-service days. Before MAST, we typically had
a few days at the beginning of the year to get ready for the school year, a day at
semester break to work on grades and do some actual staff development for part
of it, a day at the end of the year, and a few others scattered through the year. (R.
Larson, personal communication, October 16, 2009).
This sentiment made sense: teachers could handle the simultaneous implementation of
multiple initiatives, but could not achieve a level of mastery as quickly as they would
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have been able if the district had been able to limit the number of initiatives being
concurrently implemented. However, implementing the components of MAST often
required the implementation of other embedded initiatives as well if the district was not
already implementing those MAST requirements. The need to implement multiple
initiatives concurrently to satisfy the rules of MAST was experienced by all case districts
that had adopted MAST plans.
When districts, including Pine Springs, implemented many reform initiatives at
once or over a short period of time, staff did not have the time to become fully skilled in
implementing the new initiative. As more new initiatives were implemented, it was more
likely that staff would implement them with less fidelity. Ultimately these initiatives
faced a strong likelihood of failure due to the district’s lack of ability to implement any of
them well. However, at the time of this research, Pine Springs was committed to
continuing with implementation of all of these initiatives.

Positive Cultural Impacts of MAST
Participants from Pine Springs reported that MAST had a positive impact on the
district culture that would not have happened without MAST. Benefits included the
enhancement of the emerging collaboration between teachers and administrators and
promotion of professional growth.
Having had it [MAST] be part of the contract and settled, having a positive
relationship with the board, administration, and union working together [was
important]. The majority of people working on the plan were teachers and were
from different grade levels and disciplines. We’re a small school with only two
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buildings, but we had people in all levels who were knowledgeable about what
went into the plan. That the plan was teacher-driven was important…People get
money as part of being on the Oversight Committee and coaching. There are no
teachers pulled out of the classroom [for MAST-related assignments]. No one has
release time. One thing that was helpful in implementing the plan was that we
didn’t take our best teachers out of the classroom and make them middle
managers. Our plan is egalitarian. All had an opportunity to run for positions; they
are elected. Teachers can take the training and become a mentor teacher.
Everyone had the opportunity to step up and do the work and get some extra
compensation (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009).

Although money was the primary reason Pine Springs pursued MAST, over a
relatively short period of time the district culture changed so that the money became less
important than the opportunities for collaboration and professional growth.
Our school day by contract is an 8:10 a.m.-3:50 p.m. contract day. Before we
started this effort (and the effort was a District-wide shot), I could drive in the
parking lot at 7:45 a.m. and shoot a cannon in any direction without fear of
vehicular damage. Now there are any number of faculty here conducting team
meetings, working on professional growth projects, and all the etceteras. Same
way with the 3:50 p.m. experience. The difference this has made in community
perception of us as a faculty and the District has been huge…At this point there
has been such a shift from paranoia to a feeling of pride and ‘we needed to do
this,’ that even if the funding dried up in this session, we would be compelled to
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find some way to fund the majority of the professional activities we implemented
this year (J. Frodo, personal communication, March 22, 2007).

The public in Pine Springs also appreciated the change in culture within the
district. Laurie Baker, the District’s Business Manager, was working in the private sector
at the time MAST was implemented in the District and offered perspectives from a
community member as well as that of a district employee. Baker easily appreciated a payfor-performance model.
From a financial standpoint, I think it’s trying to compensate employees for going
above and beyond. In the business workplace, people get paid based on
performance, but teachers automatically move to the next level every year. It’s a
way for people to get paid for going above and beyond, like for being mentor
teachers (L. Baker, personal communication, October 16, 2009).
Although this was how Pine Springs viewed MAST compensation, the Governor,
Legislature, and CSDE thought that performance-based pay was about student
performance as measured by standardized test scores. However, this did not seem to
bother participants in Pine Springs as they had a MAST plan that was working well for
them.

Natalie Rose, Teacher and Union President, agreed that the public seemed to
approve the culture change, but she also acknowledged that the teachers changed too.
For the first time ever teachers work together on a weekly basis. We never looked
at test data or curriculum teaching strategies, and we never took the time to meet
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like we do now. Whether it’s learning from them [other teachers], or ‘they’re in
the same boat I am’ has really brought us together. Team meetings and
observations have brought us together as a whole. There’s also collegiality.
Usually we only have one or two new teachers each year. We’re an isolating
place. If you’re not from here, it’s hard to be accepted. Mentoring new teachers
helps them get through with more success. The mentorship program has helped
them be successful. I think the public has been impressed with the interaction of
teachers. The public likes to think we’re working hard. They see the cars in the
parking lot. They see that we have time to do collaboratively what’s best for kids.
I think the public did. I know the board did. We have a new board now and I think
they still do (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009).

The sense of pride and collegiality at Pine Springs was tested during the second
year of implementation when not every teacher received the additional compensation.
Pine Springs had some serious conversations about whether MAST was actually a
divisive program. Ultimately, the teaching staff took responsibility for meeting the
criteria and holding peers accountable for meeting the established criteria. As a result, a
higher level of professionalism became more ingrained in the Pine Springs culture.
“Teachers know that now when we say we’re going to do something, we do it. One of the
things that is totally unacceptable is lack of professional effort” (J. Frodo, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).
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Significantly, Dr. Frodo went out of his way to point out that the real change in
Pine Springs was a result of collaboration and staff development—not simply a change in
the compensation structure.
Our goal is to improve schools for kids. MAST is viewed in Pine Springs as
having a solid chance of doing just that. If “quality compensation" is to mean
[improving teacher quality], and all we do is change the formula for compensation
and then assume that [teacher] "quality" will necessarily follow is an argument we
can't make in Pine Springs (J. Frodo, personal communication, March 22, 2007).
Based on the lack of data tying compensation to student achievement in general, Dr.
Frodo’s statement was likely accurate that any correlation between MAST and student
achievement was probably driven by the professional development and cultural change
rather than the change in compensation structure. Given the successful implementation of
MAST in Pine Springs and the positive changes in school culture and perhaps student
achievement, one would think that CSDE would lessen the amount of reform necessary to
the salary schedule and embrace the potential of MAST for these positive cultural
changes and professional development model if it were not concerned with promoting the
Governor’s agenda.

MAST’s Long-Term Prospects in Pine Springs
Despite the positive accolades from all of the Pine Springs study participants and
Pine Springs’s approval from CSDE to implement the compensation plan as it desired,
due to pending personnel changes there was some doubt as to whether the program would
continue in the district. Dr. Frodo retired from Pine Springs in June 2010. He believed
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that the union president and assistant superintendent would leave the district then also.
There were many new members on the Pine Springs School Board who did not
understand and value MAST at the level of those who initially implemented the program.
I’m not sure how the three bodies [teachers, administration, and school board] are
going to adhere to the MAST plan we espoused in 2006. The real key whether
you’re talking MAST or whatever is, “Does it have the potency to survive into the
next generation?” The next generation of MAST in Pine Springs is going to
happen in 2011-2012. If Richard [Assistant Superintendent], me, and Natalie, and
the Board had stayed, it would have kept going—no questions. Although the
$347,000 is good, it has brought a lot of pride that people hadn’t anticipated (J.
Frodo, personal communication, October 16, 2009).

Natalie Rose also shared this concern from a teacher’s perspective.
We’re going to have 12 teachers retire at the end of this year. The new teachers
coming in won’t have the background in MAST and what we’ve been through.
We are going to need some refocusing on what it means to be part of a PLC and
what a PGP means (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009).

Despite his reservations about the longevity of MAST at Pine Springs, Dr. Frodo
continued to be a champion of the MAST program and was actively pursuing MAST in
Bear Creek, the district where he also worked part-time for the 2009-2011 school years.
However, he had concerns about Bear Creek’s plan being accepted due to the debate
between unions and CSDE about the salary schedule.
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I don’t know how rigorous the Department [of Education] is going to be on the
lane/step issue. Bear Creek sent in its letter of intent [to participate in MAST]. My
hope was that we could just take the Pine Springs’s project and take it to its
current status, put Bear Creek’s name on it, and get it approved. I was told that
wouldn’t have a chance. I was told that what we did with our language in Pine
Springs wouldn’t get approved. For example, our view of the salary schedule is
[that the levels of union-negotiated compensation is] a minimum, not a maximum.
Our view of MAST is that it is something above and beyond to augment the
salary schedule is acceptable. I’ve been told that it’s not acceptable anymore.
There will be no steps and lanes. If that is going to be the Department’s view for
new applications or renewing projects, younger projects will dissolve and new
projects will not come forward. Unless districts are in such dire straits that they
need the $260 [per student] and that is the only way they can get the money to
survive—even though it will bastardize the district—they will do it. It was never
the goal of MAST [as passed by the Legislature] to do that, but that is what is
happening with the Department of Education.

Now the new ones coming in, they were thinking about this when they were
broke, now that they are broker, they are thinking about it more. That’s not what
MAST is about. It’s not my philosophy of it. It’s basically a program to reward
good teachers for going above and beyond, but they didn’t ask my opinion of it (J.
Frodo, personal communication, October 16, 2009).
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Dr. Frodo seemed to have an accurate position on the likelihood of districts to
implement MAST going forward; however, he did not seem to be aware that eliminating
the steps and lanes was the intent of the legislation as initially written. He was correct
though in that the requirement to eliminate the steps and lanes was not in the legislation
as passed despite CSDE’s attempts to arbitrarily reinsert it through the application
approval process. Additionally, despite concerns on the part of the Pine Springs
participants about MAST continuing in Pine Springs beyond the 2010-2011 school year,
at the completion of this research (spring 2012) MAST is still in place in Pine Springs.

Winter Valley

District Background
The Winter Valley School District was located in a suburban area of a large,
Midwestern city and enrolled just over 8000 students (CSDE, 2009e). Winter Valley was
primarily a bedroom community with a high residential property value throughout most
of the district, but with little industry. It was represented by Republicans in both
legislative bodies at the state level. Winter Valley’s financial struggles were less serious
than the average school district in Central State, and its unreserved general fund balance
was increasing prior to MAST implementation (CSDE, 2009f). Winter Valley’s average
school district property tax per home was $1891, significantly more than Pine Springs,
and the district gained an additional $260 per student in MAST revenue (CSDE, 2009f).
Winter Valley was only one of four school districts in Central State and one of 50 in the
U.S. that had a Moody’s AA1 bond rating (Winter Valley Public Schools, 2008).
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Its high school was on Newsweek's list of top 500 high schools in the U.S. in 2007. The
district also received a “Gold” rating from Expansion Magazine and the “What Parents
Want Award” from SchoolMatch, a corporate relocation service, every year since the
inception of the award (Winter Valley Public Schools, 2008). Neighboring districts
generally viewed Winter Valley as the district of excellence that employed great teachers
and used innovative and effective programming for its students.
When measuring proficiency using NCLB goals, Winter Valley students
performed the best out of the four districts studied, making adequate yearly progress on
the NCLB goals in six of the past seven years (CSDE, 2009f). Its socioeconomic status
was also the highest among the four districts studied based on the percentage of students
eligible to receive free or reduced lunch (CSDE, 2009f). Winter Valley adopted MAST in
2006. The program gained in popularity since it was first implemented and it remained a
vital part of the district culture at the time of this research.
Winter Valley’s superintendent since 2001, Dr. Alan Johnson, was a frequent
author and speaker on innovative educational ideas. Innovative ideas that he championed
while leading the Winter Valley School District included the International Baccalaureate,
elementary language immersion schools, and advanced placement programs. The district
was also honored on a national level for its use of technology in classrooms while under
Dr. Johnson’s watch. Also, he was once named the Central State Superintendent of the
Year.
In Winter Valley, everything the District did related directly to its mission and
vision statements as echoed by School Board Chair, Victoria Russell.
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We have a vision statement. At the center is being a world class, child-centered
district. Everything we work toward comes back to the vision. There are very
specific things about what we will do, but everything comes back to that vision. I
really think we have done a very extensive strategic planning process. We started
in 2002 with 5 key strategies. Now we’re up to 15 or 16. Each one is a key area
we are focusing on...The vision really drives what we do. That’s the core piece of
it all (V. Russell, personal communication, September 30, 2009).

Betty Greene, a Winter Valley teacher and teachers’ union representative,
explained how this vision related to the students.
If you asked me to describe the core values of the district it’s all about the single
student learning. It’s about differentiating for individual students. It’s about
growth targets and we want their dreams to set sail. You know mission statements
can be kind of kooky, but we want everyone to succeed—we really do. If you
provide the support for the teachers they can really help those learners grow and
develop. Everything supports classroom learning (B Greene, personal
communication, October 1, 2009).

Greg Camden, a building principal in Winter Valley, illustrated the district’s
dedication to its mission and the time and thought behind its creation with this simple
statement, “The published mission and vision statements drive student
achievement…Most districts have a one- or two-page document, Winter Valley’s is 104
pages” (G. Camden, personal communication, October 1, 2009).
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That all participants from Winter Valley could speak to the district’s mission and
vision and explain how MAST fit within that mission and vision was evidence that Dr.
Johnson excelled in visionary leadership and the symbolic frame.

The MAST Plan
Like all of the other districts in Central State that implemented MAST, Winter
Valley had its own unique program. According to Betty Greene (personal
communication, October 1, 2009), a Winter Valley teacher and teachers’ union
representative, Winter Valley created 11 positions to provide career ladder and
advancement opportunities for teachers. These positions included mentor teachers, a lead
mentor, teacher instructional coaches, district department chairs, literacy specialists, and
distinguished teachers. These positions allowed teachers to earn additional stipends of
between $400 and $5000 per year. The job-embedded professional development plan
included using data to analyze student performance on the MCA II assessments by
utilizing professional development teams that met for a minimum of 50 minutes per week
with five late start/early release days for additional meetings. Winter Valley used a
combination of group, individual, and piece-rate incentives to meet the MAST
performance pay requirements, with 10% awarded to individual teachers when the school
met its achievement goals, 10% awarded to individual teachers if their students met
identified student achievement goals, and 80% awarded to individual teachers based on
student growth and the completion of individual teachers’ professional development
plans. Teachers in Winter Valley were evaluated three times a year using professional
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teaching standards, and an annual review determined teacher advancement through the
pay schedule.

Local Leadership
Dr. Johnson seemed to be adept at understanding the political nature of MAST
and effectively led the translation of messages from the Governor, Legislature, and CSDE
into language that local stakeholders accepted. As Dr. Frodo was able to translate “payfor-performance” to “reward teachers” in Pine Springs, Dr. Johnson was able to translate
the pay-for-performance rhetoric into “supporting teachers,” “student achievement,” and
the “culture of excellence” that permeated the culture and mission at Winter Valley. This
translation was significant in the successful implementation of MAST locally.
In terms of Dr. Johnson’s attention to Bolman & Deal’s (2008) four leadership
frames, Dr. Johnson was highly attentive to the symbolic frame. The district’s imageryladen mission statement in which “students’ dreams set sail” provided a backdrop for a
culture that exuded excellence. Even the district’s 104-page mission was symbolic of the
district’s desire to be the best at educating students. Each study participant from Winter
Valley related positively in some way to the symbols of the district that represented its
quest for excellence. Participants could relate MAST implementation back to the mission,
even if they did not agree that MAST fit in well with the mission, showed the importance
of the mission to the district. That everyone shared some form of the symbolic language
of the district in a positive light indicated that the symbolic leadership of the district was
effective. This was also evidence that Dr. Johnson also excelled at visionary leadership.
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Regarding MAST implementation, leadership in the other three frames appeared
to be shared or delegated. That this delegation was done effectively demonstrated Dr.
Johnson’s proficiency in the handling of administrative tasks. In a district the size of
Winter Valley, it would have been impossible for the superintendent to fully lead all
initiatives, so it became important to assess the strengths of district team members and
delegate responsibility for certain aspects of implementation as was appropriate. After
establishing the key stakeholders that would negotiate the MAST plan, Dr. Johnson led
the meetings and kept the school board informed of progress, but let stakeholders share
their ideas freely in a collaborative manner. This not only worked well in the political
frame, but set up success in the human resource frame as well as showing attention to the
relationship aspect of leadership.
When it was time to actually write the plan, Dr. Johnson turned over the
leadership of the structural frame to building principals and committee members to meet
and write their respective parts of the MAST plan. This helped to free Dr. Johnson’s time
to attend to other district issues and provided a vehicle for other stakeholders to feel
valued and trusted that they could create a plan that would fit into the culture of
excellence at Winter Valley.

MAST Implementation
Despite being a lighthouse district with very different demographics and district
structure than Pine Springs, Winter Valley had many similar experiences to Pine Springs
during MAST implementation. In Winter Valley, the drive to see each student succeed
was an important consideration in the decision to explore implementing MAST. From the
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beginning, Dr. Johnson believed MAST would be beneficial to the Winter Valley District
but not because of any change in the salary schedule. For Dr. Johnson, the promise of
MAST was as a professional development initiative.
I believe Winter Valley’s MAST plan holds a lot of promise for continuing to
raise student achievement in the Winter Valley Schools. Increasing teacher
collaboration and providing a framework for teachers to coach and mentor
colleagues holds the greatest potential for increasing student achievement. I think
we always have a frame of mind that we are always looking for things to help
support teachers and enhance instruction for students. MAST looked like it would
do that. We were negotiating even before it became law. Staff development,
student growth, and staff compensation were three main factors that prompted us
to implement MAST (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008).

Although not the most important factor, the money Winter Valley would gain
from participating in MAST was at least a consideration—for some more than others.
Competition amongst neighboring districts also appeared to be a consideration.
Obviously the money was there. We wanted to understand what it meant for
Winter Valley. Any time there is money for Winter Valley, we want to take
advantage of it. We wanted to learn more about how it could help us implement
PLCs [Professional Learning Communities]. It’s amazing how much PLCs have
become part of our culture. We shifted at that time to becoming a very data-driven
district. That work shifted dramatically as a result of our PLCs. That work and
those dollars were very beneficial. The dollars weren’t the most important part.

Pay-for-Performance Page 197 of 299
The dollars are nice, but if it didn’t do what it needed to do, we wouldn’t do it (V.
Russell, personal communication, September 30, 2009).

It had to do with compensation levels. I wish I could say it was about student
achievement, but it really was about trying to capture every dollar possible for the
district (G. Camden, personal communication, October 1, 2009).

Our neighbor, Bakersville, got into it [MAST] the year before. We were getting
reports from several levels about them. Our union president heard from their
union president, I heard from their staff development coordinator. Our
administrators heard from their administrators. We were hearing positive things,
and there was a sizeable amount of money that could be used. You really want to
compensate people for going the extra mile so to speak. All of the metro districts,
at least in this part, have high parent and student expectations and are high
performing. This would allow us to have additional compensation for high
performance (B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009).
The pressure that Winter Valley felt regarding implementing MAST because a
neighboring district had implemented the program, was likely the type of reaction CSDE
was looking for by listing the districts that were participating in MAST on each press
release. Winter Valley’s knowledge that a neighboring district implemented MAST
influenced participants’ decision to implement MAST in Winter Valley to at least some
extent. This influence showed the benefit to CSDE and other state-level MAST
supporters in using the media to communicate with the audience of school districts in its
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press releases to induce districts to act by submitting MAST applications in keeping with
the theories proposed by Edelman (1988).
Since Winter Valley was a fairly large district, it was not unusual for its
stakeholders to have differing views about initiatives than in Pine Springs. The
participants in Winter Valley had somewhat differing interpretations of the district’s
reasons for choosing to implement MAST—student achievement, staff development,
compensation, and competition. This may have been caused by the district’s larger size
and inability of stakeholders to communicate about various issues or initiatives on a daily
basis as was possible in smaller school districts like Pine Springs. However, in the MAST
legislation, it was possible to find something that applied to each of these reasons.
Like Pine Springs, for Winter Valley a team approach was an essential component
of developing and implementing the district’s MAST plan. This was echoed by all of the
study participants from Winter Valley.
From my standpoint what happed was this. A board member was aware of it. It
came through PACE [an education-related legislative liaison group]. One woman
from our board is very active in that organization through the Legislature. Terry
Smith [another school board member from Winter Valley] and Alan Johnson
brought it to the board and the board made a decision based on their
recommendation. It made sense for us to participate. There were also things in
terms of discussions with staff members and union. Terry, Alan, and Lowell
Turner, who was the assistant superintendent at the time, did a great job
communicating with teachers and the union and really educating them on it. It’s
great if we decide to do it, but if staff wasn’t going to participate, it didn’t matter.
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A lot of work was done by administration to work with the union (V. Russell,
personal communication, September 30, 2009).

We did a lot of collaboration with teacher leaders. We didn't want to push it
administratively. That wouldn't work. We were negotiating the 2005-2007
contract [at the time]. It took a lot of discussion. We had to deal with contract
parts like the salary schedule and MAST philosophy (A. Johnson, personal
communication, October 16, 2008).

A committee was pulled together. It had administrators, teacher union leadership,
teachers, some people from the district office that work with teachers, and an
Education Central State representative that our union invited as well. We spent
several meetings discussing the program, reviewing the statute, and interviewing
other districts that had MAST or TAP. We reached out to other districts, and we
found that their feelings were that it was a positive program. Our committee went
to the next step. Then we got one or more teachers from each level and then began
to write the application. Each person would go out, and with a group of our
cohorts, we drafted the sections. Then we reconvened and put the sections
together. The bottom line is it was a joint union and administrative decision. Dr.
Johnson would have kept the board apprised of the progress. That’s the beauty of
the program. You have to get together and get along for it to become a reality (B.
Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009).
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The inclusive nature of the development of the MAST plan and the effective
delegation of MAST implementation oversight was again a testament to Dr. Johnson’s
strength in visionary leadership with attention to relationships and interpersonal aspects
of leadership. It was also a testament to Dr. Johnson’s skill in the human resource and
symbolic frames.
Several factors helped implementation proceed. One of these was teamwork.
Another was an existing commitment to professional growth and student achievement A
third was a willingness to consider alternative compensation options.
The views that the school board, administration, and teacher leaders had about
professional growth, teacher compensation, and student achievement were already
strong. The discussion was more about how we work through the details. The
MAST structure helped. If it had been more [like] how it was presented initially
(Governor King's initial concept rather than the end result that was modified quite
a bit from the Governor's initial plan), it probably would not have passed in our
district (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008).

The district’s views on professional growth, teacher compensation, and student
achievement helped focus the implementation plan around the development of
professional learning communities in order to enhance professional development and
ultimately impact each of these areas through this process.
There was enthusiasm from beginning. Betty Greene worked through the
operational piece of it and worked hard to set up PLCs. We set up leadership
positions to help the PLCs get started. Initially we were more about helping the
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PLCs get started. We helped them navigate how frequently to meet, when they
would meet, how they would meet, and helped them establish goals for the
meeting. There were a lot of things to work out at the beginning (V. Russell,
personal communication, September 30, 2009).

Communication between CSDE and Winter Valley
As in Pine Springs, Winter Valley experienced multiple experiences related to
what Pine Springs participants believed was CSDE over-stepping its bounds regarding
the components of MAST, especially as it related to the salary schedule, and nightmarish
bureaucracy related to its implementation. Additionally, Winter Valley also reported
experiencing a high degree of ineptitude on the part of CSDE. Answers to questions
varied greatly based on which CSDE employee answered the question. Winter Valley
participants had the feeling that CSDE employees were making up the rules as they went
along. This created a feeling of “building the plane while they were flying it” in Winter
Valley. Among the issues about which Winter Valley scuffled with CSDE were the salary
schedule, bureaucracy, and the timing of CSDE’s approval of the district’s MAST plan.

Salary schedule: Augment versus eliminate.
Although the preceding factors facilitated the MAST plan’s initial development in
Winter Valley, implementation was not always easy. Because Winter Valley was an early
adopter of MAST, the plan was being refined at CSDE even as Winter Valley was trying
to develop the details of its own plan, causing some concern. “As the plan was being
developed, CSDE was imposing criteria upon district plans that went beyond the law
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passed by the Legislature” (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008). As
in Pine Springs, this was largely focused around differences between CSDE’s and the
district’s interpretation of how or how much the salary schedule had to be reformed.
Reforming the salary schedule was a difficult task both at the local level and in
getting it approved by CSDE.
The biggest barrier was teachers themselves. People weren’t trusting of it
[MAST]. The real problem was that the state required that the salary schedule be
reviewed and changed to reward performance rather than rewarding people for
longevity. That was a very scary change for most teachers. This was scarier than,
“What if the money goes away?” What if the money goes away was easier. If the
money is gone, then, well, it’s gone (B. Greene, personal communication, October
1, 2009).
Winter Valley ultimately acquiesced to the demands of CSDE for salary schedule reform
and worked to find a solution that was acceptable to both the local teachers and CSDE.
This was a critical juncture for MAST implementation that required effective local
leaders’ ability to gain and leverage trust as well as being able to translate the
neoconservative rhetoric that was disseminated at the state level into language that was
acceptable locally.
At the point of revising the salary schedule, the trust between teachers and
administrators was tested. Not having many districts in existence with a successful
MAST program that could be used as a model was an obstacle to successful MAST
implementation in Winter Valley.
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New changes can be viewed with a discerning and cynical eye at times. Was this
something teachers would rely on? Would it be used to replace existing salary
dollars? Was there a hidden agenda? What happens if our side wants out? The
experience of people involved was lacking. There were not a lot of models to
draw on, so we couldn’t really look at how it was working somewhere else. There
was also the question of was this just “window dressing” or would it be around
for a while. I’d call that “political trust.” That political trust changes with changes
in leadership (G. Camden, personal communication, October 1, 2009).
Because of CSDE’s insistence on interpreting the legislative language in a way that
would more effectively promote Governor King’s neoconservative education policy
agenda, the political trust between Winter Valley and CSDE was lacking. When adding
the inexperience of CSDE employees whom local school districts relied upon for advice
on writing and submitting their MAST plans, that trust was further eroded.

The bureaucratic nightmare.
In addition to serious differences of interpretation of the legislation and lack of
experience with MAST, the philosophy of CSDE to reject each plan at least once
negatively impacted Winter Valley’s ability to successfully implement MAST.
It took us three applications to get the plan approved, and took a memo of
understanding added to the contract [with the teachers’ union]. The school board
approved it, and the teachers approved it. The first year it passed by 12 votes
[with a total] of 607 teachers [voting]. The union only required a simple majority
vote. (B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009).
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Winter Valley was unable to begin MAST implementation before receiving
CSDE approval of their plan and then a union vote approving the CSDE-approved plan,
so the timing was also a negative factor in MAST implementation. Because it took three
attempts for CSDE to approve its MAST plan, Winter Valley did not receive approval for
its MAST plan until late summer of 2006 (A. Johnson, personal communication, October
16, 2008). The union vote did not occur until the teachers returned for the fall workshop
the week before classes began. However, according to the legislation, MAST had to be
fully implemented by October 1st in order for districts to pass review the following spring
so that [Winter Valley] would not lose [its] MAST funding (B. Greene, personal
communication, October 1, 2009).
This put the district in a serious time constraint to develop plans and select
teachers to fill various career ladder positions created by the plans, and then hire other
teachers to take the place of the newly “promoted” teachers in the classrooms.
We didn't get approval until late summer and teachers didn't vote until after
school started. Pulling teacher coaches out of their classrooms was an issue for
teachers and parents. It was also an issue deciding how many peer coaches to
employ (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008).

When we came back in August, we hadn’t heard yet whether our plan had been
approved by the state or not. We couldn’t move forward until we had a union
vote, and we couldn’t have the vote until after we had been approved. If we had
tried to make some contingency plans, we would have lost trust. The union would
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have thought that we were going to do this anyway regardless of how they voted
(B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009).

As noted in the previous quote, CSDE’s timelines in approving the district’s
MAST plan obviously hampered Winter Valley’s ability to adequately prepare for the
2006-2007 school year. Had CSDE not had the informal policy of rejecting MAST plans
a minimum of one time, Winter Valley may have been better able to implement its
MAST plan with less disruption to students and families. Additionally, if there was a
requirement that CSDE needed to inform districts of the status of their MAST application
status no later than May 1st of each year, districts would have more time to better
implement MAST plans. Moreover, the implementation timeline created by the delay in
approval was perhaps even more problematic. Interestingly, CSDE appeared to have
quietly waived the October 1 full implementation deadline for Winter Valley.
Had the timeline been different, it would have been better. Districts should know
in the spring if their plans are approved so they have the summer to prepare.
When we rolled MAST out, we started PLCs at that time. It really would have
been nice had we been able to bring Rick DuFour or someone like that to work
with the whole district. We set about work while we were starting the school year.
Our instructional goals were being developed as we went. Our instructional
coaches began in January. It was tough on the community as teachers were pulled
from the classrooms in the middle of the year. For example, a beloved elementary
teacher who would also be an excellent instructional coach was pulled out of the
classroom in January to serve as an instructional coach. Parents and community
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members didn’t like the disruption of having teachers pulled out of the classroom
part way through the year. It would have been nice to know in advance so we
could make personnel decisions over the summer.

DuFour says the best way to learn is by doing. I found a clip on YouTube of guys
building a plane while flying it. This is what [implementation] felt like for us. The
first year it was like teachers were doing a prescribed activity, [something we had
to do, but were not sure why]. “What do we want them to know?” can be one to
two years of work. We didn’t have any staff development time to build the big
picture and develop common knowledge. You’re approved and have to be ready
for the state to come in and determine if you’re compliant. You either have to do
it or lose it. Truly they came in to evaluate us in March or early April that year,
and we moved from level one to level two. Imagine the amount of work we did
that first semester. It was a lot of work (B. Greene, personal communication,
October 1, 2009).

Betty Greene personally had to deal with these obstacles when she was chosen to
lead the MAST implementation for the district.
I don’t believe we envisioned the implementation during the planning process.
When it came time for the implementation, we wondered, “How are we going to
do this?” They said, “Since you’re the staff development coordinator, why don’t
you be the MAST coordinator?” They let me pare off the new teacher
development part of my job and half of my job became MAST and half remained
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staff development. We never imagined what it would be like to roll it out. I wasn’t
thinking in terms of leading it, although it did make sense when they asked me to
do it (B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009).

Like Pine Springs, Winter Valley struggled with getting the various components
of MAST to work together in a cohesive manner.
We could have done more visioning along that line. I’m a very goal and task
oriented person, but you need to break it down into who needs to do what, when,
and how. I developed the plan in isolation of other things I was doing. And then I
brought it together. For example, with the PLCs, I trained people on how to do
PLCs and then brought them together to lead the PLCs. I just used the skills I
developed over the years in skill development and program planning (B. Greene,
personal communication, October 1, 2009).
This echoed Dr. Frodo’s belief that the MAST model was not really a model, but rather a
list of components. Figuring out how the components would work together seemed to be
a task that districts were on their own to complete.
Additionally, the program was mired in paperwork. School districts were strapped
for resources. This meant that fewer employees were doing more work, so districts tried
to limit activities to those that added value. In yet another interaction between CSDE and
local school districts where the two groups attached different meanings to the same
situation, CSDE and Winter Valley personnel disputed the necessity of the reporting and
paperwork requirements of MAST. Typically, district personnel viewed the paperwork
requirements associated with many CSDE programs as oppressive. CSDE viewed the
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paperwork requirements as documentation of school district accountability in
implementing these programs.
If there was a way to go from operational to cultural, that would make a huge
difference. The paperwork to show what’s done is excessive. It feels more like
being an accountant and not “let’s write a book about how teaching has improved
and student achievement has increased.” We need to talk about how this will help
us culturally instead of that a PLC will meet for 52 minutes five days a week…
From an administrative standpoint, having fewer meetings [would help]. I can
meet with teachers or school board members about student achievement and have
a plan of action in 30-60 minutes. With the MAST meetings, we can have a four
to six hour long meeting and I walk away wondering what was going on there.
We have about eight of these a year, and I don’t feel it makes an impact. For
example, we’ve discussed at length whether you can have two people on a PLC or
if you can have three people on a PLC and still get paid. Most MAST meetings
are from an accountability lens. At those meetings I feel more like an accountant
than an educational leader. (G. Camden, personal communication, October 1,
2009).

After the first year, an analysis was done to evaluate the success. Through the
analysis, we found that different kinds of groups formed—building level, subject
specific, and grade level. The information we received through the analysis
helped us to know what type of PLC was more helpful to the district and we
guided future groups in those directions, but the reporting mechanism is
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incredibly laborious. The amount of paper Betty [Greene] has to complete seems
incredible. I wonder if there couldn’t be goals established that could be reviewed
from a metric standpoint rather than completing a 50-page document…It would
reduce the amount of time spent reporting and increase Betty’s time doing. I do
understand that there has to be some reporting, but she could be analyzing how
it’s working and recommending improvements instead of spending so much time
on that paperwork. Time spent reporting is time lost doing (V. Russell, personal
communication, September 30, 2009).

In general, Winter Valley was pleased with the success of MAST in the district.
However, continued legislative support and funding was a concern not only for Winter
Valley, but for the majority of districts in Central State that considered submitting a
MAST application. “Many districts were bothered by the uncertainty. That's a very big
impediment. We took the point of view that it will be there if it's working well. If not, we
enjoyed it while it was here” (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008).
A second concern that was related to the funding of the program was the stagnant
funding to the districts. “One variable is the inflationary factor on the amount available
for teachers. Teachers won't be happy with the same amount of money every year. They
need to feel it's improving some” (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16,
2008). MAST funding had remained at $260 per student since the program’s inception.
Finally, key Winter Valley personnel were critical of the legislative discussion of
MAST from the beginning. If MAST was to really work, it required structural and
cultural change in how P-12 schools operated from the ground up. This was not
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something that could be accomplished without true educational experts working on the
issue from the start in an even-handed way.
MAST can be seen as a carrot. While there are times a carrot is helpful, most
people would move that way anyway when the data is clear. I would love for
King to be able to say here’s what it [MAST] did. I’m not finding that cultural
change. [MAST] seems like more of an operational change. Those types of
changes are not sustainable, but you need to be patient for cultural change. The
culture needs to focus on student achievement. Legislatively, they can’t change
the culture in a district. The last time I had a senator in here talking about what the
Legislature could do for us, I said, “When H1N1 came, they had the best health
experts in the world working on the problem. They had the Center for Disease
Control and all of their experts working on it. Yet, because we all share this
common education experience of having gone to school, you choose to tackle that
problem yourselves.”

They’re not qualified to do it. If you haven’t been in a high school in the last five
years, you don’t know what a high school is like today and what the issues are,
and legislators don’t have the training or experience to deal with it. That they feel
they can tackle education themselves without the help of experts in the field is
like a slap in the face (G. Camden, personal communication, October 1, 2009).
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The (Relatively) Calm Morning after the Nightmare
Despite these early challenges, MAST was successful in Winter Valley by all
accounts. Even though Winter Valley had already been a high-performing district, some
of the study participants credited MAST with helping the district to become even better.
MAST helped drive student achievement higher [and] opened doors for teachers
to watch others teach rather than having traditionally closed doors. We have
placed more emphasis on specific kinds of staff development, and staff has a more
comfortable feeling about MAST and other district programs. We have reached a
place of peace, if you will. (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16,
2008).

I don’t think anyone thought we would get as much lift from the staff as we did. I
thought we’d get more resistance. They love what we’re doing and how it has
changed education. That’s really gratifying. Seeing something like data that was
scary for these folks, and seeing that change, we’ve been able to see growth in our
district. It’s really kind of a model for making change (V. Russell, personal
communication, September 30, 2009).

We have really become a data-driven district. This was a huge change for
teachers. That combined with evaluation by peers or principal for success. The
union was scared about that—the evaluation and data. Both have been
instrumental in changing the way we do things. For example, say third grade
reading looks at scores, and the range of data says “this,” what can we do to get
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“that.” We were able to direct resources to change results. That’s why our district
is performing at the level it is today. TICS (Teacher Instructional Coaches)
evaluate others in the classroom. At first it was intimidating, now teachers find it
to be very beneficial and appreciated. Staff is open to it, sees value, and is
cooperating (V. Russell, personal communication, September 30, 2009).

Teachers who were once skeptical of the plan became thrilled with how far they
had come both as a staff and as a district. They not only saw themselves as teachers in a
high-performing district, but also as change agents who were advancing education to fit
the 21st century learner.
This will sound silly, but we’ve moved from a culture of teaching to a culture of
learning. We focus on the learner. We’ve changed in so many ways. Our staff
development goals prior to this time were general. They were not measurable,
difficult to measure at best. Now we write SMART [simple, measurable,
achievable, realistic, and time-bound] goals at the site and PLC level. Now they
are easily measured. We shifted in that way, now our goals are simple and
effective. They are simple, measurable, achievable, and we have a deadline, like
we will get this done by this date. Our focus has shifted to the learner. We truly
ask the question, “What is best for our students?” (B. Greene, personal
communication, October 1, 2009).

I was a high school teacher before I went into this role. If I’m teaching ninth
grade history, it’s so much easier if I have a schedule that allows me to end each
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class at the same spot. It makes life as a teacher easier, but if you are really
teaching at a student level—if you are learner-centered—when do you ever have
all students learning at the same level all at the same time? We’ve changed in that
way. Are we 100% there yet? No. It takes time. We’re starting year four. Some
experts say it takes three to five years…we are differentiating more for our
students (B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009).

Another change that is at the heart of what we do is the PLCs, the collaboration,
common formative and summative assessments, and discussing how are we
reporting this to parents. We’re looking at how were reporting this information to
parents. We’re changing that 19th century teaching model and now the reporting
model doesn’t fit what we do. Learning and students look different. If you look at
the five components required by statute for the MAST program, there is so much
wisdom in having those five components. Teacher leadership has been
phenomenal. Instructional coaches I work with and train, they’re doing
observations and we’re using an inter-rater reliability scale to do that. We use the
Danielson domains. Everyone when they were hired in the district is trained in
Danielson and how we use the domains. Instead of having a principal come in
once every three years, now people are evaluated three times a year. We have
most of the district retrained in effective teaching components. We’ve also
included technology. It’s our district’s own addition to Danielson. We’ve created
a common language regarding what effective teaching looks like (B. Greene,
personal communication, October 1, 2009).
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Although the focus of Winter Valley’s MAST plan was internal, Dr. Johnson also
noted support from the public at large. “We had a lot of public support, not just parents,
but in general. Folks outside of schools think that it should be that way. When
implemented well, like our plan, folks are pleased with it” (A. Johnson, personal
communication, October 16, 2008).

Education Reform Stew
Although not concurrently implementing as many initiatives as Pine Springs,
Winter Valley was implementing several other initiatives to improve student achievement
at the same time it was implementing MAST. Both districts were also committed to
implementing the Charlotte Danielson method of evaluating teacher performance.
Implementing MAST and Charlotte Danielson were two major undertakings.
Implementing both programs at the same time could strap a district’s resources in terms
of finances, time, and the staff’s willingness to adopt the change. However, school
districts in Central State could no longer afford the luxury of implementing one program
at a time and measuring its effectiveness. Districts were increasingly pressured to
implement multiple programs designed at improving student achievement
simultaneously, especially if there was money attached to implementation.
Often, as in the case of MAST implementation, there were multiple components
within a program that required the development of “programs within programs.” Both
Pine Springs and Winter Valley addressed the MAST requirement of achieving jobembedded professional development through the implementation of professional learning
communities (PLCs).
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The component that Betty Greene was actually most proud of in Winter Valley’s
MAST plan was the PLCs that lead to increased teacher collaboration and, ultimately,
increased student achievement.
PLCs, to me, are the heart of our plan. When we have teachers around a table, we
use the DuFour model. We ask, “What do we want each student to know?” In
years past when I was teaching, when the door closed, we were all probably doing
something different [in our classrooms]. We all got to the same place by the end
of the term, but that was all we had in common. [The extent of our collaboration
was that] we shared lessons if we saw something interesting—usually student
work waiting to be graded, and then asked about it. The other person may have
shared it if they had something they were really excited about….That’s the part
I’m most proud of—and the time has been provided for [teachers] to collaborate
(B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009).

MAST’s Impact on Student Achievement
Although student achievement was on the rise at Winter Valley, it was honestly
difficult to determine what if any of that improvement was attributable to MAST. As with
the other districts studied, there were multiple initiatives being implemented across the
district during the study period that could have all positively impacted student
achievement. Therefore, Greg Camden was not certain that there was necessarily a direct
correlation between MAST and the success of the Winter Valley School District.
It’s difficult to slice MAST off and say that MAST has done this for us. I wish I
could say that test scores went up, but they’ve always been up. Since MAST is
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tied to the PLCs, it may have helped those grow and flourish, but I can’t say
there’s a one to one correspondence necessarily (G. Camden, personal
communication, October 1, 2009).

With all of the focus of the early MAST rhetoric on pay-for-performance and the
Governor’s and CSDE’s over-focus on the salary schedule component, the Governor,
CSDE, and the legislative body overlooked the primary benefit of MAST as it was
actually implemented in school districts across Central State. As implemented by local
districts, this was its contribution to the professional development of teachers. That in
turn seemed to have a positive impact on student achievement, although due to the fact
that districts did not implement any one program in isolation, the impact MAST had on
student achievement could not be measured. As Dr. Johnson (personal communication,
October 16, 2008) explained it, “I don't think the Legislature realizes how powerful a tool
[MAST] has been for raising student achievement.”

MAST’s Long-Term Prospects in Winter Valley
Winter Valley did not rest on its laurels and continued to work to improve MAST
implementation. One improvement—making MAST a cultural phenomenon—would take
time, but would likely yield important gains due to the ability of teachers and
administrators to spend more time focused on the learner and less time focused on the
required paper trail associated with MAST. When a new program became a cultural
phenomenon, it seemed like the program was always a part of the culture. Its components
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fit together well and the implementation flowed smoothly. It also coordinated with other
programs in the district without creating gaps or overlaps in programming.
As the MAST program matured, it seemed to be popular with teachers in Winter
Valley, and at the time of this research, the district had no plans to eliminate the program.
“This year [2009] when the union did the survey, it was, I believe, in the neighborhood of
94-95% of the teaching staff in favor of [continuing MAST]” (B. Greene, personal
communication, October 1, 2009).

Emerging Themes between Pine Springs and Winter Valley

MAST Rhetoric
Central State’s MAST program had five required components: (a) career
ladder/advancement options; (b) job-embedded professional development; (c) teacher
evaluation; (d) performance-based pay; and (e) a reformed, alternative salary schedule.
The initial objective of MAST as promoted by the Central State Legislature, Governor,
and Department of Education was to improve student achievement by linking teacher
compensation to student performance. However, the professional development
component of MAST, rather than the compensation components of MAST, was the focus
for increased teacher and student achievement in Pine Springs and Winter Valley.
Superintendents in Pine Springs and Winter Valley were able to successfully
translate the neoconservative, state-level rhetoric into rhetoric that was more palatable
locally. These leaders focused on the professional development, student achievement, and
additional compensation aspects of MAST and never referred to it as a “pay-for-
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performance” program in any of the interviews I conducted. Further, none of the
participants in either district reported that district leaders had ever described MAST as a
pay-for-performance initiative or even linked the compensation aspect to student
achievement gains.
However, and in keeping with the neoconservative perspective from which the
original impetus for MAST was developed by Governor King, proponents of
performance-based pay outside of the districts attributed the increase in student
achievement to the way teachers were compensated—performance-based pay and the
alternative salary schedule. However, both Pine Springs and Winter Valley attributed the
increase in student performance to the increased focus and time allotted for professional
development and collaboration for teachers—the job-embedded professional
development. These differences in what local participants versus state-level
neoconservative participants viewed as the most promising aspects of MAST effectively
demonstrated how competing ideologies impacted the political discourse and perceptions
surrounding MAST.
That both districts saw increases in student achievement, while only one of the
districts had a teachers’ salary schedule that conformed to the expectations of CSDE in
terms of the extent of reform required indicated that the resulting increase in student
achievement was not likely related to compensation. If there was a relationship between
MAST and increased student achievement, it had to be connected to the part of the
program the districts shared in common. That was the professional development to which
teachers were attracted and eventually included in the cultural assumptions of both
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districts. These findings were aligned with previous reports by Honawar (2007) that
showed no correlation between teacher compensation and student achievement.

CSDE
In the Governor’s, Republican Party’s, and CSDE’s focus on the promotion of
professional compensation for teachers, they missed the most positive aspect of MAST
from a local school district perspective. It took several years of data and a change of
Governor and Commissioner of Education for CSDE to openly admit that improved
professional development practices was a positive, although unintended, outcome of
MAST.
In the interaction between CSDE and these two districts, CSDE assumed the role
it was accustomed to playing—they heavy-handed enforcer and education annex of the
Governor’s office. Winter Valley and Pine Springs played their respective roles as
obedient minions faithfully as well to a point. Winter Valley made the required changes
to their salary structure, completed the paperwork, and met as many timelines as they
could due to the late notice it received about the approval of its MAST program. In terms
of “fidelity of MAST implementation,” as Josh Gleason from CSDE referred to it, Winter
Valley ranked highest among the four districts studied.
Typically, political adversaries are individuals or groups that lack the power to
harm the group that labeled them as the adversary (Edelman, 1988). It could be argued
that, at the time of this research, the relationship between CSDE and local school districts
was this type of adversarial relationship. The interaction between the districts and CSDE
was typical of how political adversaries, as defined by Edelman (1988), related to each
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other until Pine Springs changed the game. Pine Springs may have caught CSDE off
guard in how Pine Springs handled its role in the dramaturgy. Pine Springs dutifully
completed and submitted the MAST application, and, as it was instructed, adapted the
plan to fit the district. However those adaptations were not aligned with CSDE’s
expectation of a teacher compensation plan that eliminated the traditional step and lane
system. In the typical interaction, Pine Springs would have acquiesced and eliminated the
step and lane salary schedule, but Pine Springs held firm. Perhaps only because of the
Governor’s Fishing Opener to be held there, CSDE conceded. In addition to the Governor
wanting the photo opportunity with Pine Springs District personnel and the big check,
numerous media personnel would be in Pine Springs covering the event. If the media
knew that Pine Springs refused to change its salary schedule and stood up to CSDE, it
had the potential to cause negative publicity for MAST and the Governor and perhaps
inspire more districts to openly question CSDE’s interpretation of the MAST legislation
and negatively impact CSDE’s and the Governor’s ability to use the media to shape the
public opinion of MAST. If more local school districts would have stood up to CSDE’s
MAST requirements that they felt overstepped the bounds of the MAST legislation, it
could have altered the ability of CSDE and the Governor to safely label local school
districts as adversaries. Up to that point of MAST implementation, the Governor and
CSDE had run a highly successful media campaign garnering support from the public and
enough interest on the part of local school districts to submit letters of intent and garner
some political success regarding MAST. These aspects were not lost on the savvy veteran
Pine Springs Superintendent nor likely on Governor King.
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Both Pine Springs and Winter Valley had a successful MAST programs for many
years with successful evaluations conducted by CSDE and earned the privilege of selfmonitoring their programs, a benefit districts get after four years of successful CSDE
program monitoring and evaluations. Both districts appeared to be relatively satisfied
with their programs (aside from the paperwork CSDE still requires). CSDE would argue
that Pine Springs did not implement the salary schedule with fidelity. Nevertheless, and
despite the counter assumptions of Governor King, CSDE, and the Republican Party in
Central State, the data indicated that the traditional steps and lanes salary schedule was
not a factor influencing student achievement in the districts; a finding first stated in the
official assessment commissioned by the Governor and CSDE (Hezel Associates, 2009).
However, when Bear Creek (the district where Dr. Frodo later shared his time)
submitted a MAST application that was nearly identical to that of Pine Springs, CSDE
flatly rejected it on the basis that the salary schedule had not been reformed (J. Frodo,
personal communication, October 16, 2009). Since Pine Springs’ approval was prior to
CSDE prevailing in the courts regarding the extent of reform they could require and Bear
Creek’s application came afterward, this may have indicated that changing the traditional
steps and lanes salary schedule may have been the priority over student achievement on
the part of CSDE and the neoconservatives whose agenda CSDE attempted to advance.

Financial Persuasion
The financial carrot extended to both districts incentivized them to explore and
ultimately participate in MAST, although the financial incentive was greater in Pine
Springs. The Legislature was probably wise to increase the amount of money districts
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could receive for participating in MAST from $150 to $260 per student, and it was likely
still not enough to persuade most teachers in Central State to abandon the traditional steps
and lanes salary schedule. However, in both districts, the money they received from
MAST allowed them to pay their teachers more and possibly retain and attract teachers
because of the increased compensation. It also allowed districts to fund professional
development activities in a more effective manner. In terms of dollars into the district,
both districts spent money out of their general funds to support MAST. Therefore, there
was no financial incentive to districts to pursue MAST or to persuade teachers to pursue
MAST at the district level. The only financial incentive went to the teachers themselves.
MAST funding to districts remained at a flat $260 per student since it was passed.
Participants in both districts expressed concern over the flat funding and the increasing
amount that was shifting to local taxpayers. There was also an uncertainty regarding how
much longer the teachers would perform the work associated with MAST without any
increase in MAST compensation. Neither district wanted to fill yet another funding gap
from its general fund by using general fund dollars to increase MAST compensation for
teachers. The other concern was the increasing amount of tax burden to local property
taxes in the event that either district needed to pass an operating or bond levy because the
increased tax burden may have caused local taxpayers to reject an even greater tax burden
through local, voter approved levies like operating and bond levies for schools.

De-unionizing Teachers
The legislative position on union-busting bills like alternative licensure and
MAST gave credence to Greg Camden’s (personal communication, October 1, 2009)
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belief that because people shared a common educational experience of having attended
school that they were qualified to teach or run a school. Having performed management
duties in both the business and education sectors, I could attest that they were two very
different entities. However, as anyone who has taken a number of college courses taught
by adjunct faculty (as I experienced in MBA courses) could also have understood, being
a strong business professional did not necessarily make one a strong educator.
In both districts MAST did not appear to weaken the teachers’ unions.
Additionally, teachers themselves reported feeling more empowered and in charge of
their teaching. If anything, MAST created positions in both districts where teachers
observed and evaluated other teachers, pushing them into what was once considered
solely an administrative function.
Additionally, the teachers’ unions in both districts required a 50% plus one vote to
approve the MAST program. Under the provisions of MAST, teachers’ unions in regular
public school districts could set their own required margin of victory for passing MAST.
Rather than serving as a union-busting, or at least weakening tool, MAST seemed to have
strengthened the teachers’ union in Pine Springs and Winter Valley. From the
neoconservative point of view, this was likely an unintended negative outcome of MAST
similar to the unintended negative outcomes of pay-for-performance compensation
models described by Harris.
Leadership
Although leaders in Pine Springs and Winter Valley had countless other things to
attend to besides MAST, both made MAST implementation a focus during the initial
planning and application phase of the program. In Pine Springs, MAST received a mixed
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reaction on the part of teachers. MAST was initially viewed as one more in a long line of
state programs that had come and gone. Although not explicitly stated by participants in
Winter Valley, based on the closeness of the vote in that district, teachers there were
probably thinking the same thing. The ability of local leaders to understand the political
nature of MAST and tor translate the messages from the Legislature and CSED into what
local constituents would accept and the trust established between local stakeholders were
key factors in developing and implementing the MAST plan in Pine Springs and Winter
Valley and were aligned with qualities of effective leadership as described by Northouse
(2009); Bolman & Deal (2008), and Edelman (1988).
The trust between teachers and union leadership and the trust between teachers,
union leadership, and the superintendent was key to developing a culture of trust and
teamwork that enabled Pine Springs to overcome the obstacles that CSDE placed in its
way regarding the augmentation of their salary schedule and other implementation
concerns and allowed full implementation of the District’s MAST plan. The relatively
small size of the District (with the entire staff housed in two buildings that were right
next to each other) likely made effective communication easier. This culture of trust
allowed Pine Springs to experiment with new programs and helped stakeholders
understand that mistakes would be made in good faith. As a result, Pine Springs was able
to acknowledge shortcomings of its initial plan and corrected those shortcomings without
damaging intra-district relationships.
Winter Valley also attributed the success in developing the district’s MAST plan
to using a team approach, showing effective leadership in the human resource frame and
interpersonal and relationship aspects of leadership. Winter Valley was a much larger
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district than Pine Springs with more stakeholders qualified to lead and shape the MAST
program. However, the district’s attention to the symbolic frame and visionary leadership
by attending to its mission, vision, and goals as drivers of district decision-making helped
members of the application and implementation teams effectively communicate how
MAST related to the district mission and vision to other stakeholders that were not part of
those committees. In addition, Winter Valley as a district organization was a model of
coordination of multiple departments and administrators working toward the same goals.
That the school board, administration, and teacher leaders were already focused on
professional growth and student achievement prior to discussing MAST was also a factor
that helped MAST implementation proceed.
Being able to effectively lead in the human resource, symbolic, structural, and
political frames as presented by and the ability to attend to visionary, conceptual, tasks,
administrative, interpersonal, and relationship aspects of leadership appeared to have
been important to successful MAST implementation in both districts. In both districts, the
ability of teachers to see how MAST helped them be successful led to increased support
for MAST as the districts continued to participate in MAST, emphasizing the importance
of viewing MAST from the point of view of others.
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CHAPTER SIX: TWO DISTRICTS WHERE MAST DIDN’T TAKE

Cotton Grove

District Background
Cotton Grove was a suburban area of a large, Midwestern city. It was primarily a
bedroom community that had a generally high residential property value, but little to no
industry. The school district was the largest employer in the community. Like the other
districts (except for Pine Springs) Cotton Grove was represented by a Republican senator
and a Republican congressman at the state level. Senator Mary Voss represented Cotton
Grove and also participated in this research.
The average school district property tax per home was $1454 (CSDE, 2009g). The
district was part of a rapidly growing community, but despite that growth found itself
needing to trim the school district budget by as much as 10% each year for the last three
years (2006-2009). As part of those budget reductions, teachers were placed on
unrequested leave and class sizes grew. At the time of this research, the school district
had an operating levy on the ballot for the past two years and each year the levy failed,
leaving the district with one new elementary school it could not open and numerous
reductions in services to its students. On the third attempt to pass the operating levy, the
levy was divided into two questions. The first question to provide funding to open the
new elementary school passed, but the second question to provide funding to reduce class
sizes in the middle and high schools failed.
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Cotton Grove enrolled just under 7000 students (CSDE, 2009g). Despite being
one of the fastest growing districts in the U.S., Cotton Grove experienced a declining
unreserved, undesignated fund balance at the time of this research (CSDE, 2009g).
Cotton Grove did not implement MAST, but the school district engaged in a two-year
discussion of whether or not to implement it between 2005 and 2007. Cotton Grove
students scored as making adequate yearly progress on the NCLB goals in only two of
the past seven years (CSDE, 2009g). In terms of achieving NCLB goals, Cotton Grove
students achieved at the lowest rate of the districts studied.
In its transition from small town to rapidly growing suburb, Cotton Grove had
seen perhaps more than its share of cultural change in the past decade. Part of that change
involved the retirement of a long-time superintendent and the growth of the district office
staff from essentially a two-person operation to a modern, mid-sized district model with a
staff of 10 coordinator/director-level personnel. Beginning with his arrival in 2002, Dr.
Joe O’Connor, the new hard-charging superintendent, directed that transition. This
transition included increasing the number of district administrators, building five new
schools and a district office; and remodeling or re-purposing of the rest of the schools in
the district. Under Dr. O’Connor’s leadership Cotton Grove grew into a respected
suburban school district. Dr. O’Connor was lauded as a visionary leader with a strong
commitment to environmental learning.
The change also involved the creation of a comprehensive mission statement for
the district as well as one for each school. The district mission statement was as follows.
Our mission as the Cotton Grove School District, is to be the community hub of
intergenerational learning, is to develop people who enthusiastically engage in
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purposeful learning, who are critical thinkers fully prepared to excel in everything
they do, and who are responsible and productive members of an ever-changing
global society. We will provide: opportunities that constantly challenge our
learners to discover and enhance their individual skills and talents; a vibrant,
welcoming environment focused on the needs of the learner; and an innovative
staff that is fully passionate about teaching and learning (Cotton Grove Public
School District, 2005).

This mission statement was accompanied by 14 belief statements, 8 goals, and 10
strategies to achieve those goals. Additionally, each school within the district had its own
mission statement that was related to the district mission statement, as well as goals and
strategies to achieve those goals. The mission and goals of the district were reinforced
through financial policy. All spending in the district was tied to the goals and strategies of
the district. Items that were not aligned with the goals were not funded. The financial
alignment to the district mission and strategic plan gave the district a focus and direction
for the 21st century that it had not seen before.

MAST Exploration
As noted earlier, Cotton Grove never initiated a MAST plan, but there was
discussion about implementing MAST that began in the 2005-2006 school year and
became quite serious in the 2006-2007 school year. Cotton Grove already had some
components of MAST in place and filed a non-binding letter of intent to participate in
MAST with CSDE in October of 2005. The district had many components of MAST
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already in place when it submitted its letter of intent. There were some opportunities for
career ladders where teachers were able to assume staff development positions without
becoming administrators. The district had district-wide and building goals and staff
development and budgets that were tied to those goals. The district established
professional learning communities and peer coaching. It also had a goal setting process
for individual teachers. Additionally, an administrator observed non-tenured teachers
three times per year.
If Cotton Grove were to implement MAST, the following items also needed to be
in place. All faculty members needed to be formally observed three times per year and an
alternative compensation schedule had to be created. Additionally, the local teachers’
union representatives stipulated that the MAST plan had to be approved by a threefourths majority in order to pass.
The district explored MAST extensively. We formed a committee that Logan
Taylor [Human Resource Director] headed for a year. I served on it too. There
was a building principal, HR, [School Board Member], and the Union President,
and [Union Representative] was there too. We worked hard, and spent a year
working on all of the components (J. O’Connor, personal communication,
October 1, 2009).

Jack Sutton, a building principal in the Cotton Grove school district, agreed with
Dr. O’Connor about the thorough manner in which the district explored the potential of
MAST implementation.
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We did have a committee that consisted of teacher representation, union
leadership, district administrators, building principals, human resources, and the
school board that did explore in a thorough manner some proposals of
implementation of MAST (J Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009).

Susan Barnes, Business Manager at Cotton Grove, described how the attempt to
implement MAST proceeded.
About a year ago, Logan worked with the CGEA [Cotton Grove Education
Association] President and a committee to see what [MAST] would look like for
Cotton Grove—staff development, mentor training, all those kinds of things. I
think last fall, I might have the timing wrong, Candy [Candy Jackson, CGEA
President] and Logan went to sites to explain the program (S. Barnes, personal
communication, October 16, 2008).

Other districts reported tying teacher compensation to observation results as an
initial barrier, although not as big of a barrier as altering or eliminating the traditional
salary schedule. However, this was not seen as a barrier in Cotton Grove. At Cotton
Grove, peer observation was generally regarded as a positive component of the MAST
plan as described by Charlie Jones, a teacher and union representative in Cotton Grove.
Having teachers evaluate teachers is always good. Once you get in your box, you
don’t see anything else. Math teachers seeing math teachers would help us
collaborate more than we do… Teacher observation was a small component, but
not as great as in the Bakersville [a nearby school district that implemented
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MAST] plan. The only problem is if you get evaluated by a teacher who is not in
your discipline. They can give basics of feedback, but no subject-specific ideas.
I’ve always enjoyed going into other math teachers’ rooms and other subject area
teachers’ rooms just to see what other teachers do in terms of classroom
management (C. Jones, personal communication, September 29, 2009).

The goal-setting component of MAST was well-received by teachers; however,
teachers seemed to be more interested in the professional development aspects of MAST
the most.
I think the professional development opportunities and the funding for the
professional development opportunities [were most beneficial]. I think
specifically within the MAST plan that would be the PLCs. That’s what we were
planning to do. We were going to create teacher leaders and collaborative teams.
We have been doing that anyway, but don’t have people being compensated for
that. I think it would enhance staff development at the building level (J. Sutton,
personal communication, October 1, 2009).

Charlie Jones, a teacher and union representative, repeated the positive attitude
teachers had for the professional development aspects of MAST.
Teachers would be able to collaborate with [other] teachers and be compensated
for the extra work they were doing. The district and teachers felt it would promote
the mentor program and other programs we think are beneficial (C. Jones,
personal communication, September 29, 2009).
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Even though her position focused on the district’s finances, Barnes saw
professional development as a significant benefit of implementing MAST.
You would expect me to say the money [was the most enticing aspect of MAST
implementation]. There’s definitely a cash incentive, but we can’t just use the
money any way we want. The biggest benefits would be [professional
development] training for teachers, and we would hope to increase student
achievement and improve employee morale. It’s a way to get funding so teachers
can team together and get paid for it. Without that money we would have to pull it
from somewhere else (S. Barnes, personal communication, October 16, 2008).

Despite the teachers’ and other stakeholders’ perspectives about the professional
development aspect being most beneficial, their view of what was important about
MAST varied from what Dr. O’Connor thought should be the focus of the MAST
discussion.
With the parameters given at the time, the way the discussion needed to go on, in
my opinion, was for there to be responsibility on the part of the staff person in
conjunction with their direct supervisor to develop a plan for themselves in terms
of goals, processes, the weight of each component, and how external versus
internal factors would be measured…In my opinion, group goals didn’t gain a lot
of steam in our committee, but joint team level goals and [group] building goals
would help [MAST be an effective program]. MAST works the best when there is
a joint effort on the part of staff to reach a goal. The group goal takes out the
factor of having a [low-achieving] class [for reasons outside of the teacher’s
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control]. The changing role of leadership and who is a leader is an important part
[of MAST]. Is a teacher a leader? A principal? What is a leader and how does that
fit into MAST (J. O’Connor, personal communication, October 1, 2009)?
The differences between the Dr. O’Connor’s vision of what was important about MAST
and what other stakeholders believed was most important contributed to the failure of
MAST implementation. This also demonstrated Dr. O’Connor’s lack of attention to
interpersonal and relationship aspects of leadership and the human resource frame at least
in the area of MAST. Whereas the teachers and other administrators were attentive to the
positive aspects of MAST as a professional development tool, Dr. O’Connor focused
more on the neoconservative values regarding what was good about MAST.

Derailing the MAST Train
Dr. O’Connor’s focus on the pay-for-performance and teacher accountability
aspects of MAST that were promoted by neoconservatives, served to erode trust between
teachers and Dr. O’Connor—a component that was critical to successful MAST
implementation in Pine Springs and Winter Valley. The lack of trust brought on by Dr.
O’Connor’s frequent use of the neoconservative rhetoric regarding performance-based
compensation and teacher accountability, along with his general inattentiveness toward
the MAST discussion led to the derailing of MAST in Cotton Grove.
However, MAST did not become a part of the Cotton Grove culture due to a
number of factors. The two main contributors were leadership and communication.
CSDE and the local school board approved the district’s plan; however, local teachers did
not support it to the level required for implementation (a three-fourths majority). Study
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participants reported that the majority of the stakeholders were on board, but there was a
large enough minority of teachers who were opposed to the plan that defeated it.
There was a committee that looked into what [MAST] would look like. It was
presented to staff as free money. The school board approved it, but teachers voted
it down. I’m pretty sure the high school said yes and elementary voted it down (C.
Jones, personal communication, September 29, 2009).

Seventy-five percent of the [CGEA] members had to vote yes. There weren’t that
many, so it failed. There were more than 50%, if I remember right. The rationale
is you don’t want 50% because you want a significant majority of the teachers on
board. Candy and Logan had a positive feeling about the program, but the
program was too new and we didn’t get a chance to educate teachers enough on
what it was…More education [was possibly needed]. I don’t know if the district
has any say [in what would help MAST pass]. Probably a discussion about what
percentage is needed to pass. I understand needing more than 51%, but what’s the
appropriate percentage? I think the groundwork and site visits were headed in the
right direction. We just needed more education (S. Barnes, personal
communication, October 16, 2008).

The perceptions of participants from Cotton Grove regarding why MAST did not
pass demonstrated a realization that communication between stakeholders and MAST
planners was deficient. One of the drawbacks of pay-for-performance plans like MAST
was that they could be extremely complicated and difficult for teachers to understand
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similar to what Harris (2007) found when studying merit-based compensation. Teachers
may have needed more time to understand Cotton Grove’s MAST plan and perhaps a
decision to delay the vote until more teachers understood the components of Cotton
Grove’s MAST plan would have helped it to pass. The lack of accurate knowledge
regarding the level of understanding the teachers had about the district’s MAST plan was
an indication of a lack of competence in the human resource frame and interpersonal and,
perhaps, the conceptual aspects of leadership.
The teachers’ union’s requirement of a 75% majority vote in order to pass MAST
was also a barrier to approving the plan.
It came to a vote by the board. The board accepted it. The teachers determined
that they needed to have a super vote, a 75% majority. They had a majority vote,
but did not have a super majority, so it died (J. O’Connor, personal
communication, October 1, 2009).

The vote result was that the teachers didn’t vote in favor of it, and it has not
resurfaced. That was in 2006-2007. I think the school board was ready to move on
it at that time, but unfortunately it didn’t pass with the teachers (J. Sutton,
personal communication, October 1, 2009).
Both of the two case districts that had successfully implemented MAST plans throughout
this research required only 50% plus one vote to pass MAST. Perhaps this was related to
the level of trust among stakeholders in the districts as participants in Pine Springs and
Winter Valley reported strong trust between teachers and administrators whereas Cotton
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Grove reported that there were some negative issues regarding trust in the district at the
time of the MAST discussion.

Local Leadership
Dr. Joe O’Connor was in his third superintendency while he was at Cotton Grove
at the beginning of this study. His first superintendency was in a small, rural community
in a Midwestern state where he served for three years. The second was in a small, rural
community in Central State, where he also served for three years. He was the fifth
superintendent to serve in the Cotton Grove district in its history. Of the former
superintendents, one served for 26 years, one for 12, and two for relatively short terms.
Dr. O’Connor was at the helm of the Cotton Grove school district for six years. He later
left Cotton Grove and became the superintendent of a school district in a regional center
in another state. Dr. O’Connor’s departure from Cotton Grove was unrelated to the
district’s MAST status. He left because he was frustrated when a former employee,
whom Dr. O’Connor had personally recommended for termination for what Dr.
O’Connor believed was illegal promotion of religious beliefs in school, was elected to the
school board.
Effective leadership for MAST implementation was lacking at Cotton Grove.
Participants seemed to agree that something went wrong, but they didn’t agree on what it
was. However, participants’ statements all reflected leadership and/or communication
issues as factors that derailed MAST.
In the end, it was the vote. It died probably because of leadership issues. I believe
one of the buildings killed it. I think it was one of the middle schools, but I can’t
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remember which one. I think there was a lack of trust with the building principal.
Staff was afraid of how it would be used against them. Union leadership could be
an issue too [in many such votes against an initiative], but it was not in our case.
They were with us. Candy and George [another union representative] helped lead
the process and worked hard. There were employee fears that [teachers] were
going to be evaluated on factors over which they had no control. Probably, lastly,
a lot of staff [members] don’t see themselves in a leadership role. They see
themselves as a classroom teacher. They don’t take that role seriously or
necessarily want it (J. O’Connor, personal communication, October 1, 2009).

Dr. O’Connor was accurate in identifying a lack of trust as a barrier to successful
MAST implementation. However, at the time the plan was being promoted to teachers,
Dr. O’Connor was focused on the structural aspects of leadership rather than the human
resource frame and interpersonal and relational aspects of leadership that appeared to be
necessary to successfully implement MAST. Additionally, his lack of attention in
successfully remaining informed of MAST’s status in the district once it was delegated to
others showed ineffectiveness in the task aspect of leadership.
Dr. O’Connor believed that leadership and a lack of time on his part (to be able to
leverage the trust and communication he had established with staff and administration)
were the telling issues in the failure of the MAST effort. At the time MAST was being
discussed in the district, Cotton Grove was one of the fastest growing school districts in
the country. This growth put an incredible demand on Dr. O’Connor’s time.
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My life at Cotton Grove was mostly building buildings. We had five new schools
in five years. While I was an active part of the [MAST] committee, I made every
meeting, but Logan [Human Resource Director] led it. It was just because I didn’t
have the time to do it all. I think it needs a superintendent to be out and
personable about it. I didn’t know until after the fact that the union was going to
require a super vote. If I had known, I would have gone to the buildings
personally. I don’t know if that would have made a difference or not, but a
superintendent has to be very proactive. You can’t turn it over to someone else
and say good luck. As a superintendent, you represent the spirit of trust in district.
If you don’t have that trust, you’re not going to get the vote anyway, but if you do
have it, you need to use it (J. O’Connor, personal communication, October 1,
2009).

Dr. O’Connor’s over-focus on the structural frame was understandable. A focus
on the building of infrastructure and hiring and leading many new people was required to
keep the district running, especially when considering the number of building projects
that occurred during the year the district worked on its MAST plan. However, greater
attention to the symbolic, political, and human resource leadership frames and visionary,
relational, interpersonal, task, and conceptual aspects of leadership would likely have
aided MAST implementation had Dr. O’Connor been able to keep his neoconservative
rhetoric in check.
Dr. O’Connor may have been a strong negotiator in the political frame; however,
he seemed to be unable to translate the “pay-for-performance” rhetoric of CSDE, the
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Legislature, and the Governor into language that would be accepted by the teachers at
Cotton Grove. His inability to codify this rhetoric further eroded the trust between
teachers and administrators in the district. Dr. O’Connor seemed to lack understanding of
the political nature of MAST and appeared to accept the state-level MAST rhetoric. I
think that he believed that Cotton Grove teachers would accept that rhetoric as well.
However, this was not the case.
Additionally, Dr. O’Connor completely delegated the oversight of the
development of the MAST plan to Logan Taylor (Human Resources Director) and Candy
Johnson (Union President). Had Dr. O’Connor participated in the development process,
he might have realized that MAST was more accepted in some schools than in others. He
also would have known that 75% of teachers had to vote to approve the plan. If he had
been aware of these issues, he could have spent more time in those schools promoting the
MAST plan. He would have also known that some schools strongly supported MAST.
Dr. O’Connor should have also known that MAST did not need to be implemented
district-wide, but could also be implemented school by school. He could have worked to
have the MAST plan and vote implemented by school. If one school implemented MAST
(especially the high school because of its size and the number of teachers who worked in
it) it probably would not have been long before other schools in the district demanded
MAST. This was because Cotton Grove already had many MAST components in place,
but teachers were not getting compensated for the work. It was possible that teachers in
schools that did not have MAST would resent that they were doing much of the same
work as the teachers in the school that had MAST, but were not getting paid for that work
and would request to participate in MAST as well.
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The district already had a mission statement, goals, and a strategic plan, but
MAST was never discussed symbolically in terms of how it would help Cotton Grove
fulfill its mission. This was a failure of symbolic leadership. Cotton Grove could have
leveraged the idealism that was present in its mission documents to inspire teachers to
work to fulfill this mission and illustrated how MAST would help accomplish that.
However, district leadership largely used the mission, goals, and strategic plan as
financial accountability tools rather than as symbols of pursuing excellence. This
reinforced the trend of Dr. O’Connor to focus on the structural frame of leadership and be
inattentive to the other frames as how MAST fit into the district’s mission, strategic plan,
or goals was not discussed with stakeholders.

Communication between Local Stakeholders
The lack of attention to areas outside of the structural framework also manifested
itself in ineffective communication and contradictory messages showing ineffective
leadership in the interpersonal and relational aspects of leadership as well. Inattention to
the human resource and symbolic frames and a lack of clear and consistent
communication that focused on the benefits of MAST from the teachers’ perspective
permeated implementation. Teachers wanted to participate in the professional
development aspects of MAST, and were even receptive to the goal setting component if
it tied into the goals the district already established through its strategic plan. However,
much of the superintendent’s communication with stakeholders related to the
accountability portions of MAST and failed to take into account the perspective of the
teachers. The perspective Dr. O’Connor promotes was his own which was aligned with
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that of the Governor, Legislature, and CSDE but was not shared by the Cotton Grove
teachers.
Teachers in Cotton Grove felt like they were doing a good job, but could do better
if more professional development opportunities were provided that would allow them to
use what they had learned in the classroom. Teachers were not receptive to changing the
salary schedule or adding additional accountability measures; however, teachers may
have accepted these components as the cost of having access to job-embedded
professional development, if the focus of MAST as communicated to stakeholders was
professional development rather than increased accountability.
Within the district, participants cited a lack of trust and communication as key
reasons why the initiative failed. However, participants had contrasting views about what
the trust issues were, thus reinforcing the belief that ineffective communication per se
was also an issue. As mentioned earlier, Dr. O’Connor believed that his own leadership,
as well as poor leadership on the part of one of the middle school principals, was the
instrumental to the failure of MAST implementation at Cotton Grove. Charlie Jones also
saw trust and communication as issues, although he attributed these issues to a different
source.
At the high school we had many meetings and were well informed. I think the
elementary teachers got different information and weren’t as comfortable with it.
There was fear that teachers would be pitted against each other and it would be
more competitive versus looking at achievement at the student level. There was
fear on the teachers’ part that we wouldn’t get as much of a raise if we got MAST
money. The board said it was two separate issues. I’m not sure that the elementary

Pay-for-Performance Page 242 of 299
[schools] got that information (C. Jones, personal communication, September 29,
2009).
The fact that different participants attributed trust and communication issues to different
sources, gave further credence to their belief that trust and communication were issues at
the time of the MAST discussion.
Finally, another reason that teachers at Cotton Grove may have considered the
focus of MAST to be pay-for-performance intended to undermine the union’s legitimacy
was how Dr. O’Connor presented MAST when he did communicate about it as evidenced
by his retrospective view of the most important component of MAST.
Being able to pay for performance [was the most important part of MAST]. What
I mean by that in particular is being able to recognize financially the staff
members who are change agents. Putting themselves out there being leaders and
being competent and beyond with their peers. Also, focus on professional growth
and development. It’s the “good to great” mentality. We’ve never reached
perfection. We need to keep improving toward it. This was not a component of
ours, but I would have found site goal-setting very helpful so that there is a
common purpose within the building (J. O’Connor, personal communication,
October 1, 2009).

I think teachers tend to be more skeptical. There needs to be a way to answer that
skepticism. One question is whether [MAST] would truly result in teacher
professional development. At least here that was the enticement, but I don’t think
necessarily there was real belief in that because [the teachers] thought it was
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something other than that. They thought it was something else in terms of
evaluation processes (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009).

I have noted that Dr. O’Connor’s deficiencies at the time, particularly in regard to
the symbolic aspects of his job, had a lot to do with MAST’s fate in Cotton Grove. This
was true, but the problem was deeper than that. Dr. O’Connor was completely unable to
promote the goals of MAST beyond those of the neoconservative supporters of MAST in
the Legislature and sympathetic district board members. Thus the Cotton Grove teachers’
union’s negative vote on MAST may have been a result of the focus on accountability
and pay-for-performance aspects of MAST promoted both by Dr. O’Connor and CSDE
in addition to the key leadership issues at the time as much as it was simply due to his
inattention to MAST. Perhaps rather than simply the expression of one school’s
disenfranchisement with its principal, the key block of “no” votes additionally reflected
unstated “extra” premises attached to the MAST proposal. It was also possible that if Dr.
O’Connor did actively promote MAST within the district based on his view of its
important components and not on the teachers’ view of its important components, MAST
would have failed by a larger margin.

Communication between CSDE and Cotton Grove
Teachers at Cotton Grove did not want to spend the time necessary to develop and
implement a MAST plan only to have the funding go away and have the program cease in
a couple of years, so they also questioned the longevity of the program. They wanted to
know, “How long is the state going to fund it and what happens when the money goes
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away? What happens when the money runs out? Can the district afford to keep it going?”
(C. Jones, personal communication, September 29, 2009).
The district’s business manager, Susan Barnes, also saw trust issues with the state
in terms of long-term funding of MAST and shifting costs of the program to local
districts through a property tax levy.
On the financial side, I would like it if none of the money was from local levy.
Personally, I think it was a hidden part of the program where the first year it
seemed like “here’s this great new program and this money,” but the second year
part of it became local levy. State taxes come from local taxpayers too, but when
we’re trying to pass local levies, it gets harder. When you tack on the MAST part,
the impact on local taxpayers is small, but when you’re trying to build, it’s hard. I
try to keep a close eye on the local levy impact…I don’t think that would change
implementation. Teachers really don’t care about that. That’s more of a board
concern. It’s a district choice. Districts can choose to take less revenue by just
taking the state aid portion and not participating in the local levy. The school
board could decide to do that. I don’t see that the local levy would stop
implementation, because the school board can decide whether or not to do that (S.
Barnes, personal communication, October 16, 2008).
Barnes’ sensitivity to the tax impact was likely colored by the district’s inability to pass
operating levies for the past few years.
Barnes, also saw CSDE’s scrutiny of plans in regard to altering or eliminating the
traditional salary schedule as an issue. Cotton Grove had to determine how to restructure
the traditional compensation grid to the extent CSDE would require it to be reformed.
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Now the state is looking at plans more closely. It’s not that [CSDE was] passing
them easily before, but now they are scrutinizing [MAST plans] more closely to
see if they are aligned with what the Governor wants. There is also a question
about ongoing funding. We didn’t get far enough into it, but blending the old
contract with the new MAST requirements and having teachers trust it could be
an issue (S. Barnes, personal communication, October 16, 2008).

If it is intended to be a restructuring overhaul of the step and lane schedule, that’s
not going to fly here…We have a very strong union in that regard, and a very
strong desire to maintain the status quo in that regard. I think that [MAST] would
certainly allow for people to see it as I think it could be intended—to be a huge
boost to professional development. If that were the case, I think people would be
more apt to adopt it, but it’s been touted as pay for performance, and it can’t lose
that negative connotation. It can’t lose that connotation unless the structure
changes. (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009).

The time period that Cotton Grove attempted to implement MAST was during the
time period that participants from Pine Springs and Winter Valley in addition to Cotton
Grove reported CSDE was more critical of approving MAST plans (J. Frodo, personal
communication, October 16, 2009; B. Greene, personal communication, October 1,
2009). This was also after CSDE won the lawsuit over their definition of “reform”
(Findlaw, 2007). This likely enabled CSDE to push toward more closely adhering to the
Governor’s vision of MAST.
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There were also issues of trust with the Legislature and CSDE in terms of MAST
itself and whether a hidden agenda existed with the program implementation.
I think not being tied to a particular political agenda would make it [MAST]
better. I also think a different resource structure [would help too]. I mean if it
were to be funded differently. For our district that would make it an easier sell.
There would need to be a level of commitment outside of the Governor for people
to be willing to do it. There are a lot of people who think this is the Governor’s
baby and it will only be around as long as the Governor is around. I think it needs
more champions (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009).
Jack Sutton’s thought that MAST was something other than what it purported to be
seemed to be accurate; however, despite the departure of Governor King, MAST was still
in statute at the time of this research. This was possibly due to the Republican controlled
House and Senate, although increasingly more Democrats were embracing performancebased pay for teachers.

Crying over Spilled Milk: Remorse over the MAST Vote
Despite the “no” vote for MAST, the majority of stakeholders in Cotton Grove
were disappointed that MAST would not be implemented. In addition to the post-vote
finger pointing about which people were responsible for voting it down, there was a real
sense of loss about the extra money that would have been used to pay teachers, especially
during the economic downturn and limited school funding facing districts in Central State
at the time of this research.
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I say that knowing what was coming to a certain extent —not knowing the extent
of what we’re in now that we’re in it. [In hindsight] we were foolish not do it
[implement MAST]. Now we don’t have that funding source. We’re missing out
on that money, and we can’t do some of the things we would like to do. We
continue to do the mentor program that was going to be expanded with MAST,
but we don’t do it to the level that we did even before MAST. We’ve had to scale
that back due to budget cuts, so every teacher doesn’t get their own mentor. Some
teachers share a mentor—like two teachers have one mentor. Collaborative teams
have been reduced because of budget cuts as well, but we still have them to some
extent. There are only a few that have collaborative time any more. Each year
there gets to be less and less (J Sutton, personal communication, October 1,
2009).

Although some teachers were distrustful of the MAST program, they still felt the
pain of losing the MAST funding.
[With MAST] Teachers would be able to collaborate with teachers and be
compensated for the extra work they were doing. The district and teachers felt it
would promote the mentor program and other programs we think are beneficial.
There would also be more money for collaboration. The district still supports
collaboration through Professional Learning Communities (PLCs), but they’ve
dropped off in the last couple of years. They’re not as prevalent as they were a
few years ago. Also, the high school has dropped all MAP [Measures of
Academic Progress standardized] testing, except for special ed[ucation]. The
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middle school still uses it to show progress. I wish we still had it. It was really
valuable, but times are tight and you know about cuts (C. Jones, personal
communication, September 29, 2009.

MAST’s Long-Term Prospects in Cotton Grove
Despite regrets about missing the funding at the time of this research, Cotton
Grove had no plans to resume talks about MAST. In these tough economic times school
board members were reluctant to levy an additional tax on taxpayers in order to fund the
local portion of MAST. “We recently had trouble getting our school board to support a $5
[per student] lease levy. You know, it was a really small amount, and we had trouble
getting them to support that” (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009).
There were also significant issues about trust within the district and between the district
and the state government that served as barriers to resuming the discussion about MAST.
They [administrators] need to convince the teachers that it’s [MAST] a good thing
or have other policies in place that it can’t have anything to do with negotiations.
Negotiations and MAST have to be two separate things. One thing I really liked
was the open-endedness of it. Each district could have their [sic] own plan (C.
Jones, personal communication, September 29, 2009).

Once the Cotton Grove teachers’ union rejected its MAST proposal, the district
experienced a number of challenges. In 2008 Dr. O’Connor left Cotton Grove; however,
much of his legacy remained, but not all of what was good. Since his departure, the
district faced an inability to pass building bonds and operating levies that led to
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overcrowded schools, larger class sizes, and devastating cuts to its flagship
environmental education program, including forfeiture of a $500,000 environmental
learning grant.
Also, many members of the district office staff hired during Dr. O’Connor’s
tenure left—some voluntarily and some because the positions created during Dr.
O’Connor’s tenure were eliminated due to the district’s need to reduce its budget.
Mirroring the recent turbulence within the district, the district’s mission statement also
changed. The new mission statement for the district was, “Our mission is to educate all
learners to reach their full potential as contributing, productive community members of
an ever-changing world. We are innovative, environmentally focused, and wise stewards
of our resources” (Cotton Grove Public School District, 2009). According to Jack Sutton
(School Principal) the new mission statement was intentionally more focused and easier
to connect to the district’s recent difficult times.
We’ve shortened it considerably. We now have a one-page document. We had a
different consultant come in, and I think its better. It’s much more succinct than
our previous one, but it wasn’t the one that was in place when we explored
MAST. The core values included in the district’s new mission statement include
partnership, innovation, respect, wise stewardship, accountability, and striving for
excellence (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009).

Charlie Jones reported that the district’s core values were updated to incorporate
the following components that were reflective of the district’s difficult financial situation.
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There’s a commitment to rigor, and environmentalism is very important here. The
district also tries to maintain diversity in choices of courses while maintaining
class sizes of 23 or more. There is a policy in place now that says you have to
have 23 students in your class, otherwise the class is cancelled. There is no
maximum [number of students allowed in a class] (C. Jones, personal
communication, September 29, 2009).
Interestingly, this was the first time I had ever heard of an organization change its
mission and vision statements to reflect its poor financial situation.
As Central State’s finances deteriorated and its Legislature shifted education
financing due in the current year to being paid in a future year and withheld aid payments
to districts in order to preserve its own cash flow, districts in Central State felt the pinch.
With most teacher unions settling for modest pay increases or no increase at all, it did not
appear to be enough of an incentive for Cotton Grove teachers to consider MAST
implementation again.
We aren’t having to borrow money for cash flow needs at this point yet, but we
aren’t able to invest as much. The tighter that gets, the more we should have in
fund balance to help us through those tight cash flow times. And that’s tough
because how are we supposed to do that with no money? We shared that
information with the union, but I’m not sure there’s a mutual concern or
understanding of that. The district always says that, so the union doesn’t
understand why it’s different now (S. Barnes, personal communication, October
1, 2009).
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Despite the lack of any conversation about MAST for three years at Cotton
Grove, at least some would not be surprised if the depressed economic situation of the
district caused the subject to be revisited. However, there was a general feeling among
the participants in the district that MAST did not have a realistic shot at being
implemented in Cotton Grove any time soon.
I haven’t heard it mentioned at all since the vote. I don’t know if either side is
bringing it up because I haven’t heard anything. At the same time, I wouldn’t be
surprised if [MAST exploration resurfaced] because that’s the only money out
there. If teachers want new money, it’s the only way to get it right now. That’s
why I think we should have jumped on board when we had the chance. I didn’t
foresee the extent of the economic downturn, but it was a pot of money we could
have had access to (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009).

When interviewed in 2008, Barnes reported that she and the new superintendent
were in fact talking about reviving the MAST discussion in the district; however, in a
year, that conversation had not gained momentum.
I think [MAST] might spark a conversation after negotiations. Last time they
discussed it in between—in the year in between negotiations. I could see that
happening here. It depends on how negotiations go. I think if it’s brought back up
again because of the economic times, I think the board will be very sensitive to
local taxpayers. Last time the board was going to try to access all of the dollars.
This time I think they’d just access the state dollars to be conscious of the
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economic times and the local taxpayers while still supporting MAST (S. Barnes,
personal communication, October 1, 2009).

Right now CGEA feels [MAST is] a dead issue. If it happened again there would
need to be better communication with teachers. We would need to meet to find
out what went wrong last time and fix it before moving forward again (C. Jones,
personal communication, September 29, 2009).

Blue Lake

District Background
Blue Lake was a regional center comprised of typical working class families.
Tourism was the most notable industry in Blue Lake, although there were numerous
varied manufacturing-type businesses as well. Blue Lake was represented by both a
Republican congressman and a Republican senator in the state Legislature. Its school
district was one of the largest employers in the city, and enrolled approximately 3,800
students (CSDE, 2009b).
Despite spending less than the state average, Blue Lake had a declining general
fund balance at the time of this study (CSDE, 2009b). The average school district
property tax on homes in Blue Lake was $421 (CSDE, 2009b). However, the industrial
base helped offset Blue Lake’s low revenue generated from residential property taxes.
While the district was participating in MAST, it also received an additional $260 per
student (CSDE, 2009b). Blue Lake adopted and implemented MAST in the summer of
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2005, but abandoned the program prior to the start of the 2006-2007 school year due to
an inability to reach an agreement with its teachers’ union and CSDE on a reformed
teacher salary schedule. Blue Lake students scored as making adequate yearly progress
on the NCLB goals in five of the past seven years, ranking second of the districts that
participated in this study, just behind Winter Valley (CSDE, 2009a).
The Blue Lake School District had a strong set of core values that it used to guide
district decision-making. These values included acting ethically, respecting diversity,
preparing learners, developing students’ leadership and problem-solving skills, and being
accountable as a district.
According to Blue Lake Superintendent Ben Adams (personal communication,
September 23, 2008), Blue Lake also worked toward annual goals to focus its decisionmaking. The district’s 2008-09 strategic goals included increasing student literacy,
improving district infrastructure, and improving communications and access.

Local Leadership
At the time of this research, Dr. Ben Adams had been with the Blue Lake School
District for 22 years. At the time Blue Lake adopted MAST, he was the assistant
superintendent, but worked with local stakeholders to implement MAST. He became the
superintendent of the Blue Lake School District in 2006, at which time the Blue Lake’s
teachers’ union voted to discontinue the MAST program. He remained the superintendent
at Blue Lake for the duration of this research.
Dr. Adams did not appear to be emotionally or intellectually attached to MAST,
but rather seemed indifferent to it during both interviews. This could have been because
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of the costs to the district associated with MAST in terms of administering the program
and the amount of his time that was devoted to that administration during the year Blue
Lake implemented MAST as well as the two years that had passed since Blue Lake
teachers voted to discontinue MAST. Additionally, although Dr. Adams spoke mostly
about MAST in terms of professional development and student achievement, he also
referred to it as a “pay-for-performance” program on occasion. However, Dr. Adams’
comments regarding the pay-for-performance aspects of MAST were much more
subdued than those of Dr. O’Connor at Cotton Grove. It appeared that Dr. Adams was
largely able to translate the neoconservative MAST rhetoric promoted at the state level
into language that was accepted locally; however, local teachers may have just not been
willing to dramatically change their compensation method.
Trust and collaboration were key leadership elements that helped secure the local
approval of the initial MAST plan. This was similar to the experiences of Pine Springs
and Winter Valley. That Dr. Adams was able to develop the level of trust and
collaboration necessary to lead the district through its rapid application and
implementation process, showed his strength in the relational and interpersonal aspects of
leadership as well as his ability to operate successfully in the human resource and
political frames. That Blue Lake teachers did not approve the MAST plan with a
reformed salary schedule was probably more of a reflection of that particular component
of MAST rather than a reflection of Dr. Adam’s leadership.
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Education Reform Hash
Like the other districts that implemented MAST, Blue Lake did not implement
MAST in isolation. As part of its job-embedded professional development, Blue Lake
also implemented several other initiatives promoted as tools to increase student
achievement.
While we were working on MAST, we were also trying to start a lot of other
things. We did SMART goal setting, lesson study, tuning protocol, common
assessments, Marzano’s instructional strategies, Understanding by Design,
literacy training, differentiated instruction, at-risk programming, inquiry based
science, and understanding and using student standardized test data in instruction.
I think that’s all of them. (A. Mason, personal communication, October 5, 2011).
With all of these initiatives being implemented at approximately the same time, it was
extremely difficult to determine what impact, if any, any one initiative had on student
achievement as was true with the other case districts that implemented MAST.

MAST Plan
Amy Mason was a teacher in the Blue Lake district at the time of its MAST
implementation, but was working at CSDE at the time of this research. She shared the
components of Blue Lake’s MAST plan. That plan had all of the required components
similarly to the other case districts with the exception of a reformed salary schedule. Blue
Lake’s MAST application included career ladders, job-embedded professional
development, a comprehensive evaluation system, and alternative teacher compensation
that linked 40% of the MAST-funded compensation to individual teachers’ students’
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assessment performance and 60% to school board approved site goals. These items were
already in place when Blue Lake submitted its application to CSDE. According to CSDE,
an alternative teacher compensation schedule for the non-MAST funded teacher
compensation was also a required part of the application; however, in order to get more
school districts involved with the MAST program quickly, Blue Lake was allowed to
begin its participation in MAST without this aspect completed with the understanding
that the district would develop and implement this portion prior to the following school
year (A. Mason, personal communication, October 5, 2011).
Otherwise, Blue Lake’s MAST plan was much like those of the other case
districts that implemented MAST. Its career ladder included the following five rungs:
resource teacher, career teacher, site leader, instructional assessment coach, and mentor
coordinator. All of these positions included an additional stipend with the exception of
resource teachers (A. Mason, personal communication, October 5, 2011).
The comprehensive evaluation plan involved rubrics aligned with Central State’s
standards of effective practices and course content assessments, and everyone that
participated in MAST had to develop and follow an individual growth plan (A. Mason,
personal communication, October 5, 2011). In order to be able to do this, Blue Lake
principals, peer coaches, and teachers were trained in coaching and developing and using
instructional frameworks (A. Mason, personal communication, October 5, 2011).
Performance pay compensation was awarded with 40% of the MAST dollars
being awarded based on individual teachers’ instructional assessments and 60% based on
school board approved school site goals. The alternative teacher professional pay
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schedule was not in place at the time Blue Lake began the MAST program, but there was
a provision for it in the district’s MAST application.
Blue Lake planned to implement an alternative teacher professional pay schedule
that included expanded use of learning resource teachers, leadership pay
opportunities, revised responsibility pay, teacher board certified awards, and a
modified salary schedule. Blue Lake didn’t have this in place, but it is common
for districts to have their applications approved without having all of the
components in place…Blue Lake did have a memorandum of understanding
covering all of the components mentioned above with the exception of the
modified salary schedule. In their MAST application, Blue Lake stated that this
would be in place by July 1, 2006 (A. Mason, personal communication, October
5, 2011).
With CSDE’s insistence on districts radically changing their traditional step and lane
salary schedule, it seemed strange that Blue Lake’s MAST plan would be approved with
essentially a promissory note in this area. However, that CSDE regularly approved
MAST plans without having all of the components in place seemed to be accurate based
on the experiences of Pine Springs and Winter Valley. This practice could have also
fueled the rumors that CSDE approved plans on a partisan basis.

MAST Implementation
For Blue Lake, like the other case districts, money was an important consideration
in pursuing MAST, especially since the district had some of the required components
already in place.
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There was a twofold opportunity for implementing MAST. Money was a strong
consideration. We had a number of things already in place for MAST—building
goals, teacher goals, collaboration, and a targeted professional development
program that we could build upon. We were heavily into peer coaches already (B.
Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008).
Having at least some of the required MAST components already in place seemed to be an
incentive for districts to pursue MAST, probably because this was perceived to make
implementation easier and teachers could receive compensation for something that they
were already doing for free.
At Blue Lake, as with the other districts studied that implemented MAST, there
was a collaborative effort between teachers, administrators, and the school board. This
was necessary for implementation as Blue Lake experienced a challenging time frame to
put a plan together in order to be accepted by CSDE for implementation at the beginning
of the following school year.
There was a tight time frame between [teacher contract] negotiations and the
MAST deadline so MAST became part of [teacher contract] negotiations. This
was from July to September. There was a strong relationship between the [union]
and administration, and we worked collaboratively (B. Adams, personal
communication, September 23, 2008).

As Blue Lake progressed through its year of MAST, it found that teachers
improved their ability to set and work toward goals as site-based teams.
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We got better at building individual and site goals. We learned a lot about
creating goals that were measurable. We didn’t realize at the beginning it would
be so difficult to develop measurable goals (B. Adams, personal communication,
September 23, 2008).
That implementing the MAST components was more difficult than expected was also a
common experience among the districts that had implemented MAST.
Like the other districts that implemented MAST, Blue Lake found that as a result
of implementation, collaboration between teachers improved, as well as their ability to
effectively use data. According to John Murphy, Blue Lake Business Manager (personal
communication, December 10, 2009), “It gave the teachers more insight on how to
improve their instruction, which in turn would improve academic achievement.”
Dr. Adams also echoed this sentiment.
Since implementing MAST, we’ve improved at developing building goals using
data and tying professional development goals to building goals. We are much
better at collaboration and teamwork for instructional purposes…Our building
goals were more measurable, our staff development is tied to building goals;
individual goals are tied to professional evaluations. We have teacher leadership
and building leadership teams focused on how we get better at what we do.
Teachers work with principals on building goals; communication; and in some
cases, hiring. We feel good about our peer coaches and the support they provide.
(B. Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008).
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Two factors affecting the continuation of MAST in Blue Lake included the
requirement of a super-majority vote to continue MAST and employee turnover in key
leadership areas. Blue Lake’s teacher’s union required 70% of union members to vote in
favor of changing the salary schedule and continuing the MAST program. Like in Cotton
Grove, the majority of Blue Lake’s teachers voted in favor of the MAST plan, but the
majority was not large enough for MAST to pass. In addition to needing a super-majority
vote, there was staff turnover in the union leadership and in the superintendent and
assistant superintendent positions areas that impacted continued MAST implementation
at Blue Lake.
We had to get an alternative salary schedule by the state’s timeframe. Maybe by
spring of 2007 we had to start getting it done. We had new union and district
leadership. We got together over two days to put together a plan. We shored up
areas that needed improvement in our first plan, including the alternative salary
schedule and less paperwork. We needed a 70% majority for passing the plan.
The plan passed 55%-45%, but didn’t pass by 70%, so it failed… If we had
completed the salary schedule up front, there’s a chance MAST could have
survived in our district (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23,
2008).
However, there was also the possibility that the Blue Lake teachers were simply not
supportive of the idea of the reformed salary schedule to the extent CSDE required.
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Communication between CSDE and Blue Lake
As with most of the other case districts, Blue Lake experienced confusion and
frustration related to CSDE over-stepping its bounds regarding the components of
MAST, especially as it related to the salary schedule, the timing of its implementation,
and MAST bureaucracy.

Salary schedule bypass and roadblock.
The collaborative effort between administrators and teachers enabled Blue Lake
to put together a MAST plan that was tentatively approved by CSDE in the fall of 2005.
However, the plan was not complete, because it did not address the teachers’ salary
schedule at all. Blue Lake, like other districts, struggled with the newness of MAST that
resulted in a lack of models to draw from, and a lack of expertise on the part of CSDE
staff. This was problematic because the district relied upon CSDE staff for assistance in
developing its MAST plan.
We came together as a district to begin implementation and developing our plan.
We were meeting frequently to resolve challenges. We got better at using data at
the district and the building level because of our MAST experience…Barriers
included the fast track with the October MAST deadline. The Central State
Department of Education was implementing the program as they were designing
it, so it was difficult to get consistent answers from them. The district’s MAST
program was tentatively approved without an alternative salary schedule.
Ultimately this became a barrier (B. Adams, personal communication, September
23, 2008).
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Had CSDE been able to properly train its employees in MAST prior to its implementation
in local school districts, the inconsistent answers to district questions about MAST could
have been avoided. However, this would not have addressed CSDE’s insistence on
eliminating step and lane compensation from the teachers’ salary schedule.
When participants were asked what would have made MAST implementation
better at Blue Lake, the idea of having a clearer idea at the state level of what MAST was
and what plans needed to have in order to be approved and successful, as well as
accepting only completed plans for approval, were common themes.
I wish we would have been asked to meet the criteria of the alternative salary
schedule up front. I’m not sure that our starting point would have been different.
The timeframe was too tight. CSDE should have put their plan together for
another year first because of the inconsistent messages they were sending us…If
there was a consistent message from CSDE, we wouldn’t have had to backtrack as
we were designing the plan (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23,
2008).
This frustration was common on the part of all case districts.
Still, because it was not clear that teachers would have signed on for the “pay-forperformance” overtones of MAST, if CSDE had required Blue Lake to reform its
teachers’ salary schedule prior to approval, the MAST vote might not have been
different. However, if CSDE had required the salary schedule to be reformed prior to
approving Blue Lake’s MAST plan, it would have saved Blue Lake a lot of time and
energy on a one-year program. That said, the district improved its professional
development practices due to its MAST planning and implementation. This is an area of
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district activity that Blue Lake kept in place as much as possible through the duration of
this research.
Because MAST was not gaining popularity as the Governor predicted, CSDE was
under pressure to work with districts to get them participating in MAST so that the
Governor’s cornerstone education program would not be viewed as a major failure. Since
Blue Lake was a regional center and showed early interest in MAST, CSDE worked hard
to ensure that Blue Lake was added to the short list of districts participating in MAST.
CSDE even waived the deadline for a complete proposal in order to get Blue Lake to
participate that first year of MAST (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23,
2008).
Interestingly, while Blue Lake was participating in MAST, it was listed as one of
the districts that had implemented MAST on every CSDE press release about the
program, and Blue Lake’s MAST plan was included on CSDE’s website. However, after
Blue Lake discontinued MAST, its name was removed from the press releases, its plan
removed from CSDE’s website, and all press releases regarding Blue Lake’s adoption of
MAST removed from the public CSDE archive. These items were still available by
request through CSDE; however, the first two times I asked for these documents, my
request was denied. On the third try they were only provided reluctantly after I reminded
the CSDE employee that they were public documents. It seemed as though CSDE was
trying to erase Blue Lake’s brief participation in MAST from the public consciousness.
This could have been another attempt at mystification of other school districts and the
public on the part of CSDE by giving the illusion that all of the districts with approved
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MAST plans were still successfully implementing them, thus inflating the perception of
MAST as a successful program.

The bureaucratic traffic jam.
Blue Lake, like the other districts studied, found that the MAST paperwork was
burdensome, and the initial implementation process was daunting.
In our first round with MAST, there was too much paperwork. It was a
frustration. We were more focused on doing paperwork than talking about
coaching (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008).
Dr. Adams and Mr. Murphy both felt that the reporting requirements with MAST
negatively impacted the time Blue Lake had to actually implement MAST and its focus
on improving teaching and learning. This was similar to the experiences of Pine Springs
and Winter Valley as well.
Amy Mason concurred. She attempted to email me a PDF file of Blue Lake’s
original MAST application; however, the file was too big. She had to divide the
document into three sections and email each section separately (personal communication,
October 5, 2011). Upon reading the documents, I found them to be tedious and repetitive
and that the same or very similar information appeared in multiple sections on the
application.

MAST through the Rearview Mirror
The vote to discontinue MAST was a surprise and disappointment to many of the
Blue Lake stakeholders because for the most part they were finding its professional
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development qualities helpful. But, the district still had an obligation to its students, so
life at Blue Lake moved on.
There was disappointment from the school board because they believed in payfor-performance and put a lot of time into it. There was initial surprise and
limited emotion, and then we got back to the business of getting better at what we
do. We felt good about our plan, but support wasn’t there (B. Adams, personal
communication, September 23, 2008).

John Murphy believed that MAST was successful the year it was implemented,
but that issues related to the requirement of reforming the salary schedule caused the
collapse of MAST at Blue Lake.
[MAST] maybe was successful for a very short time and then for whatever
reason, they abandoned it…The inability to agree on an alternative salary
schedule was ultimately the major cause of the downfall of MAST in Blue Lake.
We would still have it if the teachers hadn’t voted it out…It would have been
helpful to have the salary schedule revised at the forefront instead of trying to
revise it after we got going. That was a real challenge. It was perceived that there
was a lot of work on the staff part because of the goals and that. Staff is still doing
that, but now they’re just not getting compensated for it (J. Murphy, personal
communication, December 10, 2009).
It seemed that in Blue Lake, the professional development components were successful
as they were in Pine Springs and Winter Valley. From participants’ descriptions of the
demise of MAST in Blue Lake, it seemed that if Blue Lake had received approval for the
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same salary schedule that was approved in Pine Springs that Blue Lake may well have
still been participating in MAST at the time of this research and CSDE would not have
had to mask its brief participation in MAST. However, that would not have done
anything to advance the Governor’s agenda regarding eliminating the traditional step and
lane salary schedule.
Without the continued availability of the MAST dollars, Blue Lake had to
prioritize its programming and make some decisions on how to fund the parts of the
MAST program the district wanted to keep. “We had to decide how to reallocate dollars
to continue these programs… It affects people because of pay. It took away some
professional development money” (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23,
2008). John Murphy (personal communication, December 10, 2009) echoed that
sentiment, “One of the successes was teachers having coaches to help them improve.
We’re no longer doing that part.”

A lesser factor, but still significant in the decision to discontinue MAST, was the
increasing shift of fiscal responsibility for the program from the state to local tax levy.
As we were leaving the program, a growing concern was the shift from state to
local funding. More veteran teachers were more wary of funding disappearing and
the shift of financially supporting the program becoming increasingly local (B.
Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008).
During the time of this research, Blue Lake passed a successful referendum to build a
new high school. Dr. Adam’s attention to the local taxpayer may have been an indication
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of his ability to view an issue from other perspectives and to successfully navigate the
political frame of leadership.
Since stopping MAST participation, Blue Lake continued many of the
components of MAST, but had to reallocate dollars to fund those initiatives.
Our building goals were more measurable, our staff development is tied to
building goals; individual goals are tied to professional evaluations. We have
teacher leadership and building leadership teams focused on how we get better at
what we do. Teachers work with principals on building goals; communication;
and in some cases, hiring. We feel good about our peer coaches and the support
they provide. We had to decide how to reallocate dollars to continue these
programs (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008).
One of those tough decisions was the decision to eliminate peer coaches due to a lack of
funding.

MAST’s Long-Term Prospects in Blue Lake
Blue Lake continued to operate an exemplary staff development program and
provided students with the best education it could within its means. Since dropping
MAST, there was no formal discussion of re-entering the program (B. Adams, personal
communication, October 16, 2009). At the time of this research, despite the trying
economic situation in which districts were immersed with the state delaying its payment
of a significant portion of districts’ budgetary allocations for a year, there was only a dim
chance that the conversation about MAST implementation would resurface (B. Adams,
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personal communication, October 16, 2009). However, some components of MAST
survived without the related funding.
There were things that were created like building leadership teams, our coaching
model, collaboration, and more attention given to data results and achievement. I
think those things have sustained themselves over that time (B. Adams, personal
communication, October 16, 2009).

Whether or not discussion about MAST would continue would likely depend
upon factors outside of the district. “I guess it [revisiting MAST] would all depend on
state finances. If it were the only way to get additional dollars—that may be the only
thing” (J. Murphy, personal communication, December 10, 2009).
The state finances continued to deteriorate, and Blue Lake experienced the
impact.
It [tax shift] will cause us to borrow and to use aid anticipation certificates to
cover cash flow. We’ll use a combination of borrowing and drawing on fund
balance to maintain cash flow. We’ll lose earned interest and spend more on
interest on borrowed dollars and use money from fund balance. It impacts the
bottom line on the budget (B. Adams, personal communication, October 15,
2009).

The funding freeze and tax shift were a part of the teacher negotiations picture, as
were state and district finances in every negotiation year.
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It’s part of the background information we use as we go through with
negotiations. It’s part of the economic times. That and the tax shift is all
information that is out there. We use the problem-solving model for negotiations.
It’s part of the understanding of what the lay of the land is and understanding the
data that’s out there. It’s part of understanding the economic landscape and
planning cycle we use to build the budget every year. We always do that and
that’s how we go through negotiations too (B. Adams, personal communication,
October 15, 2009).

Despite the rough economic times, the great majority of school districts in Central
State settled for at least a continuing contract at existing compensation levels with their
teachers’ unions. Very few districts were able to freeze teacher salaries completely. Blue
Lake was aligned with the majority of districts in not settling for a “hard freeze.”
We’re not going to have a hard freeze here, so we’re not in that scenario. I don’t
know if it [state and district economic climate] will spark renewed interest or not.
I don’t know if there’s an interest in it [MAST]. It has to originate out of teachers’
union. We’re prepared for that conversation from a school board point of view but
we don’t know if it’s going to come or not. There have been no formal
conversations about it since it was discontinued (B. Adams, personal
communication, October 15, 2009).
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Emerging Themes in Cotton Grove and Blue Lake

MAST Rhetoric
In both Cotton Grove and Blue Lake both superintendents referred to MAST as a
pay-for-performance model, although to a much greater extent in Cotton Grove during
their interviews. The external pay-for performance rhetoric was similar to what was
experienced in Pine Springs and Winter Valley with board members and community
members openly referring to MAST as a pay-for-performance plan. This external rhetoric
was similar all four case districts.
Dr. O’Connor seemed to be oblivious to how local teachers received the statelevel neoconservative pay-for-performance rhetoric. In Cotton Grove, where MAST was
not implemented at all, Dr. O’Connor consistently cited paying teachers based on their
performance as a key component of MAST. The pay-for-performance rhetoric use in
Cotton Grove could was understood by teachers to mean that Dr. O’Connor did not
believe that teachers were performing at a desired level. This interpretation led to a lack
of trust between teachers and Dr. O’Connor. However, Dr. O’Connor did not appear to
even realize that this was an issue; a clear failure of “taking the point of view of the
other.” That made symbolic leadership nearly impossible.
This was contrasted by Blue Lake where the administrators (at least Dr. Adams)
did not promote CSDE’s neoconservative line to the same extent. Dr. Adams only
mentioned MAST as a pay-for-performance program once while referring to what the
Blue Lake School Board liked about MAST and in one other instance. During interviews,
Dr. Adams seemed to be most pleased with the professional development aspects of
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MAST—the aspects Blue Lake did its best to maintain after it no longer received MAST
funding. This translation of the neo-conservative rhetoric likely aided MAST’s early
implementation in Blue Lake. Additionally, the district culture in Blue Lake seemed to be
more cohesive than that of Cotton Grove, possibly a result of the level of trust among
local stakeholders.
Both districts did implement professional development components of MAST.
Blue Lake implemented them formally through its one-year trial of MAST and retained
those that it could afford after it discontinued MAST. Cotton Grove implemented them
without MAST funding at all. During the time of this research, both districts saw modest
gains in their student achievement as measured by state-wide standardized testing.
Neither district implemented a reformed salary schedule. This added further evidence that
MAST’s pay-for-performance component most likely was not the driver of increased
student achievement.

CSDE
CSDE’s attempted manipulation of the legislation had a role in MAST
implementation in Blue Lake. Although district participants said that they might have still
had MAST at the time of this research if CSDE had required them to submit the salary
schedule up front, the District and the teachers’ union were unable to reach an agreement
on a reformed salary schedule in the year that followed their initial approval. I had a
difficult time believing that Blue Lake would have reached a salary schedule agreement if
it had a shorter time frame to do so. It seemed to me that Blue Lake would have been
more likely to keep MAST and develop a reformed salary schedule as a condition of
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keeping a high-quality professional development program. The “blame CSDE” response
could have been a result of continued social interactions with CSDE that led district
participants to view CSDE as bureaucratic, inefficient, and perhaps inept. Additionally,
blaming CSDE allowed the district stakeholders to maintain their cohesiveness by not
blaming each other. However, in Cotton Grove, the blame seemed to be directed at both
CSDE and local district stakeholders.
Although CSDE required Cotton Grove to revise their plan once before approving
it, in keeping with CSDE’s unofficial policy of requiring at least one revision, it did not
seem to upset any of the participants at Cotton Grove. They simply made the revisions,
all of which were minor, and re-submitted the plan. Similarly, Blue Lake had no major
concerns about the plan revisions. The major issue by far at Blue Lake was the
requirement of the reformed salary schedule.
However, all four case districts shared a concern, although to varying degrees,
that the funding and future of MAST was uncertain. Many pay-for-performance programs
before MAST had come and gone—largely due to a lack of funding and difficulty and
expense of administering the program. The concern about the longevity of MAST was
also voiced by participants in Cotton Grove and Blue Lake. Blue Lake also shared
concerns about the costs to administer the program that were not covered by MAST
funding. Cotton Grove participants did not list the administrative costs of MAST as a
concern. Perhaps since they had not implemented MAST, they were not fully aware of
this obstacle.
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Financial Persuasion
As in Pine Springs and Winter Valley, the financial incentive for MAST
participation was the benefit to teachers. Districts would have had money to pay teachers
more and provide job-embedded professional development, but would have incurred
costs to administer the program. In terms of providing high quality professional
development and empowering teachers, this may have been money well spent; however,
the teachers in these two districts did not buy into MAST.
Since Blue Lake was trying to pass a building bond and Cotton Grove was trying
to pass a building bond and operating levy, the increasing burden of MAST funding that
was shifted to local taxpayers, was a concern for both of these districts. If the teachers’
unions in these districts had chosen to pursue MAST again, it was unlikely that these
school districts would have accepted the local levy portion of MAST. This would have
placed the financial needs of the district ahead of the financial desires of the teachers and
left fewer dollars available for MAST compensation. As Central State shifted more of the
MAST funding burden to local taxpayers, it was likely that more districts would
discontinue MAST or at least stop accepting the local levy portion of MAST funding. If
MAST funding were to shift entirely to local taxpayers, increasingly districts would drop
MAST as they needed to pass bonds and operating levies to keep their districts
functioning.

The Importance of Trust
Trust among case district internal stakeholders and between the Cotton Grove and
Blue Lake districts and CSDE seemed to be important aspects of planning and
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implementing MAST successfully. The teachers’ unions of both school districts may
have been distrustful of CSDE, MAST, and to a varying extent, district leaders, which
may have spurred the requirement for more than a 50% plus one majority vote
requirement to approve MAST. The Blue Lake teachers’ union required a 70% vote to
pass MAST, and Cotton Grove required a 75% vote to pass MAST. Nothing in MAST
legislation established a level at which public schools were required to pass MAST. In
districts where perhaps the union leadership was more skeptical of MAST, the leadership
could have established a required percentage of “yes” votes that would have made MAST
adoption unlikely. Unions could have also misinterpreted the legislative language and
believed that a 70% “yes” vote was required for public school districts to participate in
MAST (This was only a requirement for charter schools at the time of this research). At
any rate, both districts had a majority of teachers who voted in favor of MAST, but did
not have the extra votes necessary to implement the program.
Likely because administrators in Blue Lake did not promote the neoconservative
components of MAST, but rather focused on the professional development aspects of the
program, trust amongst internal stakeholders was never raised as an issue, despite the
difficulty teachers’ union and district representatives had in settling the contract. The
trust issues in Blue Lake seemed to center around the “pay-for-performance” rhetoric and
the “reformed” salary schedule required by CSDE.
However, in Cotton Grove, a lack of trust and effective communication were
mentioned frequently by participants. At Cotton Grove there appeared to be strong
communication between the members of the MAST exploratory team, and all Cotton
Grove participants reported that all members of the exploratory team worked hard,
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worked well together, and that there was a culture of trust between them. However
participants pointed to a lack of time to effectively educate teachers about MAST to the
degree necessary to have at least 75% of union members vote “yes” on the district’s
MAST proposal. Additionally, Dr. O’Connor did not know that the Cotton Grove
teachers’ union required a 75% “yes” vote. Although if he was attending to MAST
effectively, he should have known, especially since Dr. O’Connor reported that he had
attended, but had just not led, all of the MAST meetings.
Being unable to effectively communicate with teachers about the benefits of
MAST for the Cotton Grove District raised issues of trust and questions about whether a
hidden agenda existed within the program. In Cotton Grove a lack of understanding about
the program raised fears that teachers would be more focused on competing with each
other for dollars than focusing on student achievement. There was also concern about
MAST dollars being used to replace regular salary increases. Study participants reported
feeling like they received correct and adequate information, but that they did not believe
that that information was disseminated thoroughly throughout the district, as participants
reported being uncertain that various groups received correct information about MAST. It
was also interesting to note that as participants reported on the group that did not receive
correct information, the group identified varied among participants.
In the Cotton Grove District the human resources director and the union president
went to individual schools to explain to teachers the MAST program the district hoped to
implement. Perhaps with a longer time frame between developing the plan and
implementation, there would have been more time to have multiple meetings with
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teachers so that development team representatives could have been able to answer more
questions and established a greater feeling of trust in regard to the MAST program.
Dr. O'Connor pointed to a lack of trust between one of the building principals and
the teachers in the school he led. His failure to address this trust issue prior to the MAST
vote allowed rumors about MAST to spread faster than the factual information about the
district’s MAST program. He also failed to acknowledge that his own hard-charging
rhetoric may have had anything to do with the failure of MAST implementation at Cotton
Grove. Had Dr. O’Connor been able to understand the political nature of MAST and lead
effectively from the human resource and political frames and leverage the relational,
interpersonal, and conceptual aspects of leadership regarding MAST, Cotton Grove may
have had a different result in its attempt to implement MAST.
Additionally, at the time of this research, the MAST discussion in both districts
was dead unless the teachers’ union in its respective district chose to pursue MAST
again. This position put the power of implementation squarely with the teachers’ unions.
This was most likely another unintended consequence of MAST, but rather than
dissolving or weakening teachers’ unions, MAST appeared to strengthen them as the
legislation clearly gave the local teachers’ unions the power to block MAST locally.

Leadership
At Blue Lake, the tight time frame between teacher negotiations and the deadline
to submit their MAST application was only a month and half, but the strong relationship
between the teachers union in the administration helped provide the collaborative
atmosphere necessary to mostly meet this deadline. The tight time frame did not allow
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Blue Lake enough time to tackle the toughest question about MAST implementation for
their district. The question about how to revise the salary schedule had not been answered
and ultimately became the main reason that MAST did not survive in Blue Lake. That
teachers did not favor adopting a reformed salary schedule as dictated by CSDE did not
appear to be a local leadership issue.
However, in Cotton Grove, lack of effective local leadership was one of the main
reasons MAST implementation failed. Dr. O'Connor also reported being out of the
communication loop as far as knowing a 75% vote would be required. He attributed this
to factors external to MAST. The district’s rapid growth and the need to focus on
facilities to accommodate the growth was an urgent district need at the time that
consumed much of Dr. O'Connor's time. As a result, he chose to delegate the task of
communicating the MAST plan to others, a decision, in hindsight, he wished he made
differently.
When Dr. O’Connor did communicate about the MAST program and potential
plan he overtly promoted the neoconservative pay-for-performance rhetoric used by
Governor King and CSDE. This was not well-received by teachers and showed a lack of
ability to be able to frame an issue from the point of view of the teachers, an important
leadership skill. This ineffective rhetoric combined with a general lack of oversight and
involvement with MAST led to Cotton Grove’s failure to implement MAST.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTHER
RESEARCH

Basic Findings
The five major findings as a result of this research were: (a) the financial
starvation of local school districts fostered a greater willingness to try new initiatives if
there was money attached to them; (b) MAST failed as a pre-fabricated solution to
improve student achievement by altering teacher compensation, but did prove to be a
promising professional development model; (c) CSDE attempted to manipulate the
MAST legislation to promote the Governor’s agenda regarding teacher compensation; (d)
the rhetoric used by CSDE regarding MAST shifted over time; and (e) local district
leadership was important to effective MAST implementation.
The first major finding was that the financial starvation of local school districts
fostered a greater willingness to try new initiatives if there was money attached to them.
When first introduced, the majority of school districts in Central State submitted to CSDE
a non-binding letter of intent to participate in MAST. However, most of those school
districts did not participate in MAST. With MAST there were additional unfunded costs
associated with the initiative. These were largely related to the administration of MAST.
These unfunded costs also likely had some influence on the number of school districts
that ultimately chose to participate in MAST. When already faced with mounting
financial pressures, allocating dollars out of the district general fund to administer an
additional program was not high on the priority list for local school district administrators
if the local teachers’ union was not interested in MAST participation.
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In addition to the unfunded costs, another financial barrier to implementing
MAST was that the $260 per student local school districts could gain through MAST was
not likely enough of an incentive for the majority of teachers’ unions in school districts in
Central State to abandon their traditional step and lane compensation model.
The second major finding was that the pay-for-performance legislation was aimed
at unions and at teachers as part of a pre-fabricated solution to the problem of inadequate
student achievement. Identifying the teachers and their unions as the “villains” who
caused the inadequate student achievement paved the way to create legislation designed
to undermine the power of teachers’ unions in collective bargaining and encourage poor
teachers to leave the profession. MAST was one example of this type of legislation.
However, it failed to undermine local teachers’ unions and its impact on student
achievement was inconclusive.
MAST did not appear to weaken local teachers’ unions. In fact, MAST legislation
essentially gave veto power to the teachers’ unions with regard to implementing MAST.
Without union support, at whatever level the local union leadership deemed appropriate,
districts were unable to proceed or continue with a MAST plan. In order for MAST to be
implemented in each district, teachers’ union approval of the local MAST
implementation plan was required by law.
Additionally no relationship could be established between how teachers were paid
and student achievement. All four case districts implemented at least some of the
professional development aspects of MAST and all four case districts saw increases in
student achievement at the time of this research. However, only one of the case districts,
Winter Valley, actually implemented the reformed salary schedule as envisioned by
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Governor King and administered by CSDE. Since Winter Valley’s increase in student
achievement was not substantially different from that of the other case districts, a
relationship between teachers’ compensation and student achievement could not be made.
MAST did show strong promise as an effective professional development model that may
have had some correlation to student achievement. However, this was an unintended
consequence that was seemingly unappreciated by the neoconservatives in Central State
Government and CSDE.
The third major finding was that CSDE attempted to manipulate the MAST
legislation to promote Governor King’s agenda regarding teacher compensation. As
MAST progressed through the Legislature, it was modified from the original version first
introduced. However, the legislative language was vague enough to allow for a variety of
interpretations, especially regarding the requirement to “reform” the traditional step and
lane salary schedule. CSDE’s interpretation of reform as meaning that the traditional step
and lane salary schedule needed to be eliminated was aligned with Governor King’s
initial vision. However, many local school districts construed “reform” to mean to
change, but not necessarily eliminate the step and lane compensation model.
These varied interpretations occurred amidst mixed messages from CSDE and
perceived incompetence on the part of CSDE employees by case district participants.
Participants in the case districts were angered and frustrated by CSDE imposing its own,
seemingly arbitrary requirements on MAST through the approval process, along with its
lack of consistency in the criteria it required for plan approval. From the perspective of
the case districts, CSDE’s enforcement of MAST requirements varied across local
districts. Additionally, as case district participants received varied answers to questions
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depending on which CSDE employee responded to the question, case district participants
tended to view CSDE employees’ administration of MAST as incompetent.
The fourth major finding was that the initial rhetoric that focused on MAST’s
pay-for-performance and reformation of the traditional step and lane salary schedule
aspects of MAST shifted to a focus on professional development. At first, CSDE’s and
Governor King’s rhetoric regarding MAST revolved around “pay-for-performance” and
“professionalizing” teacher pay by eliminating the traditional step and lane
compensation. CSDE and Governor King failed to realize how this hard-charging rhetoric
would the impact the decision to participate in MAST at the local level. The majority of
local teachers’ unions did not bite on the lure of $260 per student in additional
compensation to eliminate their traditional step and lane salary schedules. This
necessitated some type of rhetorical shift on the part of those promoting MAST.
The realization that MAST would not be implemented in most Central State
school districts with a focus on the “pay-for-performance” and “professionalizing”
teacher compensation components of MAST came too late to be effective. However,
CSDE and Governor King realized that school districts that participated in MAST found
that the professional development aspects of the program were well-received. CSDE and,
to a lesser extent, Governor King softened their rhetoric around pay-for-performance and
professionalizing teacher compensation and switched the focus of their rhetoric to MAST
as an effective professional development model.
Finally, the fifth major finding was that district leadership was important to
effective implementation of MAST. As district leaders attended to the many issues that
demanded their attention, they needed to pay attention to all four leadership frames as
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discussed by Bolman & Deal (2008) and all aspects of leadership as presented by
Northouse (2009). The human resource and political frames and the relational,
interpersonal, and cultural aspects of leadership as well as the ability to “construct the
political spectacle” differently that how it was promoted at the state level seemed to be
the most critical leadership areas for successful MAST implementation. If MAST was
important to the district, leaders needed to attend to the initiative personally and from the
appropriate leadership frame in order to optimize the chances of MAST’s success in the
local school district.
Additionally, MAST rhetoric as it was used by local school district leaders was
also a factor. In the two districts that had active MAST programs at the conclusion of this
research, the reformed salary schedule and pay-for-performance aspects of MAST were
not the focus of the discussion, but rather the focus was on professional development.
This also appeared to be the case, at least initially, at Blue Lake. However, CSDE’s
requirement of a reformed salary schedule pushed the issue in that district, ultimately
leading to the demise of MAST in Blue Lake. In Cotton Grove where the
Superintendent’s rhetoric was almost exclusively about pay-for-performance, the District
lacked the trust necessary to approve MAST.

Suggestions for Further Research
The ideal typology used in this study focused on district size and type and
whether or not the district was implementing MAST at the time of this research. The
districts were not selected based on whether they were represented politically by
Democrats, Republicans, or another party, and three of the four districts were represented
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by Republican legislators. Given the accusations that CSDE had approved MAST plans
on a partisan basis, it would be interesting to study districts’ experiences with MAST
based on their legislative representation to explore this potential aspect of MAST
implementation.
Wirt et al. studied the impact of two states’ political histories and their impact on
education statutes. A similar study could be done comparing the pay-for-performance
teacher compensation programs between states. This research would serve to give greater
insight into how political differences between states impact the implementation of teacher
pay-for-performance initiatives.
This study only superficially touched on education reform history in Central State.
Additional research more thoroughly comparing MAST to other education policy in
Central State could reveal any commonalities or trends that may exist. One such policy
that may be of particular interest in this comparison is legislation that was recently passed
in Central State that had not yet gone into effect at the time of this research that would
require teachers’ compensation to be tied to performance evaluation rather than
longevity. Additionally MAST could be compared to other past education reforms that
have been seen as successful in Central State such as open enrollment or post-secondary
enrollment options, commonly referred to as PSEO.
This study focused largely on overall MAST implementation at the local level,
and case district participants reported the majority of individuals eligible for MAST
compensation in their district, received it. However, there were five major components to
MAST: (a) career ladder and career advancement opportunities, (b) job embedded
professional development, (c) performance-based pay, (d) comprehensive and objective
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teacher observations, and (e) an alternative professional compensation schedule.
Therefore, it may be beneficial to evaluate the specific components of MAST, especially
with regard to peer observations, administrator observations, and criteria for receiving
MAST compensation compared to the expectations of Central State legislators regarding
performance-based pay.
.
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